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". . . The new generation of military 
leaders has shown an increasing 
awareness that armies cannot only 
defend their countries—they can 
. . . help to build them."—Presi­
dent John F. Kennedy, March 13, 
1961. 
By the early 1960's, it had become clear, from the 
obvious threat posed by Castro's Cuba, that the cold 
war had entered the Western Hemisphere. The possi­
bility that constitutional democracies would be estab­
lished in the nations comprising the rest of Latin 
America had become increasingly remote as the 
armed forces of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, the Domini­
can Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, and 
Peru moved successfully to unseat, alter, or block 
altogether the civilian regimes of their respective 
countries. 
In the hope of averting other revolutions and in the 
face of further Communist infiltration of the hemi­
sphere, the United States government has pledged 
its economic policies to the principles of social 
reform in Latin America. It provided at the same 
time, the military assistance necessary for the 
strengthening of internal security forces as a means 
of achieving the political stability required to effect 
social reform and bring about economic progress in 
the face of rapid demographical, social, economic, 
and even ideological change. 
In adopting this policy, the United States has posed 
for itself a serious dilemma; for it finds itself com­
mitted to support of the very institutions in Latin 
America that, in the past, have so frequently been 
associated with the forces of reaction and dictator­
ship. Latin American military officers are trained by 
North Americans in the techniques of combating the 
guerrilla with no assurance that the skills learned 
will not be used in the cause of insurrection or that 
the officer so trained will successfully distinguish 
between the revolutionary guerrilla and the protestor 
of social injustice and oppression. 
(Continued on back flap) 
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Foreword

WE MIGHT WELL CONSIDER that United States relations 
with the other American republics can teach us about the 
problems encountered by a great power seeking its own 
brand of international peace and security through the 
modulated exercise of variegated influence. Within the 
inter-American system several styles of alliance behavior 
have been demonstrated; a rudimentary form of collec­
tive security has been operated. Meaningful implications 
for Western, Asian, and Near Eastern commitments are 
waiting to be drawn. When the United States plunged 
headlong into a world-wide program of economic and 
military assistance, years of experience with analogous 
measures in the Western Hemisphere had developed 
patterns of co-operation and, what is more important, 
structures of expectations concerning the results. 
How to attain political stability amidst rapid demo­
graphic, social, economic, and even ideological change 
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is the problem. What the United States can do to help 
whom in solving this problem is the question. For some 
time Latin America has been the testing ground. Latin 
American officers are trained by North Americans in how 
to combat the guerrilla—the instructors offering up a 
prayer that their pupils will find the new game more 
engrossing than the old one of "throw out the president," 
that they will not use learned techniques to aid the 
cause of insurrection, and, above all, that they will suc­
cessfully distinguish the revolutionary guerrilla (badly 
infected with alien ideology) from the protestor against 
injustice and oppression (a goodly agrarian reformer). 
It is at this point that a kindred United States policy 
enters, cloaked in the euphonious phrase "civic action," 
or how to put the military to use and get the deprived 
to love the uniform. That the policy is important no 
reader of the news from Vietnam can doubt. However, 
the Latin American test in the long run may be equally, 
if not more, significant. For in the Western Hemisphere 
we are attempting to discover whether a politically in­
fluential force in most of the countries can become, not 
the instrument for direct, United States intrusion, but 
the means for national self-help. And become so in time, 
before unrest turns to implanted, externally directed 
insurgency. If both tests cannot be passed, the United 
States may, within the next decade or before its Vietnam 
war is concluded, confront an equally unpleasant di­
lemma much closer to home. 
For a time "civic action" was hailed in official military 
and civilian circles as a quick-acting panacea. But most 
of the salutes were set off by those who either knew little 
about the other American republics or read only each 
other's reports. The significant contribution of the pres­
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ent study is to cut through the eulogies and self-serving 
justifications and uncover the complex reality under­
neath. The reader should expect to find the record dif­
ficult to generalize but very far from encouraging. In 
particular instances some home truths emerge starkly: 
recipients of largesse are insatiable; they find new ways 
to dislike their benefactors; the military does not take 
kindly, enthusiastically, or permanently to (lowly) non­
military activities; outside instigators make a shifty 
target and show a sneaky talent for profiting from 
programs seeking to eliminate them. 
The authors know what they are writing about. Exist­
ing, available evidence is painstakingly and objectively 
analyzed. Each brings impressive credentials to the 
undertaking. As Foreign Service Officer, Willard Barber 
served in many Latin American posts and in several 
State Department posts dealing with Latin American 
affairs. C. Neale Ronning, a political scientist, has also 
spent much time in Latin America—including a trip 
made specifically for purposes of this study—and has 
delved deeply into the sources and implications of po­
litical violence in a number of countries. A continuing 
focus of research by the Mershon Social Science Program 
in National Security is the United States position within 
the Western Hemisphere. Internal Security and Military 
Power is a central product of that research effort. 
EDGAR S. FURNISS, JR. 
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Chapter 1

Introduction 
In signing the Act of Bogota in 1960 and 
the Charter of the Alliance for Progress in 1961, the 
United States explicitly pledged its economic policies 
to the principles of social reform in Latin America. But 
the very condition that prompted the signing of these 
documents—the threat of social revolution—also coun­
seled the immediate strengthening of security forces 
within the Latin American countries. Here was a 
built-in dilemma. Strengthening the security forces 
within Latin America meant a strengthening of the 
armed forces—the very institutions that had often been 
associated with reaction and dictatorship. 
The frequency of illegal and unscheduled changes in 
Latin American chiefs of state during the nineteenth 
century was often the work of military coups, and in 
recent times military coups are still the cause of most 
of the illegal changes. In many cases civilians either 
supported the coups or were active participants. Ques­
tions that could always be asked were: "Which civil­
4 Internal Security and Military Power 
ians?" or "How many civilians?" It could also be asked, 
"Which military?" or "How many military?" For there 
are often divisions among the military as well as within 
the larger body politic, exemplified by recent military 
coups in Argentina, Brazil, and the Dominican Republic. 
Since 1930, the Western Hemisphere has witnessed, in ad­
dition to the assassination of President Kennedy in 1963, 
106 illegal and unscheduled changes. The number in­
cludes chiefs of state who were assassinated, committed 
suicide, or were forced from office. It does not include 
accidental or natural deaths. (The data are given in full 
in Appendix A.) To list the number of unsuccessful at­
tempts at assassination and coups d'etat would add 
greatly to this dismal statistic. It is Mexico's good for­
tune and honor to be the only country not on the list. 
Ecuador and Bolivia are cited eleven and ten times re­
spectively for their political changes during the thirty-
five years. 
There appeared to be at least one avenue for the 
resolution of the dilemma of security and reform: the 
reorientation of the Latin American armed forces. This 
meant, on the one hand, a stern policy of disapproval 
when the armed forces interfered with constitutional 
processes.1 On the other hand, it would mean exposing 
them in that portion of their professional training that 
they might receive in the United States, to a democratic 
atmosphere, including the concept of the supremacy of 
civilian authority in government. Furthermore, an effort 
would be made to channel the military's time and 
energies into economically useful activities. 
However one looked at it, the big question in the con­
frontation of the threat of social revolution in Latin 
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America would be the role of the military. The posture 
and the status of Latin American armed forces and their 
intervention in politics has been studied for many years 
by a wide variety of scholars. Recent works have ad­
vanced contradictory theses as to the visible trends-— 
that the military is becoming more professional- and 
less political-minded, or that there has been a resurgence 
of political interventions and take-overs on the part of 
the military leaders. 
In this study we shall investigate only one aspect of 
the role of the military in Latin America: their role in 
meeting the current threat of insurgency. In reference 
to this role we shall use the term counterinsurgency, and 
in analyzing it we shall give particular attention to the 
concepts and programs of civic action. The variety of 
meanings attributed to these terms in contemporary 
literature and in official usage suggests the need to offer 
the reader some "official definitions"—those used in the 
Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint 
Usage, issued on February 1, 1964, by the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff. 
In the voluminous military literature scanned by the 
authors, a veritable multiplicity of explanations, defi­
nitions, and illustrations of terms was encountered. In 
non-military publications, the usages were even more 
disparate. It is evident that the necessity for obtaining 
uniformity of nomenclature brought the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff to the decision to adopt a set of specific terms. Of 
course this did not mean that the interpretations of the 
definitions would become uniform and unambiguous. The 
definitions did not achieve this result among our own 
military services, much less in the Latin American armed 
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forces, and even less in the writings of North and South 
American civilians. 
"Military Civic Action"2 is defined as "the use of 
preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects 
useful to the local populations at all levels in such fields 
as education, training, public works, agriculture, trans­
portation, communications, health, sanitation, and others 
contributing to economic and social development, which 
would also serve to improve the standing of the military 
forces with the population. (United States forces may 
at times advise or engage in military civic actions in 
overseas areas.)" It will be noted that both long range 
and immediate or intermediate objectives are indicated 
in this definition: (a) economic and social development, 
and (b) to improve the standing of the military forces 
with the local population. This serves to emphasize a 
point that will become clearer as our discussion pro­
ceeds: although in Department of Defense doctrine, 
civic action is only a part or a technique of counterinsur­
gency, in practice it is at times treated as a program 
related to other objectives such as economic develop­
ment or improved civil-military relations. It is argued, 
of course, that the latter objectives have effects that are 
useful in countering subversion and insurgency. (It 
might be more accurately stated as "prevention of in­
surgency.") 
But economic development, or improving the image 
of the military, for example, may become ends in them­
selves. This helps to explain why we speak of counter­
insurgency and civic action, although by the official 
definitions, civic action is encompassed within counter­
insurgency. It might be observed, for example, that 
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officials of the United States Agency for International 
Development think of civic action in terms of projects 
that would contribute to economic development. State 
Department officers engaged in the same programs might 
well be thinking in terms of how the project on which 
they are engaged could divert military influence and 
activity from political intrigue, and influence the armed 
forces toward contributions to representative govern­
ment and constitutional practices. And simultaneously, 
as has been made clear, the United States military have 
the purpose of improving the standing of the local mili­
tary with the population. In the sense that economic 
development is a form of counterinsurgency (we repeat, 
it might be more properly phrased as "prevention of 
insurgency"), the larger part of United States policy in 
Latin America, including the Alliance for Progress, could 
be said to have this objective insofar as that policy is 
concerned with political stability and hemispheric secu­
rity. An attempt to synthesize these different objectives 
may be seen in the statement of U. S. National Objec­
tives Relating to Overseas Internal Defense, reproduced 
in Appendix B. This only emphasizes that the concept 
of counterinsurgency is in many minds as loose and 
confusing as that of "military civic action." 
"Subversion" is defined as "action designed to under­
mine the military, economic, psychological, morale, or 
political strength of a regime." "Insurgency" is defined 
as "a condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection 
against a constituted government, which falls short of 
civil war. In the current context, subversive insurgency 
is primarily communist inspired,3 supported, or ex­
ploited." "Counterinsurgency" is defined as "those 
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military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychologi­
cal, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat 
the subversive insurgency." 
In reports, testimony before congressional committees, 
and in unofficial books and articles, civilian and military 
officials do not always adhere strictly to these definitions. 
Counterinsurgency may be used with reference to actual 
combat with insurgent groups as well as to action in­
tended to prevent an outbreak of insurgency. These ac­
tivities, then, may range over a wide spectrum. They 
could include the actual use of force, a show of force, or 
improving the popular image of the military and the 
police in order to maintain order. Counterinsurgency 
may even encompass the reform or the mitigation of 
distressing social and economic conditions. To most 
readers the term probably connotes actual combat with 
rebel or guerrilla bands. We emphasize, therefore, that 
in official circles, as well as in the present study, the term 
has a much broader implication. 
The authors are aware of the difficulty and danger of 
using the term "Latin American" when referring to 
policies or conditions. They have, between them, studied, 
traveled, or lived in all of the American republics. One 
has only to mention a few examples to bring the diver­
gencies a-nd variations among them into sharp focus: 
Brazil compared with El Salvador; isthmian Panama 
compared with land-locked Bolivia; or Haiti contrasted 
to Chile. The importance of these differences will be em­
phasized in our discussion of the Latin American civic-
action programs, their administration and application. 
The omission of Cuba from our study was viewed as 
necessary rather than desirable because of the paucity 
 9 Introduction
in this country of information about its military and 
paramilitary organizations and their functions. Discour­
agement by the United States government of the idea 
of a possible visit for research in that country brought 
the authors to the conclusion that Cuba would have to 
be omitted. 
Data are primarily from unpublished materials, in 
many cases from the personal experiences and private 
files of persons who have been working with civic action 
in the field and in Washington. Some of the material 
representing opinions and judgments was made available 
on a highly personal basis and will not be identified ex­
cept in terms of general categories. Correspondence and 
interviews produced much data and evaluations based 
upon personal experience. The main sources of unpub­
lished data were officials in Washington, United States 
military missions in five Latin American countries, 
United States Embassy, AID (for an explanation of this 
and other acronyms see page xvii), officials and members 
of governments in Latin American countries, United 
States and local citizens in Latin American countries, 
and United States military personnel in the Canal Zone 
and in United States military schools and training 
centers. 
Our discussion begins with a brief survey of conditions 
and events that appear to have been important so far 
as United States policy-makers were concerned in the 
formulation of the doctrines relating to counterinsur­
gcncy and military civic action in Latin America. This 
will be largely a discussion of why these doctrines 
emerged. Chapter III discusses more specifically the 
factors that have shaped the doctrine of civic action and 
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some of the reasons why the doctrine emerged in its 
particular form. Chapters IV and V discuss some of the 
administrative, co-ordinating, and training agencies that 
deal with counterinsurgency and civic action. Chapter 
VI deals with civic action and counterinsurgency al­
though, as we have emphasized, the term counterinsur­
gency in the Latin American context emphasizes "pre­
vention of insurgency." Chapter VII reviews the prob­
lems and the prospects of counterinsurgency and at­
tempts to place in a reasonable perspective the issues 
pertaining to military civic action. 
In estimating the lasting value to be derived from 
military civic-action programs in their classic manifesta­
tions of road-building, school construction, and literacy 
and medical services offered, it is significant to recall that 
precisely these activities have for two decades been 
characteristic of United States policies toward Latin 
America. Under the rubric of the Good Neighbor Policy 
and the beginning of the Institute of Inter-American 
Affairs, dating back to the 193O's, these have been the 
familiar programs through which technical know-how 
and financial aid have passed. They are now embodied 
in the Alliance for Progress. These are the same kinds of 
activities that the Peace Corps has undertaken. In Peru, 
the identical programs are being taken up by the Popu­
lar Co-operation Movement, for which university stu­
dents devote their holidays. As local voluntary organiza­
tions, as well as the whole panoply of United States 
foreign aid (Food for Peace, Peace Corps, Alliance for 
Progress, and others) use these names to promote the 
spirit of community development and economic im­
provement, the questions daily become more acute: 
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Are these the areas in which military civic action should 
concentrate? Can not the civilian organizations, public 
and private, national and alien, do the job? 
1. President Kennedy's administration did not consistently maintain 
a stern attitude toward coups; as months went by there was a discern­
ible change. This tendency continued under President Johnson. 
2. Throughout this study the word military will usually be dropped 
from the term "military civic action." This is partly a matter of con­
venience and partly the result of quoting or paraphrasing documents, 
speeches, and other sources where the shorter term is used. In all cases, 
however, references are to military civic action, whether or not the 
word military precedes the term. 
3. The reader will note that in this definition "'subversive insur­
gency" is by definition "primarily communist inspired." 

Chapter 2

Arena of Decisions: The Early 7960's 
Among the many trends, events or condi­
tions in Latin American countries and in inter-American 
relations, five appear to have had an important influence 
on decision-making in the United States in the early 
1960's. They were not new, nor were they the only facts 
of importance in United States policy-making. In some 
cases they represented an important stage in a long 
trend; in others, the significance lies in the fact that they 
were more clearly perceived at that point. In a few cases, 
the events that were referred to occurred closer to the 
mid-1960's. They are mentioned because they empha­
size or shed light upon the importance of earlier and 
related events. What is most important for purposes of 
our discussion is that, together, they produce a climate 
of urgency, perhaps even desperation in the search for a 
Latin American policy. Their complexity as well as the 
dilemmas they presented might also serve as a warning 
to the reader that the job of the policy analyst and critic 
is less hazardous than that of the policy-maker. 
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Cuba 
By the early 1960's, the cold war had moved unmis­
takably into the Western Hemisphere. There had indeed 
been evidence of this throughout much of the preceding 
decade, but one development more than anything else 
served as a watershed. In Cuba, Fidel Castro had tri­
umphed in a nationalist revolution and had subsequently 
set up a Communist government. The warning that "it 
could happen here" was already out of date. It had 
happened. 
Threats and attempts to spread the Cuban revolution 
to other parts of Latin America were alternated with 
official and unofficial attempts to invade Cuba from the 
United States and Central American countries. The 
spiral of challenge and response culminated in the mis­
sile crisis of October, 1962. But the easing of this crisis 
left the over-all situation unchanged. Political, economic, 
and social conditions in most of Latin America made it 
obvious that the area was ripe for social revolution. The 
Cuban revolution was evidence of one of the directions 
that other revolutions might take. 
The Inter-American Security System: Frustration and Tension 
Throughout the 1950's the signs of Communist pene­
tration of the Western Hemisphere had not gone unob­
served. In response to them the United States made 
attempts, based on the Rio Treaty, to get inter-American 
action against the governments of Guatemala and Cuba 
on grounds that Communist influence or control there 
was a threat to hemispheric security. 
Arena of Decisions: The Early 1960's IS 
In 1954, the Tenth Inter-American Conference (Ca­
racas) approved a United States sponsored resolution 
that declared that "the domination or control of the 
political institutions of any American State by the in­
ternational communist movement would constitute 
a threat to the sovereignty and political independence 
of the American States, endangering the peace of Amer­
ica and would call for a meeting of Consultation." But 
approval of the resolution had been preceded by bitter 
debate, outright opposition from some of the more 
democratic governments, and apathy or reluctance on 
the part of others. 
In August, 1960, a special meeting of the American 
foreign ministers held at San Jose, Costa Rica, was able 
to agree upon only a very mild and oblique resolution 
on the Cuban problem. Without referring to Cuba, it 
merely condemned intervention by an extracontinental 
power in the affairs of the American republics and re­
jected "attempts of the Sino-Soviet powers to make use 
of the political, economic or social situation in any 
American state." Even this resolution created a crisis 
within the Venezuelan government when the foreign 
minister refused to sign the resolution and had to be 
replaced by an alternate. A statement by the Mexican 
foreign minister that no condemnation of Cuba was 
intended further emphasized his government's lack of 
enthusiasm. 
Thus, until the conference at Punta del Este in 1962, 
"action" took the form of ineffectual resolutions that 
nearly always had less than unanimous support, ranging 
all the way from reluctant to enthusiastic. If official or 
governmental response in Latin America was less than 
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optimum to United States policy-makers, the response 
from non-official sources was often disturbing. 
Liberal leaders who claimed to be friends of the United 
States responded with a number of arguments and com­
plaints. One was that the United States was trying to 
use the OAS as a cloak to cover interventionist policies 
when its private investors became alarmed at liberal or 
leftist governments. Both the Guatemalan and the 
Cuban crises had been preceded by bitter controversies 
with the United States over expropriation of U. S. invest­
ments; and although the United States insisted that the 
issue was Soviet or Sino-Soviet penetration and not 
expropriation, many Latin Americans remained un­
convinced. 
Another argument was that the United States was 
supporting military dictators. Unfortunately, there were 
enough cases in which the United States had gone out 
of its way to demonstrate its approval of some of the 
worst dictatorships to give this complaint much credit 
throughout Latin America. United States demonstrations 
had ranged all the way from Presidential honors to 
laudatory (if somewhat uninformed) speeches from the 
floor of Congress. Military and economic assistance, 
granted without distinction as to the type of government, 
only helped to support the complaint. It was also pos­
sible to show the unwavering support of the United 
States by Latin American dictators when the United 
States had a controversial resolution before an inter-
American conference. 
Somewhat inconsistently, a few liberal governments 
(there were not very many in existence) and many 
more private sources called for hemispheric action 
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against existing dictatorships. But the files in foreign 
offices are long and deep, and it was possible to bring out 
the same arguments in support of their propositions 
that the United States used in calling for action againsr 
Communist subversion. The arguments and complaints 
also contained no reference to the fact that in most 
cases United States relations with dictatorships were 
carried on for want of an alternative. Indeed, refusal 
to deal with them or discrimination against them with 
reference to assistance would have undoubtedly back­
fired with the usual charges of intervention. 
The most persistent argument throughout the 195O's 
was that the United States was uninterested in the 
economic and social functions of the inter-American sys­
tem. Again there was evidence to give this complaint 
credibility. There were statements from the highest 
levels of the executive department to the effect that 
Latin America could and should rely on private invest­
ments for its economic development. Needless to say, 
statements of this type served as proof for the increasing 
number of the United States critics who argued that the 
State Department was mainly interested in preserving 
Latin America as a private domain for United States 
investors. Assistance to Latin America was usually com­
pared with assistance to Europe under the Marshall 
Plan to show that the former was clearly getting the 
short end of the deal. All of this, of course, ignored the 
question of whether Latin America was in a position to 
absorb capital to the extent that Europe was and 
whether massive assistance to Latin American govern­
ments could not have been used to show that the United 
States was supporting the status quo. The Korean War 
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also served to emphasize the urgency of the situation in 
Asia and to further remove Latin America from public 
and even private concern in the United States. Latin 
America was to be "blessed" with its own Korea at the 
end of the decade. 
Economic Assistance: Doubts and Increases 
It is impossible, of course, to determine precisely what 
effect the arguments of the critics of United States policy 
had upon the policy-makers. But there is at least much 
circumstantial evidence to indicate that there was a rela­
tionship that was more obvious in some cases than in 
others. One of the more obvious indications of a relation­
ship was the sudden reversal of policy in the last years 
of the Eisenhower administration. To the cynical or sus­
picious, there might well have appeared to be some 
connection between this reversal and our attempts to 
marshal hemispheric support for action against Fidel 
Castro. 
A few days before the OAS approved a resolution 
calling for a conference to deal with the alleged Cuban 
threat, President Eisenhower (in July, 1960) issued his 
Newport Declaration. Here the President stated that the 
United States was prepared to participate in a joint 
search for effective methods through which the Latin 
American states could continue to accelerate their eco­
nomic and social progress. About a month later, Under­
secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon, on behalf of the 
President, asked Congress to authorize $500 million for 
the ends stated in the Newport Declaration. This was 
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about a week before the conference actually met at 
San Jose, Costa Rica. 
In 1959, the United States and the Latin American 
countries had negotiated an agreement establishing the 
Inter-American Development Bank. The next year, at 
Bogota, United States representatives went even further 
in accepting certain principles that they had previously 
refused to accept. The Act of Bogota affirmed that Latin 
American economic and social development required a 
massive injection of external financial resources largely 
in the form of loans on more flexible terms. At the same 
meeting, the United States agreed to allocate an addi­
tional half billion dollars to create a special fund for 
social development to be administered by the Inter-
American Bank. 
Whatever the factors that contributed to the late 
President Kennedy's announcement of massive United 
States assistance under the rubric of the Alliance for 
Progress, the amount of money involved was unprece­
dented for Latin America. Later, about $20 billion was 
"foreseen" over a period of a decade, the "greater part 
in public funds." 
The notable features of the new economic assistance 
policy dealt with much more than simply the part of 
the world and the amount of money involved. What 
was perhaps more remarkable was that it came at a time 
when there were growing doubts concerning the basic 
assumptions about the relationships between poverty 
and Communist influence. It was easy to point to plenty 
of places in the world where a decade or more of United 
States assistance was not having the desired results. In 
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addition, it was impossible to find a single example where 
unquestionable proof could be offered that economic 
assistance had been responsible for keeping Communists 
out of power. This, it must be added, was probably 
because of the nature of the difficulty of showing cause 
and effect relationships in such cases, rather than to 
any proved shortcomings of assumptions about economic 
assistance. 
Critics did, however, attack the basic assumptions of 
the programs, especially the simplistic notion of a direct 
relationship between poverty and political instability. 
Lucien Pye, for one, argued that the social and psycho­
logical disturbances attending the development process 
were far more important than economic factors. Indeed, 
he pointed out economic development is probably a 
greater cause of social instability than economic depriva­
tion. He chided as moralistic and contrary to the ex­
periences of history the American belief that the solution 
to such problems lies in broad programs of development 
and reform.1 
In a somewhat similar vein, another critic advocated 
greater emphasis be given in our assistance programs to 
"social technology," that is, the training of leaders in 
the political and administrative skills necessary to man­
age the development task. He saw the lack of such 
leadership skill as the primary cause of the stagnation 
and instability in Cuba preceding the Castro revolution.­
Those criticisms were given an ambivalent reception by 
the Congress and the press. On the one hand, it was 
accepted that foreign aid was pouring money down a 
rat hole unless it was intelligently and honestly applied 
within the recipient countries to economic development 
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and needed social reforms. But, on the other hand, little 
was done to provide for the kind of political and admin­
istrative training needed to assure such handling of the 
funds. Instead, there grew up around the economic 
assistance program a sort of despair that reflected itself 
in increasing resistances to the continuance of the pro­
gram. In some cases, it led to acceptance of the inevita­
bility of the authoritarian way to development. 
There had been little evidence of sympathy for a 
second criticism of the program's assumptions raised by 
many Latin American economists, notable among them, 
Raul Prebisch. He insisted that although the Latin 
American countries needed to undertake major reforms 
in their social and economic structures, it was even more 
essential that the United States and other developed 
nations undertake reforms in their trading relationships 
with the emerging countries. The onus of responsibility 
for the economic plight of Latin America was shifted, 
in this argument, from the Latin American states to the 
exploiter nations of the north, which, it was said, under­
paid for basic commodities and overcharged for finished, 
manufactured goods. This led to a circle of increasing 
poverty for the commodity-producing nations and ever 
increasing wealth for industrialized nations. Among other 
facts, it was pointed out that one Latin American nation's 
loss of income with the advent of a one-cent per pound 
decline in the price of coffee outweighed the total of 
United States economic assistance to all of Latin America 
for that year. 
Some efforts (such as the International Coffee Agree­
ment of 1961) were made at correcting the instability 
of the world markets for primary commodities. But the 
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United States was far from accepting the position that 
it was to blame for the underdevelopment of Latin 
American nations. 
The Crisis of Civilian Leadership 
Beginning in the mid-1950's there was a growing 
optimism concerning the future of civilian government 
in Latin America. The fall of Juan Peron in the 
autumn of 1955 was followed by the overthrow or retire­
ment of dictators in Peru, Colombia, Venezuela, and 
Cuba during the next four years. In Bolivia, Costa Rica, 
and Brazil, constitutional governments that had replaced 
dictatorships after World War II seemed at least to be 
holding their own. The growing optimism was reflected 
in Twilight of the Tyrants by the seasoned New York 
Times reporter, Tad Szulc. Published in 1959, it predicted 
that "the long age of dictators in Latin America is finally 
in its twilight." 3 
It soon appeared, however, that every silver cloud 
had a dark lining. By the early 1960's, the armed forces 
had unseated, altered, or prevented civilian regimes from 
taking power in Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Hon­
duras, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Bolivia, 
and Guatemala. But it was not this fact that was the 
most disturbing. The pendulum had swung from military 
dictatorship to constitutionalism and back again' too 
many times for most observers to be upset by another 
swing. What was most disturbing was the poor perform­
ance of a number of the civilian governments that had 
been replaced. This was already becoming evident b)r 
the first years of the 1960's. 
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In Argentina, civilian administrations showed a com­
plete inability to produce a substitute for peronismu. It 
should be noted, however, that a large part of the 
problem was the chaotic economic situation left by the 
Peron administration and that the provisional military 
governments (1955-58) made little if any progress in 
implementing economic reforms or development pro­
grams. Under the administration of Arturo Frondizi 
(1958-62), the cost of living continued to rise while 
labor's share of the national income declined. Graft, 
inefficiency, and conspicuous consumption among the 
elite were visible everywhere, while the government 
asked citizens to tighten their belts under its "austerity" 
program. The president, nationalistic and leftist-sound­
ing in his campaign, was unable to fulfil most of his 
promises to the voters. Without popular support for his 
program to compete with the peronistas, the Frondizi 
administration decided to join them. In an appeal for 
electoral support, the peronistas were promised legal 
participation in future contests. When they showed a 
disturbing popularity, not surprising in view of the 
government's performance, the armed forces unseated 
the civilian government rather than allow elected peron­
istas to assume their seats in congress and their posts 
in the provinces. 
In Brazil, although the administration of Kubitschek 
(1956-61) had its problems of inflation and balance of 
payments, it could show one of the better records so far 
as economic growth was concerned. Furthermore, the 
popular president presided over one of the more peaceful 
Latin American countries without resorting to the use 
of violence, which more and more governments were 
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forced to rely on in the first years of the 1960's. But in 
Brazil, as elsewhere, most of the problems remained un­
touched—land reform, growing slums around all of the 
large cities, illiteracy, and malnutrition. The Congress 
no less than the military offered adamant resistance to 
any fundamental social reforms. According to one ob­
server, more money was spent on the military than on all 
public works combined.4 
Kubitschek's successor, Janio Quadros, ran into the 
same problems and shocked the nation by resigning after 
seven months in office, claiming that "reactionary forces" 
were preventing his reform measures from being adopted. 
Military opposition to Vice-President Goulart brought 
the country to the verge of civil war; but a compromise 
was worked out, and he assumed the office of president 
with its powers severely restricted. The United States, 
never very happy with Goulart, became less and less 
comfortable after his full powers were restored following 
a national plebiscite. There had been numerous charges 
of Communist sympathy against Goulart, and his appeal 
to the masses raised fears of another Castro. Following 
his overthrow by the armed forces in April, 1964, Presi­
dent Johnson's telegram of congratulations left no doubt 
of his relief and approval over the action. 
In Colombia (where the military had not intervened 
from 1957 to the early 1960's), the two major political 
parties and their leaders could claim little more than an 
agreement to alternate control of the machinery of gov­
ernment until 1974. Although until recently such an 
arrangement had been satisfactory to some of the leaders 
of the two parties, the results have been considerably 
less than that in terms of producing a program of devel­
opment and reform. 
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From the beginning of the 1950's to the early 1960's, 
civilian presidents in Ecuador had managed to remain 
in power by a combination of ad hoc political support 
and demagogic appeal. They had, at least, been com­
pleting their constitutional term of office, but the formula 
equaled little more than a holding operation. Although 
a decade of relative peace resulted in some economic 
gains for the country, the fundamental problems of land 
tenure, illiteracy, and poverty were about where they had 
been a quarter of a century or longer ago. Velasco Ibarra, 
inaugurated September 1, 1960, relied even more on 
demagogic appeal than on ad hoc political support. From 
the outset he relied principally on emergency decrees 
and his paid gangs of chasmas. To appease the left he 
issued pro-Castro statements, and to appease the right he 
did not interfere with the status quo. His term ended 
with a military coup nearly a year later, following sev­
eral weeks of unrest in the course of which almost a 
hundred people had been killed or injured. 
In Chile, there were already reports that a socialist-
communist coalition had a good chance of winning in the 
next presidential and congressional elections. In Bolivia, 
the civilian government seemed to be fighting a losing 
battle against right wing and left wing opposition. Some 
journalists and commentators saw Romulo Betancourt 
of Venezuela (1959-64) as a Communist in disguise. 
His refusal to include Communists in his government was 
only a clever smoke screen so far as these observers were 
concerned. The example of Fidel Castro emphasized the 
possibility that Communists might take over a civilian 
government on the heels of a liberal revolution. 
In defense of the governments that we have discussed, 
it must be said that they faced enormous problems. 
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Archaic social systems, land tenure, illiteracy, rising ex­
pectations, inflation, loss of foreign trade, rapid urbani­
zation, and a host of other problems, were a nightmare 
to anyone trying to establish cause and effect relation­
ships. The economy of much of Latin America was in 
difficulty in the early 1960's. In almost every country, 
domestic budgets were deep in deficits; and, on the 
international level, there were problems in the balance 
of payments. Large, corrupt, and inefficient bureaucracies 
were a constant drain on government income. At the 
same time strong remedial measures would have been 
political suicide for the chief executives. 
From 1951 to 1955, Latin America's increase in prod­
uct per person was 2.1 per cent per annum. From 1956 
to 1960, it had declined to 1.7 per cent per annum. Even 
more serious, food production (at least with respect to 
products locally consumed) had actually fallen behind 
the rate of population growth in many of the countries/' 
Although industrial production was increasing more 
rapidly than argicultural production, it failed to provide 
enough jobs for the growing influx of new residents who 
poured into slums surrounding all of the larger urban 
centers. 
Drastic measures which were required to meet these 
problems, inevitably ran into the opposition of vested 
interests. Attempts to marshal mass support against this 
opposition carried with them the threat of unrest and 
even violence. In situations such as this, the armed 
forces usually stepped in to remove the government in 
power and "restore order." 
The crisis in civilian government as seen in the early 
1960's may be summarized as follows: Although the 
problems confronting Latin American governments had 
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multiplied, the political institutions with which to meet 
this challenge had shown little progress in most of the 
area. 
The Image of the Military 
A fourth factor affecting United States policy in the 
early 1960's was a changed attitude toward the Latin 
American military. Once widely regarded as a major 
impediment to the development of democracy in the 
hemisphere, the military came to be viewed by many 
in the 1960's as a bright new hope for progress and 
reform. 
Not surprisingly, a leading publicizer of the new look 
in hemisphere armies was the United States military. 
Among those North Americans who had worked with 
the Latin American armed forces, there was wide agree­
ment that the military was rapidly emerging as a willing 
and able force for social change. Some even maintained 
that "in general most of the military are as conscious of 
the need of reform as any class in the country." 6 
The new regard for military virtues was shared by 
many outside the defense establishment. One State De­
partment official confided his belief that the military had 
a better grasp of national problems than most civilians 
and was certainly better prepared to do something about 
them. 
The military image was refurbished by academicians 
as well. John J. Johnson, in his study The Military and 
Society in Latin America, called the military's response 
to changes in civilian government a landmark in their 
historical development.7 In a similar vein, Robert 
Alexander reported that "Only in a few nations is the 
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army still acting as a last-ditch defender of the economic 
and social status quo. In some cases it is even taking the 
side of revolutionary changes."8 Even long-standing 
critics of Latin America's military conceded the need to 
revise old stereotypes. 
There is little question that this new image weighed 
heavily in the decision to intrust a broader social role 
to the Latin American military through civic action. 
Indeed, the light regard that generally was paid the 
potential pitfalls of the policy would be difficult to ex­
plain otherwise. How else could it be proposed in good 
conscience that the traditional guardians of the feudal 
status quo devote themselves more energetically to social 
affairs? Clearly, some evidence of a basic change in the 
character of the military was necessary to justify placing 
such a temptation to power in its way. 
II 
Invasion from Abroad or Subversion from Within 
By 1960, the efficacy of many panaceas was being 
questioned; many errors had become obvious but had 
not themselves suggested alternatives; many hopes had 
been shattered; and many grim predictions had been 
fulfilled. The crisis in civilian government no less than 
the frustrations and tensions in the inter-American se­
curity system were but symptoms of basic problems and 
dilemmas of Latin American society. It all added up to 
a climate of urgency and, in the United States, a desper­
ate search for a Latin American policy. What is more, 
it was a presidential election year when issues would be 
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aired more widely, if not more intelligently. A presi­
dential election year was also a good time to demand and 
promise bold new policies. 
Along with the search for a Latin American policy 
came a reappraisal of hemispheric security policy. That 
reappraisal brought up the question of the rationale be­
hind the United States military assistance program in 
Latin America. The rationale behind the program had 
indeed been questioned before, but because of the small 
amount of assistance given annually (roughly $35 million 
during the 19S0's) some rather dubious explanations 
were usually permitted to go unchallenged. When chal­
lenged by an occasionally persistent congressman or sen­
ator, it seemed to have no effect on the outcome of the 
request for appropriations. In the course of reappraisal, 
the problem that loomed larger and larger was that of the 
internal security of the Latin American countries. For 
those who had been called upon to justify a military 
program that had been in search of an objective for 
nearly a decade, this must have been good news. 
In framing hemispheric security organization no less 
than in congressional testimony during the initial years 
of United States military programs in Latin America, the 
rhetoric had been in terms of defense against a military 
threat, especially (although not exclusively) from an ex­
tracontinental source. There were, of course, always a few 
individuals who pointed out the greater danger of Com­
munist subversion. In the statutes of inter-American 
security machinery and in the testimony relating to 
United States military assistance, some direct or oblique 
references to subversion were also inserted. Thus Article 
6 of the Rio Treaty calls for consultation in the event of 
extracontinental or intercontinental conflicts short of an 
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armed attack or of any other fact or situation that might 
endanger the peace of the hemisphere. But, as stated in 
Article 3, if "an armed attack by any state against an 
American State" (which calls for assistance from all 
contracting parties) was clearly intended to include 
subversion, it certainly could have been stated in une­
quivocal terms. It is probable that the provision was 
left vague in order to encourage ratification by those 
who would oppose the inclusion of subversion as well as 
those who would approve it. In an area of the world 
where a majority of the governments normally comes 
to power by means of "an armed attack," it is not 
unreasonable to think that many of them would shy 
away from an unequivocal statement. 
In testimony relating to the Mutual Security Act of 
1951, Assistant Secretary of State Edward Miller listed 
four primary military objectives in connection with Latin 
America: (1) To secure sources of strategic materials; 
(2) to keep open the lines of access to those materials; 
(3) to have the armed forces of those countries in readi­
ness to keep the strategic areas defensible from small 
air and submarine attacks from abroad; and (4) to 
reduce the commitments of our own armed forces for 
the defense of those areas.9 As late as 1959, Section 105 
of the Mutual Security Act stated that internal security 
requirements would not normally be the basis for mili­
tary assistance to Latin American nations.10 
But the argument of an armed attack on the hemi­
sphere as a rationale for building up the Latin American 
armed forces was never entirely convincing. As the 
danger of an armed attack from outside became less and 
less likely, the threat of Communist subversion became 
more and more fixed in the minds of United States 
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policy-makers. By the early 1960's, the process of revers­
ing the original emphasis was well under way.11 The 
conditions discussed in the preceding section, particu­
larly the crisis in civilian government and the frustration 
and tensions in the inter-American security system, 
played an important role in this change. The Guatemalan 
scare of 1954 became a Cuban reality in 1960: books and 
articles, learned and unlearned, warned of the increasing 
danger. Communist statements concerning their strategy 
in the underdeveloped parts of the world, many of them 
made 20 to 30 years ago, were given the publicity of new 
discoveries. A brief review of some of the more important 
statements emanating from the President, the Depart­
ment of State, congressional leaders (and legislation), 
and military leaders will help to demonstrate the new 
emphasis placed upon internal security in United States 
hemispheric defense policy. 
Prior to his inauguration and in the weeks immedi­
ately following, President Kennedy had been informed 
from various sources, and warned about the position of 
the Communist movement in aggressively supporting 
or even instigating "liberation wars." In his message to 
Congress on March 28, requesting the appropriations for 
the Defense Department, his statements showed the ex­
tent of the shift toward a concern over the internal-se­
curity problem. "The free world's security," he said, 
"can be endangered not only by a nuclear attack but 
also by being slowly nibbled away at the periphery, 
regardless of our strategic power, by forces of subversion, 
infiltration, intimidation, indirect or non-overt aggres­
sion, internal revolution, lunatic blackmail, guerrilla 
warfare or a series of limited wars." 12 
During 1961 and 1962, on a number of occasions in 
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press conferences, formal speeches, in messages to Con­
gress, and in other ways, the President referred to 
Khrushchev's January, 1961, speech on "wars of libera­
tion." Perhaps an outstanding illustration of the Presi­
dent's preoccupation with the speech was given in his 
television address to the country immediately following 
his trip to Europe, the first week of June, 1961. The new 
and young President, an activist by determined choice, 
had obviously been strongly impressed, indeed rebuffed 
and chagrined, in his two-day confrontation with 
Khrushchev in Vienna. 
"Mr. Khrushchev and I," the President said, "had a 
full and frank exchange of views on the major issues 
that now divide our two countries. I will tell you now 
that it was a very sober two days." Most of all, Mr. 
Khrushchev had predicted the triumph of Communism 
in the new and less developed countries. He told the 
President of his certainty that the tide there was moving 
his way, that the revolution of rising peoples would 
eventually be a Communist revolution, and that the so-
called wars of liberation, supported by the Kremlin, 
would replace the old methods of direct aggression and 
invasion. "In the 1940's and early fifties," the President 
pointed out, "the great danger was from Communist 
armies marching across free borders, which we saw in 
Korea." Now the great danger was that a small group 
of disciplined Communists would exploit discontent and 
seize control of an entire country without Communist 
troops ever crossing any international frontier. This, he 
warned, is the Communist plan.13 
The State Department's A Case History of Com­
munist Penetration: Guatemala, issued in 1957, perhaps 
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encouraged the flow of publications that became a flood 
after Castro came to power. A common feature of State 
Department publications and statements on hemispheric 
security was a growing preoccupation with the problem 
of Communist subversion. In February, 1963, Assistant 
Secretary of State Martin outlined the steps which the 
United States was already taking. Our direct attack on 
the problem of Communist subversion, he said, has al­
ready been launched in two directions. One was to isolate 
Cuba from the hemisphere and discredit the image of the 
Cuban revolution in the hemisphere. The other was to 
improve the internal security capabilities of the countries 
concerned.14 A year later, efforts already under way to 
bring action into line with doctrine were recorded in an 
informal unclassified memorandum prepared in the State 
Department and entitled Points in Explanation of U.S. 
Military Assistance Program for Latin America. The first 
paragraph stated in matter-of-fact tones that, "this Ad­
ministration is seeking to orient the military assistance 
program in Latin America away from the outmoded 
concept of hemispheric defense toward greater emphasis 
on meeting the internal subversive threat." 
To Congress, the threat loomed as large as anywhere. 
A congressional joint resolution of October 3, 1962, called 
for immediate steps "to prevent by whatever means may 
be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-
Leninist regime in Cuba from extending by force or the 
threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to 
any part of the Hemisphere." Months later, the Senate 
majority whip, Hubert Humphrey, in pleading for both 
military and economic aid to Latin America, cited "Che" 
Guevara as declaring that "The Cuban revolution has 
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shown that in conditions of imperialist domination such 
as exist in Latin America, there is no solution but armed 
struggle." » 
TABLE 1* 
UNITED STATES BILATERAL MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS 
Bilateral 
Mission Military
Agreement Assist- Internal Country (Army, Air, ance Security Other 
or Navy Agree- Notet 
ment 
Argentina X 
Bolivia X 
Brazil X 
X
X
X
X
X
 
X
X
X
 
X
 
X
 
X
X


X
 
X
X
X
 
X
X
 
X
X
X
 
X
 
X
X


Navy War 
College Adviser 
JBUSMC* 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador .. 
Guatemala 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Mexico 
X

X

X

MAAG

X

X

X

X

JMUSMC§ 
Nicaragua X

Panama X

Paraguay X Civic Action 
Note 
Peru X 
Uruguay X 
Venezuela X 
* The texts of military assistance agreements and of exchanges of nota 
regarding the "internal security" use to which the equipment could be put are 
found in Appendix G.
t Notes specified that materials' use was limited to internal security and
hemispheric defense and for no other purpose unless with United States consent.
1 Joint Brazilian-United States Military Commission. 
5 Joint Mexican-United States Military Commission. 
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A report issued on April 14, 1965, by the House Sub­
committee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs brought the story up to date with its 
version of intrigue, secret meetings, machinations, and 
selection of priority targets, discussed at the Havana 
meeting of Latin American Communists in December, 
1964.16 
That Khrushchev's statement of policy had been con­
tinuously kept fresh in the minds of the United States 
military high command was shown by United States Air 
Force Chief of Staff General Curtis LeMay, in an address 
at St. Louis, Missouri, on October 19, 1963: 
Khrushchev himself gave us a forecast of that threat in 
his January, 1961 speech to leaders of the Communist 
Party. He acknowledged, at that time, that general war 
and limited war on the scale of the Korean conflict in­
volved unacceptable risks. However, he declared the in­
tention of the Communist Bloc to encourage and support 
what he referred to as national uprisings and wars of 
liberation. As we all know, he was referring in that case 
not to wars of liberation, but to subversive campaigns of 
aggression which are aimed at the overthrow of pro-
Western governments.17 
A year later, General Robert J. Wood, director of 
military assistance, asserted that "the primary purpose 
of the proposed fiscal year 1965 Military Assistance 
Program for Latin America is to counter the threat to 
the entire area by providing equipment and training 
which will bolster the internal security capabilities of 
the recipient countries." 18 The accumulative amounts of 
military aid to the Latin American countries, as well as 
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the proposed fiscal year 1965 allocation is shown in 
Table 2 below. 
TABLE 2* 
UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO LATIN AMERICA 
(In Thousands of Dollars) 
Total for Fiscal Proposed Program for Country Years 1950-64 Fiscal Year 1966 
Argentina $ 13,564 $ 1,206 
Bolivia 10,858 591 
Brazil 186,846 2,314 
Chile 74,259 1,096 
Colombia 55,325 1,124 
Costa Rica 1,828 13 
Cuba 10,575 
Dominican Republic 12,098 
Ecuador 29,567 573 
El Salvador 3,828 91 
Guatemala 8,702 238 
Haiti 3,405 
Honduras 3,596 
Mexico 1,198 . .  . 
Nicaragua 6,603 
Panama 1,799 16 
Paraguay 3,579 744 
Peru 66,776 1,703 
Uruguay 32,912 11 
Venezuela 3,685 40 
•Source: "Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1965. Hearings before a 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations." House of Representatives, 
88th Cong-., 2d Sess., April 14, Part I, 1964, pp. 412 and 523. 
As far as means were concerned, hemispheric defense 
doctrine was now clearly preceived and clearly stated. 
But it soon became apparent that the application of 
these means would create other dilemmas. 
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III 
When Soldiers Are Insurgents 
The evolution of hemispheric defense doctrine from 
one which emphasized security against an outside attack 
to one that emphasized security against subversion and 
internal uprising brought with it two dilemmas for 
United States policy. First, by encouraging local military 
forces to prepare for counterinsurgency, training them 
in these skills, and providing them with equipment, the 
United States is increasing the power of one of the com­
peting political groups in a given Latin American 
country. But does this in fact contribute to the stability 
and security of the hemisphere? Second, can the use of 
military assistance once it has been provided be con­
trolled by the United States? 
The answer to the first question depends on the role 
that the armed forces of Latin American nations will 
choose to play when confronted by situations of actual 
insurgency or by situations where events appear to be 
moving in that direction. At one time or another, they 
have assumed four distinguishable roles when confronted 
by situations such as these. They have served as the 
guarantors of constitutional government, the self-ap­
pointed "guardians" of the national interest, the guard­
ians of order and the status quo, and the promoters of 
reform. 
Onh in Colombia and Venezuela (and only in the last 
decade) have the armed forces been willing to protect 
a constitutional government throughout a relatively pro­
longed period of violence. In both cases, however, a 
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rather inconclusive picture is presented. The rural ban­
ditry in Colombia was not insurgency in the sense of 
aiming at the overthrow of the government or creating 
conditions that might eventually bring this about. As 
such there was not the danger of a movement that might 
destroy the military or at least weaken its position in 
society.19 The present increasing urban violence from 
labor and student groups will be a much better test of 
the military's role in this respect. In Venezuela, elements 
of the military have tried to unseat the government a 
number of times since 1958. Fortunately, the loyal ele­
ments of the armed services have thus far triumphed each 
time an attempted coup d'etat or rebellion has occurred. 
More likely, the military will serve as the "guardians'' 
of the national interest by replacing a government that 
is confronted by growing strikes, riots, and terrorism or 
one that seems to be in danger of being taken over by 
a resurgence of labor-leftist forces. This was the stated 
rationale in recent coups in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, and 
Honduras.20 
These temporary expedients are fraught with contra­
dictions and difficulties. The armed forces quickly dis­
cover that the task of government is not an easy one 
and have usually found it expedient to turn the govern­
ment back to civilians. The growing power and influence 
of labor and student groups soon force a military dicta­
torship to decide whether it will move in the direction 
of a police state or a system of representative govern­
ment. More recently there has also been pressure from 
the United States whose stated policy in Latin America 
is to promote social reform and economic development 
through the Alliance for Progress. 
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In returning the government to civilian hands, the 
armed forces will probably impose two conditions: That 
the new government not threaten the military as a 
privileged institution and that its program not disrupt 
the status quo to the extent that resultant tensions 
produce violence and disorder in the wake of which more 
radical groups might gain influence. But a growing labor-
leftist group will probably find such a program unsatis­
factory and resort to agitation, strikes, and even violence. 
In the short run, any program of national development 
and reform will probably produce insurgent movements 
as much as a lack of one. Opposition will develop among 
a conservative oligarchy that opposes the reforms on 
grounds of individual or group interests, among those 
who approve of change but want reforms to move faster, 
and among extremists who have demanded the reforms 
but want to bring the program to a halt in order to 
create conditions whereby they can assume power. Thus 
the cycle is again repeated with intervention by the 
armed forces. 
If the armed forces continue this role it will raise 
serious problems for those who have been attempting to 
improve their image. Will the effects of repeated inter­
vention against constitutional governments serve to wipe 
out the good will built up through propaganda and 
civic-action projects? We should not be misled by the 
momentary popular approval that might follow a mili­
tary coup d'etat. Given the nature of Latin American 
politics, almost any government's popularity declines 
rapidly when the time comes to transform the promises 
of campaign oratory into action. Thus there are always 
a substantial number of people who will greet the over­
throw of any government with enthusiasm—not because 
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they approve of the new saviors but because they have 
become disenchanted with the old ones. The new saviors 
soon encounter all the difficulties of their predecessors, 
and, without the pretense of a popular mandate, their 
popularity vanishes even more quickly. 
The military may also choose to remain in power and 
preserve order and the status quo via a police state. The 
official justification for such regimes is, of course, not the 
preservation of the status quo, but the preservation of 
order and social peace. Order, the argument goes, is es­
sential for economic development; and economic devel­
opment must precede the establishment of constitutional 
government. Thus, the important thing for the moment 
is to put down insurgency, develop the country's econ­
omy, and worry about constitutional government later. 
The country, it is said, is not ready for representative 
government. 
Lest anyone think that these arguments are new, they 
were precisely the ones advanced by some of Latin 
America's first caudillos, including Rosas of Argentina 
and Paez of Venezuela. They were stated with more 
precision by five of the best-known strongmen of the 
twentieth century: Diaz of Mexico, Gomez of Venezuela, 
Ubico of Guatemala, Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, 
and Batista of Cuba. All of them provided periods of 
unprecedented order and notable economic development, 
a fact that led financial circles throughout the world to 
comment on the unusual wisdom of these leaders. Yet 
thirty years of Diaz' prosperity were followed by nearly 
twenty years of civil war. Thirty years of Gomez' pros­
perity were followed successively by a period that came 
seriously close to civil war and eventually developed into 
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a military-leftist coup, inevitable disorders accompany­
ing reform measures introduced by a civilian government, 
another rightist military coup, a bloody coup to oust 
that dictatorship, and an extended period of violence 
following further reforms under another civilian admin­
istration. The demise of Trujillo after thirty years of 
uninterrupted peace and economic development has left 
the Dominican Republic ripe for civil war, a situation 
with which even another military dictatorship proved 
incapable of coping. No North American needs to be 
told what followed the prosperity of the Batista regime 
in Cuba. 
What is overlooked in the "peace and prosperity" 
argument is that a period of economic development 
helped to produce the conditions of insurgency—popula­
tion explosions, urbanization, contact with other parts 
of the world, and better communications within a 
country. Yet during the same period, the institutional 
props capable of facing a major challenge (political 
parties and independent labor unions) were not de­
veloped. Furthermore, the economic prosperity reached 
only a small minority. It should be no surprise, then, 
that the demise or overthrow of the strongman was 
followed by a period of chaos. 
Only in Paraguay and Nicaragua have regimes of this 
nature continued into the 1960's. Both have developed 
efficient systems for dealing with the symptoms of in­
surgency. Secret police, a controlled press, and the arrest 
or exile of labor, student, and party leaders have kept 
potential insurgents under control. Both are among the 
more backward countries of Latin America, but both 
are in a period of peace and relative prosperity. Whether 
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they will follow the path of the countries mentioned 
above, or when, remains to be seen. 
Finally, the armed forces might become the reformers 
as well as the guardians of internal security. There are 
few examples of this in Latin America. Colonel David 
Toro and Colonel German Busch in Bolivia tried un­
successfully to set up a reformist regime in 1936. But 
this was to be "State socialism with the aid of the parties 
to the left" rather than a purely military regime.21 
Colonel Juan Peron also used reform as the keynote for 
his regime following a coup d'etat in 1943. But he soon 
turned to a single peronista party, largely constituted of 
workers, in order to balance the power of his not-too­
reliable military colleagues. 
More recently, military governments in Bolivia, Brazil, 
and Ecuador have stated their desire to see reforms 
instituted although under a constitutional government 
based on free elections. This, then, is simply a return 
to their role as "guardians" of the national interest. 
Whether this is an indication that the armed forces are 
now prepared to offer their backing to civilian govern­
ments with reform programs remains to be seen. If so, 
it is unlikely that most of the armed forces will be willing 
to support anything beyond very moderate changes. 
Given the magnitude of the social and economic prob­
lems in Latin America a large part of the civilian sector 
will probably find this unsatisfactory, and a period of 
agitation and violence will ensue. Will the armed forces 
then intervene? 
If the armed forces become the promoters and guard­
ians of reform, it is likely that schisms among the serv­
ices, and even within the services, will be intensified. As 
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in the civilian sector there will be those who oppose 
reform, those who support it, and those who think it 
should be moving more rapidly. 
With respect to this problem, one critic has recently 
pointed out that, although the military has been the 
traditional bulwark of the anti-Communist crusades, 
military leftism has been on the crescendo in such diver­
sified political systems as Mexico, Guatemala, Brazil, 
and Cuba. This has been happening in a period of a 
declining trend in left wing mass civilian politics, except 
in Chile, Bolivia, and perhaps Venezuela. 
The recent violence in the Dominican Requblic em­
phasizes the problem of division within the armed forces. 
In 1965, pro-Bosch supporters in the armed forces called 
for a return of the exiled former president and invited 
civilian support. This plunged the capital into a bloody 
civil war that threatened to spread throughout the 
country. It appears to be a safe assumption that some of 
the weapons and ammunition distributed to civilians 
by members of the armed forces will be used for other 
attempts in the future. 
Venezuelan army tanks and infantry had to be called 
out twice during 1962 when the navy's marine corps 
tried to overthrow the constitutional government. In 
both cases, weapons fell into the hands of civilians who 
have probably been using them in other parts of the 
country. 
There have been other interservice encounters that did 
not involve direct civilian participation. In 1961, air 
force fighters routed army tanks outside the National 
Congress in Quito and installed their candidate for presi­
dent. Two years later the Argentine Air Force destroyed 
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the navy's air arm in one of a number of interservice 
political struggles in that country. 
Edwin Martin, assistant secretary of state, pointed out 
this problem in 1963: "Theoretically, we could put vast 
amounts of arms and riot equipment into Latin American 
hands today to stamp out rebellion and to shoot down 
the Communist leaders and followers. But in whose hands 
would we put these arms? How can we be sure that the 
riot quellers of today will not be the rioters tomorrow? 
What good are arms and security controls in a perma­
nently unstable society?"22 
The second dilemma that accompanied the evolution 
of hemispheric security doctrine is even more perplexing. 
Given the uncertain role of the Latin American armed 
forces, how could the use of military assistance, once 
provided, be controlled by the United States? 
Presumably, the legislation authorized the use of 
United States aid only against Communist-inspired sub­
version and not against other kinds of revolutions or 
for other political purposes. But the problem of enforcing 
those restrictions remained; and, if anything, it became 
more difficult than ever to determine what constituted 
a violation. The distinction between external defense and 
internal security was clear, if unreal. But the line be­
tween different kinds of internal disturbances was vague 
and practically impossible to draw. Conceivably, any­
thing that disrupted the stability of a country would 
make it more susceptible to Communist subversion and, 
therefore, would be a legitimate target for the use of 
United States military aid. 
As had his predecessors, Secretary of Defense Mc­
Namara apparently recognized the danger of such unin­
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tended uses of equipment and supplies but dismissed it 
as of less importance for the immediate interest of the 
United States than the threat of a Communist take-over: 
"The essential role of the Latin American military as a 
stabilizing force outweighs any risks involved in pro­
viding military assistance for internal security purposes.' 
Then, as if to reassure the congressmen that the United 
States was not entirely at a loss to control the situation, 
he added, "that in accordance with congressional re­
quirements, each internal security program for Latin 
America is subject to express Presidential determination 
in the first instance, and thereafter to continuing close 
policy review by the Department of State." 23 
Senator Gruening did not share the confidence ex­
pressed by others in the new Latin American military. 
He expressed the opinion that most of the Latin Ameri­
can military leaders would "continue to react to power 
struggles in their own countries in accordance with their 
own estimates of the situation, their own ambitions, their 
vested privileges, and their own heritage. Democracy," 
he added, "does not rub off by commingling of individ­
uals or by grants of military assistance." 24 
Responding to growing complaints from Latin Ameri­
can and North American critics that the United States 
was befriending military dictators and assisting them to 
remain in power through military grants, Congress 
amended the Mutual Security Act in 1959. As amended, 
it provided that, "Internal security requirements shall 
not, unless the President determines otherwise, be the 
basis for military assistance programs to American re­
publics." 25 But the restriction could be circumvented 
without much difficulty by a simple determination by the 
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President that internal security aid was necessary and 
served the best interests of the United States. 
From a military standpoint, the restriction does not 
appear to have made much sense. Even in a conventional 
war, a government has to be prepared to act against fifth 
columns and other threats to internal order that could 
weaken the country^ ability to conduct its defense. 
When, as already noted, it became known that the Com­
munist strategy had shifted from overt aggression to 
covertly sponsored wars of "national liberation," it be­
came paramount that Latin American armies undertake 
internal security as a primary mission. Despite testimony 
and other statements to this effect, and despite a report 
by a special study mission of congressmen that recom­
mended that "in the Latin American area emphasis in 
the military field should be placed on the training of 
personnel for internal security and civic action pro­
grams," 26 legislation continued to require that, unless 
the President determined otherwise, internal security 
should not be the objective for United States military 
assistance. Nevertheless, the wording of the restriction 
was much broader in the 1963 version and even appeared 
to approve of the use of United States aid against all 
kinds of revolutions. 
Except (1) to the extent necessary to fulfill prior com­
mitments or (2) to the extent that the President finds, 
with respect to any Latin American country, that the fur­
nishing of military assistance under this Act is necessary 
to safeguard the security of the United States or to safe­
guard the security of a country associated with the 
United States in the Alliance for Progress against over­
throw of a duly constituted government, and so informs 
the Congress, no further military assistance under any 
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provision of this Act shall be furnished to any Latin 
American country.27 
There are at least four methods by which such aid 
can be used in unintended ways: 
1.	 Simple disregard of use restrictions. The only re­
course is to take action after the fact, a step the 
United States has not wanted to take for fear of 
jeopardizing its larger interest in keeping the 
country in question within the hemispheric alliance. 
(For stipulations regarding the use of the military 
equipment, see Appendix G for the texts of military 
assistance agreements and exchanges of notes.) 
2.	 The receipt of United States military aid may re­
lieve a country of the cost of providing for certain 
basic equipment and supplies and permit it to 
turn that savings into other kinds of equipment 
that can be used for unrestricted purposes. In this 
way, the United States contributes indirectly to 
those other purposes. 
3.	 Unlike the equipment it provides, the United States 
cannot put use restrictions on the men it trains. 
This is a second and perhaps more visible way in 
which the United States contributes to unintended 
uses of military aid. 
4.	 Whether United States aid is put to actual military 
use, its existence has an effect on the domestic 
balance of power. It is fatuous to believe that the 
struggle for power can be solved by assuming that 
the tiger will change his stripes and be converted 
into a progressive, democratic force. It is nai've to 
feel that the problem will yield to legal solutions. 
48 Internal Security and Military Power 
Summary 
We have outlined briefly the evolution of hemispheric-
security doctrine since 1947 and have emphasized the 
responses and dilemmas that accompanied it. Above all, 
the evolution of hemispheric-security doctrine brought 
with it a fresh justification for Latin American armed 
forces in hemispheric-defense arrangements. As defenders 
against a Soviet armed attack, they had never presented 
a very convincing picture. As defenders against internal 
Communist subversion and insurgency, a case could more 
easily be made for their existence and for improvement 
of their capabilities. Although some military dictators 
had in the past co-operated with Communists in order 
to destroy the democratic left, by and large the armed 
forces had a reputation for being fiercely anti-Commu­
nist. But, as we have noted, there were reasons for con­
cern over the unexpected or unwanted effect of increasing 
the power of this politically oriented group. The search 
for a way out of this dilemma was at least one of a 
number of factors in the development of a doctrine of 
civic action. 
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Chapter 3

The Development of a Doctrine: 
Civic Action 
Our analysis of the evolution of hemi­
spheric-security doctrine must now emphasize an addi­
tional point. The emerging doctrine of counterinsurgency 
as it was applied to Latin America stressed the impor­
tance of rectifying those conditions that were believed 
to have given rise to the threat of insurgency. These 
included poverty, rising but unfulfilled expectations, and, 
in many countries, a highly unfavorable public image 
of governments and their armed forces. In a word, pre­
vention! It should be no surprise, then, that military 
civic action was given increasing importance as a part of 
counterinsurgency doctrine. We have, therefore, chosen 
to discuss at some length the development of the con­
cept of civic action among United States policy-makers. 
Three points of interest stand out with respect to the 
development of this concept: (1) it had a solid base in 
United States and Latin American historical experience; 
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(2) when the great interest and impetus in Washington 
came (in the early 1960's), considerable groundwork in 
inter-American co-operation had already been laid; and 
(3) it showed the convergence of many interests and 
objectives. 
II 
United States and Latin American Precedents 
The internal experience of the United States military 
in civic action in peacetime goes back to the early days 
of the country's history when the Military Academy, 
established at West Point, followed French models in 
curriculum and training by emphasizing engineering 
subjects in its courses. The graduates, in addition to 
entering military careers to serve with the troops, were 
sought as professors in civilian engineering institutions 
that were established later. Putting to practical use the 
engineering education of its officers, the government 
designated them to command and to staff the explora­
tion parties that traveled through the West and to bring 
back invaluable data on the flora and fauna of the re­
gions not yet part of the national domain. Army ex­
plorations were conducted by Lewis and Clark; by Pike 
and Long, for whom Colorado mountains were named; 
and by other officers whose names are especially well 
known in the western tier of states—e.g., Fremont and 
Bonneville. This military leadership and the resulting 
knowledge became the basis for the typically civilian 
activity of the nineteenth century—the westward move­
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merit. Army units were assigned to plan and locate the 
roads and canals needed to open the new regions for set­
tlement and economic development. Over a period of 
years the army provided the needed elements of gov­
ernment and order in some areas. Individual officers were 
assigned, or were permitted, to work for the railroad 
builders in the closing decades of the century. 
A basic report by Major Kearney in 1816 had been of 
considerable commercial benefit in developing coastal 
waterways. Major Long's report in 1816 on the trans­
portation possibilities of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers 
and Secretary of War Calhoun's report to Congress the 
next year on roads and canals were followed by the 
General Survey acts of 1824. The latter act authorized 
the use of army engineers for canal- and road-construc­
tion duties and for improvement of the navigation of 
rivers and harbors. Subsequently, flood control was 
added to their duties. In 1849, they were given the 
responsibility for road-building in the Utah Territory; 
by 1854 that responsibility included Kansas and Ne­
braska, as well as the territories of Washington and New 
Mexico. In the 183O's, some fifteen railroads were using 
army engineers. In the 185O's, twenty officers were de­
tailed to chart four routes between points on the Mis­
sissippi and the Pacific Coast. In 1858, the engineers 
began the development of the Great Lakes navigation 
system. 
Celebrated in history and drama, the medical investi­
gations of Dr. Walter Reed and William Gorgas, army 
surgeons, contributed not only to national health but to 
the world's knowledge of diseases such as yellow and 
typhoid fevers. Navy officers and men have also been 
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noted for their explorations and for scientific and edu­
cational contributions to the country, as exemplified in 
the Arctic and Antarctic voyages of Peary and Byrd. 
Navigation charts, prepared and developed by the 
Unite States Navy have been of immediate, practical 
use to commercial transportation. Studies of winds and 
currents, also prepared and developed by the United 
States Navy (in oceanography and allied fields) have 
produced many civilian and economic benefits. U.S. Air 
Force investigations and studies of meteorology, aviation, 
weather forecasting, and medicine, have had direct and 
far-reaching influences on agriculture, transportation, 
medicine, and other endeavors in the civilian sector. In 
1922, the air force helped to improve aerial spray for 
insect control. It has bombed log jams and ice jams, 
flown serum to epidemic areas, transported food and 
supplies to disaster refugees, flown relief missions abroad 
after natural disasters, and brought Hungarian refugees 
to the United States in 1956. 
Various kinds of temporary military duty including 
disaster relief, flood- and fire-fighting, establishment of 
law and order, and, in recent years, utilization of mili­
tary forces in the Arkansas and Mississippi public-edu­
cation crises—these, if not unique, were civilian oriented 
in purpose. In the past two decades the advances in 
science, health, communications, space, mathematics, 
agriculture, industry, and electronics gained much from 
the Defense Department's research and experimentation 
conducted directly by the military establishment 
through its educational or research institutions. Not 
every mission of the military related to civilian life 
has been successful, or popular. In accordance with the 
law of the times, the United States Army, in order to 
safeguard the mails, acted as strike-breaker in the Pull­
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man strike of the last century and flew the air mail in 
the 193O's. 
The application of civic action under conditions of 
actual insurgency has also been a part of I nited States 
military experience. In the Philippines, 1898-1905, the 
United States was faced with the task of governing and 
starting the modernization of an area that had been 
ruled by an unimaginative Spanish colonial regime for 
two hundred years. But local Filipinos aspiring to na­
tional independence collected around the leadership of 
Aguinaldo, who led a guerrilla-type campaign against 
the United States. The Aguinaldo forces felt frustrated 
and disillusioned and turned against their liberators as 
embodying a new imperialism. (On a minor scale and for 
a shorter time, a comparable situation prevailed in Cuba 
after the Spanish-American War.) 
The Philippine guerrillas offered a stubborn and 
lengthy resistance to the United States. According to 
one account there were no less than 200,000 deaths— 
not all battle casualties—before the Philippine insurrec­
tion was put down. As part of the campaign against the 
Philippine insurrection, the United States undertook 
what was then considered to be a large-scale program 
of economic development and nation building that in­
cluded school-building and teaching, road construction, 
medical and sanitation improvements, and governmental 
administration. These reforms of Spanish misrule, of 
rehabilitation from the wartime destruction, and the 
building of foundations for future economic growth were 
managed and administered by both military and civilian 
officials. 
Generals Bruce Clark and Maxwell Taylor in the 
South Korean conflict initiated a civic-action program 
that succeeded in improving the relations between the 
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Korean population and the United States and Korean 
forces. It also contributed solidly to the reconstruction 
of the national economy. The antiguerrilla and counter­
insurgency advisory roles emphasizing military civic 
action in Vietnam brings up to date the record of this 
kind of military effort by the United States. 
American historical accounts of activity in the area 
of counterinsurgency and military civic action regularly 
ignore what probably were the first such programs 
sponsored by the United States in Latin America. The 
programs carried out by the United States Marines in 
their occupation of Haiti (1915-34), the Dominican 
Republic (1916-24), Nicaragua (1912-off-and-on to 
1932), and to some extent the projects undertaken by 
the United States Army in Cuba and Panama during 
brief interventions, unmistakably belong on the civic-
action family tree. These early-in-the-century programs 
involved two kinds of activities: (1) public works and 
other projects carried out directly by United States 
military units, and (2) the training of local military or 
police organizations to carry on the work of the marines, 
including their civil functions when the occupation 
ended. 
Only the first of these activities has been the subject 
of wide comment. In addition to reorganizing local gov­
ernments and mounting an attack on tropical diseases, 
the American military government in Cuba built roads, 
dredged harbors, strung telegraph wires, paved streets, 
installed sewers, and in general carried on a compre­
hensive program of public works. The marines are 
credited with similar accomplishments in the Dominican 
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Republic: Building schools; training teachers; and con­
structing highways, sewer systems, and communication 
networks. In Haiti, the occupation forces undertook a 
similarly wide range of civil functions, especially in the 
area of public health and agricultural education. 
Less attention has been given to the training of local 
military forces. For the most part, comment has been 
confined to the military aspects of that training and to 
general remarks on United States Marine Corps efforts 
to encourage the professionalization, discipline, and effi­
ciency of its Caribbean pupils. In Haiti and the Domini­
can Republic, United States forces sought to school their 
proteges in civic-type functions as well. Lieutenant 
Colonel Clyde H. Metcalf in his A History of the United 
States Marine Corps, reports that in the Dominican Re­
public "a tremendous effort was made to raise the 
efficiency of the Guardia to enable it to control the 
country after the withdrawal of the Marines." It is 
apparent from his discussion that part of that "control" 
involved the administration and supervision of a num­
ber of civil functions. 
The Haitian Gendarmerie, also organized and trained 
by the marines, went even further into civilian functions: 
The Haitian Gendarmerie performed a great variety of 
duties. It was trained as a military force and was ready 
to oppose groups of outlaws. It exercised all normal 
police functions, both local and national. Gendarmes 
supervised the distribution of all arms and ammunition, 
the public lands, travel and traffic, and weights and meas­
ures. It was their duty to prevent smuggling, collect vital 
statistics, enforce sanitary regulations, exercise control 
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over prisons, enforce harbor and docking regulations, 
and, for several years, they were largely responsible for 
the development and maintenance of the roads and tele­
graph lines of the country.1 
The Gendarmes also carried out sanitary engineering 
projects, constructed public schools, dug irrigation 
ditches, maintained telephone service and radio stations, 
and administered the lighthouse service. In the consti­
tutional plebiscite of June 18, 1918, "The Gendarmes 
were ordered to try to convince the voters of its [the con­
stitution's] desirability and give receptions and barbe­
cues, paid for from Gendarmerie funds, to make it more 
popular." 2 Although the Nicaraguan occupation can be 
distinguished in many ways from the interventions in 
Haiti, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic, there too, 
the United States-trained Guardia Nacional undertook 
a variety of civil functions, notably in the medical and 
communications fields. 
The objectives were laudable. But there were un­
expected and unwanted long-range results, after tem­
porary successes. This was the view of Dana Munro: 
The replacement of the old inefficient and corrupt armies 
by better-trained police forces in Haiti and the Domini­
can Republic helped to maintain peace but had unfortu­
nate consequences after the American occupation ended. 
The efficiency and discipline of these organizations gave 
their officers a potential political power which only the 
ablest of the old style caudillos had had. . The evo­
lution of the constabularies was a disappointment to 
those who hoped that they would help to promote repub­
lican government. The support of constituted gov­
ernments and the discouragement of revolutions meant 
in practice that one party might stay in power indefi­
nitely.3 
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Similarly, Herbert Matthews, summarizing this situa­
tion, declared that 
In all five Caribbean interventions (Cuba, Haiti, Do­
minican Republic, Nicaragua, and Panama) the imme­
diate results were beneficial, and in all the five the 
long-range results were nil or worse. We put political 
power in the hands of the military and made them in­
vincible. Since the bases on which to build democracies 
were still not present in these countries and since the tra­
ditional concept of politics as a spoils system still pre­
vailed, our well-meant efforts led inevitably to results 
like Trujillo in the Dominican Republic and Somoza in 
Nicaragua.4 
The objectives in the Caribbean interventions parallel 
the major goals of civic action—internal security, eco­
nomic development, and the advance of responsible 
government. There are other similarities. The goals now 
are the same as they were then: to promote a respon­
sible and non-political military establishment; to extend 
the central government's authority into remote prov­
inces; and to divert military resources into socially 
constructive uses, especially where there was a lack of 
such resources in the civilian community. If there is a 
similarity in the objectives and activities of the Carib­
bean experience with those currently proposed for civic 
action, may not civic action also yield similar unforeseen 
and unfortunate consequences? 
When the great impetus and interest in civic action 
came from Washington in the early 1960's, considerable 
groundwork had been laid in Latin America also. The 
most obvious example of this was the tradition of some 
civic action in nearly every Latin American country. 
That tradition varied greatly from country to country, 
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however, as did the attitude that the armed forces ex­
hibited toward this kind of activity. Attitudes them­
selves were undoubtedly shaped by historical experiences. 
Some of the army units of President Gomez in Vene­
zuela for example, had been little more than slave labor 
camps working with picks and shovels to build roads 
to the dictator's many estates. By contrast the Brazilian 
Army engineers have, since the days of the Empire, been 
a major and respected source of professional skills to 
which every administration has turned. In general, what 
is now called civic action had been chiefly the function 
of the armies and has emphasized engineering projects; 
frontier or border services; public-work constructions; 
land, air, and sea transportation; mail and medical 
services to remote areas; and sometimes education. In 
Chile the army engineers have for decades been the 
agency of the government responsible for construction 
and maintenance of many public works. In Paraguay, 
the military control of the national government over 
most of the years of its history made it inevitable that 
the military would furnish many public services, includ­
ing road-building, and ranging through the spectrum of 
other governmental functions such as the operation of 
plant and animal breeding farms in the realm of agricul­
tural experimentation. 
Like services provided by any other branch of the 
government they usually went unnoticed. When they 
were noticed they might occasionally have been appre­
ciated, but it is far more likely that most Latin Ameri­
cans regarded this arm of the government as they have 
traditionally regarded all government—with suspicion 
(and probably for good reason). In Argentina the army's 
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civic action made a sufficient impact to create opposition 
on political grounds in the late nineteenth century. The 
rural oligarchs, concerned over losing their grip, feared 
that the army's civic action in rural areas would create 
a dangerous bond between the military personnel and 
the rural inhabitants. These activities were accordingly 
curtailed or suspended. 
Ill 
A Foundation for Civic Action in Inter-American Relations 
The decision to encourage civic action was made easier 
to implement because the bilateral and multilateral 
channels for military co-operation had already been 
established. The history of these arrangements has been 
spelled out in detail in numerous studies." We merely 
note that inter-American co-operation turned to matters 
of hemispheric defense in the 193O's. Affirmations of 
hemispheric solidarity were accompanied by resolutions 
calling for consultation in the face of a threat to hemis­
pheric security. Later, during World War II, bilateral 
agreements provided military bases for the United States 
in Latin America. Under the Lend-Lease Act, millions of 
dollars worth of military supplies and weapons were 
supplied to Latin American governments, and United 
States military training missions were sent to most of 
them. An Inter-American Defense Board, created as a 
wartime organization in 1942, was made a permanent 
part of the inter-American system in 1945. Within less 
than a year, by October, 1945, the Defense Board had 
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recommended (its powers are limited to planning and 
recommendation), for adoption by the member states, 
a policy long advocated by the United States: the 
standardization of organization, equipment, and train­
ing. In keeping with this concept, the Truman adminis­
tration strongly urged the Congress, in 1946 and again 
in 1947, to pass legislation authorizing substantial United 
States military equipment for the Latin American gov­
ernments. In both years the House approved the legisla­
tion, but it did not pass the Senate. 
In 1947, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance was signed at Rio de Janeiro. It stipulated 
mutual obligations and procedures in case of an armed 
attack on a member state and in case of threats to hemis­
pheric peace or security. Later, the general realization 
of the dangers to all Free World countries after the 
attack on South Korea led to passage of the Mutual 
Security Act of 1951. Stimulated by Congress1 authoriza­
tion, the administration began negotiating bilateral 
agreements with Latin American governments, provid­
ing them with advisers or weapons or both. By July, 
1959, the United States had training missions in nearly 
all Latin American countries and had provided $317 mil­
lion in grants for military aid for equipment going to 
twelve countries. (See Table 1 of Chapter II and Ap­
pendix G.) Seven other countries were obtaining mili­
tary equipment from the United States under the 
reimbursement provisions of the act.0 
As far as United States policy is concerned, the em­
phasis placed upon civic action in the early 1960's was 
not exactly a sudden innovation. A high ranking execu­
tive of the then International Co-operation Administra­
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tion (ICA, later the AID) informed the writers of a 
number of precedents. As early as 1951 in Bolivia and 
1955 in Paraguay, the Institute of Inter-American 
Affairs advanced the idea of using local engineering 
battalions for economic development projects, road-
building, construction of parks and barracks, engineering 
education, shop work, and training in mechanical main­
tenance and repair work. United States Army men were 
to serve as some of the instructors in these educational 
programs. The Bolivian government also sought to pur­
chase equipment such as bulldozers and road machinery 
for its army's engineering battalions (this was before the 
days of MAP grants for such purposes).7 
In other countries, the presence of United States Corps 
of Engineers, officers in military training missions, or 
Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) missions 
gave rise to suggestions that indigenous military units, 
particularly of engineers, could be put to more con­
structive use than in barracks or drill duties. The Inter-
American Defense Board, at the initiative of General 
Mendoza, head of the Peruvian delegation, had before it 
since 1958 the question of vocational training for re­
cruits and their use in construction and colonization 
projects. This resulted in a 1960 resolution (number 
XLVII) by the board giving favorable consideration to 
such activities. (For the text of the Resolution see Ap­
pendix D.) 
In 1958, the Office of the Chief of Civil Affairs of the 
Department of the Army conducted studies which deter­
mined that it was in the best interest of the United 
States to urge the armed forces of friendly countries to 
contribute to their country's social and economic devel­
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opment. That same year, the President's Committee to 
Study the United States Military Assistance Program 
(the Draper Committee) was appointed to examine and 
to recommend modifications in the program. Military 
officers, including a representative of the chief of civil 
affairs of the army, serving with the committee, recom­
mended the use of indigenous military forces in the 
socioeconomic development of their countries. This sug­
gestion was advanced in the final Draper Committee 
report of August, 1959, and was incorporated into the 
basic statute of the United States Congress on economic 
and military assistance for 1959. The concept has carried 
over into subsequent statutes and amendments. 
IV 
A Convergence of Interests and Objectives 
Ideas with respect to civic action were evolving during 
the late 1950's at a time when the tactical applications 
of civic action in counterguerrilla operations in Southeast 
Asia were proving themselves extremely useful. Military 
officers, who had seen what civic action could do in an 
insurgency environment, were convinced of its utility. 
The result was a natural alliance between elements in 
the military who viewed civic action as a combat tactic 
and civilians in both the Defense Department and the 
State Department who were concerned with the eco­
nomic or political utility of civic action. 
Within the United States, a school of thought articu­
lated by such members of the Senate as Fulbright, 
Aiken, Morse, and Humphrey, had for some time advo­
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cated arms control and disarmament for Latin Ameri­
can countries. In the early 195O's, the then congressman 
from Massachusetts, John F Kennedy, in successive 
years introduced amendments to pending mutual secu­
rity acts to reduce the amount of military assistance to 
Latin America.8 Members of this school also included 
Latin Americans, as exemplified by Costa Rican and 
Chilean initiatives for hemispheric disarmament in 1948 
and 1960 respectively. It was epitomized by the lectures 
and writings of the former President of Colombia, Serior 
Eduardo Santos, whose thesis was summarized by the 
phrase, "Each Latin American country is being occupied 
by its own army."9 Congressional thought, however, 
veered from disarmament to taking action to reduce 
United States military assistance for Latin America, 
and then as a substitute advocated that such savings 
as might be derived from arms reductions should be 
applied either to (a) economic projects or (b) an inter-
American military force. In June, 1965, to the surprise 
of the executive departments, Chairman Fulbright of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee proposed that 
$25 million of the $55 million annual ceiling for Latin 
American military assistance be earmarked for an inter-
American military force under the control of the OAS. 
This illustrates a continuing and unique initiative by the 
Senate committee, as comparable proposals were made 
by Senator Church of Idaho and Senator Smathers of 
Florida in 1959 and by Senator Morse in 1961. In 1963, 
the Senate's measure reiterating the same idea was modi­
fied at House insistence.10 
During the 1950's, United States military thinking 
was shifting away from its primary concern with thermo­
nuclear war and the doctrine of deterrence to the needs 
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for balanced forces and capabilities for small and con­
ventional wars. This tendency within the military was 
hastened by the Korean invasion in 1950. It had pre­
viously been slowly advancing through the ranks of the 
military as the object lessons of campaigns in Malaya, 
Africa, and the Philippines became more clear. To this 
growing concern, which sharpened the quest for new 
military doctrine, there came the gift of Premier Khrush­
chev's January, 1961, declaration regarding "wars of 
liberation." For those who would read and listen, this 
was ample warning and confirmation of a need for 
reorientation of United States security policy. 
Within the United States public, and reflected in 
congressional debates and appropriations, there was 
diversity of opinion and variation in intensity of support 
for foreign economic assistance and foreign military as­
sistance. This diversity became so sharp that adminis­
tration leaders decided to combine the two programs 
administratively, to the extent possible, under the Mu­
tual Security Administration. The joining of the two 
programs in the authorization and appropriation legis­
lation, it was felt, resulted in obtaining larger appropria­
tions for the economic projects than would have been 
possible if they had been presented separately without 
the protective covering of military assistance; (the 
latter gave the color of national defense and of anti-
Communism to the whole administrative-legislative pro­
gram). Thus military civic-action programs became at 
once administratively feasible—appropriations from both 
the military and economic assistance funds could be 
utilized—and, at the same time, satisfied some the­
oretical and ideological concepts. (The opposite way, 
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i.e., to present as separate legislation the requests for 
economic and military aid, was again advanced by Sen­
ator Fulbright in the early months of 1965.) 
It was also believed that military civic action might 
contain within it solutions to some Latin American in­
ternal problems, both economic and political. It would 
meet the contention that large standing armies were a 
drain on the economy; it would make full use of idle 
hands and idle skills within the military organization. 
It might even help to keep them out of politics. Accord­
ing to a report by Senator Aiken that process was well 
under way if not completed in Bolivia by 1960: "The 
military has been thoroughly purged of anti-revolution­
ary elements and set to work on a variety of civilian 
projects, such as road- and bridge-building. One engi­
neer battalion even runs a sawmill. (This use of the 
military for civilian activities, after the manner of the 
Army Engineers in the United States or the old Civilian 
Conservation Corps, provides a model which could be 
usefully studied for wider application in Latin Amer­
ica.)"11 But the Bolivian coup of 1964 suggests that 
even the best purgatives are not 100 per cent effective. 
In 1961, the Senator noted that the dilemma resulting 
from the buildup of internal security forces was still a 
troublesome one in other parts of Latin America as is 
shown in the following dialogue during a committee 
hearing: 
[Senator Aiken] And one of the purposes is to main­
tain friendly governments in office in these [Latin 
American] countries? 
[General Lemnitzer] Yes, sir: this is one of the pur­
poses in some countries. Hemispheric defense and in­
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ternal security against Castro and Communist-inspired 
subversion are others. 
[Senator Aiken] If one of the purposes is maintaining 
friendly governments in office, this is a laudable ambi­
tion. However, the experience of some of those countries 
has been that when they got a strong military force, the 
military just take over the friendly government.12 
A year later, following some hopeful testimony by 
Secretary of Defense McNamara, senators again de­
tected some progress in resolving the dilemma: 
[Secretary McNamara] Last Friday, I spent the 
day in Panama at the headquarters of our Caribbean 
Command with the ambassadors and military chiefs of 
several of our missions in Latin America, discussing the 
ways in which we can further contribute through the 
civic programs to the economic development of those na­
tions. In one particular instance there is a program being 
developed that will, for a very small amount of money, 
make it possible for approximately 10,000 man-years of 
work to be done on vitally needed roads, water sources, 
sanitation facilities, school buildings and other founda­
tions for economic growth and development. 
[Senator Carlson] Mr. Secretary, with the last state­
ment I agree thoroughly. I think that the military can 
play, and does play, an important part in not only Latin 
America, but under-developed countries, in sanitation 
and roads, and highways. I think that is a very fine part 
of the program.13 
The dialogue was repeated after a statement by Gen­
eral William Enemark, director of the Western Hemi­
sphere Region, OSD/ISA: 
The chief emphasis in the fiscal year 1963 program will 
be on training, communications, transportation, and civic 
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action for the ground forces; training and air transport 
capacity for the air forces; and antisubmarine and coastal 
patrol effectiveness for the naval forces. 
[Senator Aiken] I have been concerned, as I know 
you have, over the past years lest we provide the means 
for arming one Latin American country against another. 
I know that we have both expressed a hope that there 
will be more conversion to engineering battalions and 
other phases of the military besides that of being strictly 
policemen. And I am glad to hear you report what prog­
gress is being made.14 
The Senator, obviously pleased to learn of the intended 
use of engineering personnel, did not elaborate on the 
comparatively small fractions of the requested appro­
priations that were earmarked to be used for civic action. 
Of considerable influence both in the executive and 
legislative branches of the government was the impact in 
1959 of the Draper Committee Report, which has been 
mentioned above. Several of the supplementary sections 
of the report, which strongly recommended civic action, 
were the work of a retired Corps of Engineers officer, 
General Don Shingler, who brought his wide practical 
experience in engineering—abroad and within the United 
States—to bear upon the study (Colonel Lincoln, of the 
Social Sciences faculty at West Point arranged for Gen­
eral Shingler to work with the Draper Committee.) 
Based on the high prestige of the members of the com­
mittee and bolstered by considerable research, the report 
was conveyed to the public with favorable mass media 
commentary. It recommended 
that, pursuant to the spirit of the Mutual Security Act 
of 1959, responsible United States agencies and officials 
encourage the use of foreign military forces in less de­
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veloped countries for achieving economic objectives, sub­
ject to the two qualifications that (a) such a program 
should not be used as an excuse to maintain military 
forces which are not justified for purely military rea­
sons, and (b) the ability of military forces to carry out 
essential security missions, should not be significantly 
reduced by these proposed economic activities. 15 
The 1960 platform of the Democratic party adopted 
in Los Angeles, presented to the convention by Ambas­
sador Chester Bowles, contained more than a hint of 
party sponsorship of civic action. A section entitled, 
"The Underdeveloped World," promised: 
Where military assistance remains essential for the 
common defense, we shall see that the requirements are 
fully met. But as rapidly as security considerations per­
mit, we will replace tanks with tractors, bombers with 
bulldozers, and tacticians with technicians. The 
Democratic programs of economic cooperations will be 
aimed at making it as easy as possible for the political 
leadership in these countries to turn the energy talent 
and resources of their people to orderly economic growth. 
The Democratic Platform of 1964 declared: 
Since . . 1960 we have created a balanced versatile, 
powerful defense establishment, capable of countering 
aggression across the entire spectrum of conflict from 
nuclear confrontation to guerrilla subversion. Since 
1961 we have trained over 100,000 officers in 
counter-insurgency skills necessary to fight guerrilla 
warfare, and increased our special forces training to deal 
with counter-insurgency by 800 per cent. 
After only six weeks in office President Kennedy an­
nounced the Alliance for Progress as a major decade­
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long measure for economic development by democratic 
means, and his hope to enlist the support of the gov­
ernments and of the peoples of the other countries of 
the hemisphere. The original statement by the President 
on March 13, 1961, included a significant phrase: 
And the new generation of military leaders has shown 
an increasing awareness that armies cannot only defend 
their countries—they can, as we have learned through 
our own Corps of Engineers, help to build them.16 
In his aid message nine days later he stated in his re­
quest for funds for foreign aid: 
. . To the extent that world security conditions permit, 
military assistance will in the future more heavily em­
phasize the internal security, civil works and economic 
growths of the nations thus aided. By this shift in em­
phasis we mean no lessening of our determination to 
oppose local aggression wherever it may occur.17 
Simultaneously, the President charged Secretary of De­
fense McNamara with general, total, and specific review 
of internal security and strategy. 
The United States Corps of Engineers provided a use­
ful example that the President could emphasize. In his 
"Urgent National Needs" message to the Congress on 
May 25, 1961, he stated: 
Military assistance can, in addition to its military 
purposes, make a contribution to economic progress. The 
domestic works of our own Army Engineers are an 
example of the role which military forces in the emerg­
ing countries can play in village development, sanitation, 
and road building.18 
74 Internal Security and Military Power 
Secretary of State Rusk joined in setting up the concept 
and prestige of the Engineers Corps as a model for Latin 
America: 
The U. S. Government would like to see Latin Ameri­
can armed forces increase their part in modernizing the 
basic facilities of all the American Republics. We believe 
they could borrow profitably from the long and honorable 
record of our own U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, in 
strengthening the civilian economy.19 
This highly favorable view of the military engineering 
function—if not the institution—was reiterated by the 
well-known, Spanish-Mexican author, Victor Alba: 
Latin America ought to put the thousands of military 
technicians to work. What they learn in schools—the 
capacity to undertake enterprises, to plan public works 
and direct their execution—covers many of the tech­
nical problems that still remain unresolved not only for 
want of money, but also for the lack of professional skills. 
The army that Latin America needs—and this is not a 
demagogic phrase—is an army of engineers, of overseers, 
of constructors.20 
General Maxwell Taylor, with many years service in 
the Corps of Engineers, is known to have exercised sub­
stantial influence in the Kennedy administration, in his 
capacity as special military adviser in the White House 
and subsequently as chairman of the JCS. His influence 
was direct and strong in favor of civic-action programs 
in the underdeveloped countries in general, and in Latin 
America in particular. It was perhaps more than a 
coincidence that many of these programs would fall 
under the supervision and management of the Corps of 
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Engineers officers. The Armed Forces Assistance to 
Korea program (AFAK), was established in August, 
1953, by General Bruce Clark and General Taylor, then 
commander of the Eighth Army in Korea. The latter 
had proposed through a letter to Assistant Secretary of 
Defense John A. Hannah that surplus construction ma­
terials worth $15 million be used by the United States 
military personnel to help Korean reconstruction. Presi­
dent Eisenhower approved the plan, as did the United 
States Congress in November, 1953, which appropriated 
$20 million for its support. Closely tied to the self-help 
concept, a priority among projects was established: (a) 
schools, (b) public health, (c) orphanages, (d) civic 
buildings, (e) public utilities, and (f) bridges. General 
Taylor's assistant chiefs of staff were navy and air force 
officers who implemented the congressional mandate. 
The UN later undertook comparable activities, but on 
a temporary basis. 
The parallel role of Congress also must be taken into 
account. In the Mutual Security Act of 1959 previous 
policy was broadened to include a rather wistful hope 
for administrative action that later became known as 
civic action. The act stipulated that: "To the extent 
feasible and consistent with the other purposes of this 
chapter, administrators of the military assistance pro­
gram shall encourage the use of foreign military forces 
in underdeveloped countries in the construction of public 
works and other activities helpful to economic develop­
ment." 21 The following year the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations reiterated its view "that the military 
assistance program to Latin America, including training, 
should be carried out, as far as possible, with emphasis 
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on the performance of economically useful civil functions 
by the military." Then, referring to the relevant legisla­
tion, it observed: 
This implies training in engineering and assistance for 
military engineering units. Something has already been 
done along this line, and the committee hopes that more 
progress can be made, not only in Latin America, but 
also in other less developed countries. The kind of work 
involved is primarily construction of such things as 
roads, harbors, bridges, and airfields, roughly similar 
to some of the things done by the Army Corps of Engi­
neers in the United States.22 
In reporting on a 1965 amendment to the Foreign 
Assistance Act, the Senate Committee on Foreign Re­
lations noted that, insofar as practicable, foreign military 
forces should not be maintained solely for civic-action 
activities. The committee observed that such activities 
should not detract significantly from the capability of 
military forces to perform their military missions and 
should be co-ordinated with, and form part of, the total 
economic and social development of the country con­
cerned. The committee concluded that economic devel­
opment is of great importance to the defense and internal 
stability of less developed countries, and civic-action 
efforts such as the type envisaged by the amendment 
should be encouraged. In addition to speeding the eco­
nomic development of the recipient country, these activi­
ties were reported to "improve relations between civilian 
populations and their military forces and provide on-the­
job training for members of military engineering 
units."2 3 
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Professional and Competitive Interests in Civic Action 
United States military personnel have not written in 
the professional journals or often testified before the 
Congress regarding the strictly military purposes which 
might be carried out by their service abroad in counter­
insurgency or civic-action billets. But as Commander 
C. F. Krickenberger, Jr., director of the navy's Con­
struction Force Office, pointed out in a 1962 conference 
on the navy's role in Latin America: "Use of our forces 
in the C/I [counterinsurgency] program will provide us 
a greater likelihood of our Naval construction forces 
being in or near an area where they're liable to be re­
quired if trouble erupts. At the same time, of course, we 
are learning about these areas. We are gaining intelli­
gence about these areas." 24 
Furthermore, civic-action and counterinsurgency mis­
sions are consciously used in an experimental way to test 
and perfect various United States military doctrines and 
techniques. General Maxwell Taylor, referring to United 
States advisory missions in South Vietnam, told a House 
Subcommittee: 
Here we have a going laboratory where we see 
subversive insurgency, the Ho Chi Minh doctrine, being 
applied in all its forms. This has been a challenge not 
just for the armed services, but for several of the agen­
cies of Government, as many of them are involved in one 
way or another in South Vietnam. On the military side, 
however, we have recognized the importance of the area 
and have consciously used it as a laboratory. We have 
had teams out there looking at the equipment require­
ments of this kind of guerrilla warfare. We have rotated 
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senior officers through there, spending several weeks just 
to talk to people and get the feel of the operation, so 
even though not regularly assigned to Vietnam, they are 
carrying their experience back to their own organiza­
tions.25 
It may be too soon to ascertain the verdict of history. 
But there are many—including United States military of 
high rank—who think that the experimenting and test­
ing of the counterinsurgency, civic action, and conven­
tional army doctrine and techniques have lasted in that 
unhappy land long enough to warrant a negative judg­
ment as to their efficacy in yielding acceptable results. 
The interest of United States military men in civic 
action is not always entirely selfless and public spirited. 
Human as they are (and bureaucrats in the bargain) 
they have not been above asking of the program, What's 
in it for us? An obvious answer to that query is new 
duties, with the additional personnel, funds, and author­
ity that such duties would entail. Institutional loyalties 
and ambitions being what they are, it is not surprising 
that some service bureaus have risen to this lure. Thus, 
Rear Admiral N. J. Drustrup, deputy and assistant chief 
of the navy's Bureau of Yards and Docks, during a 1962 
conference of navy officers, candidly listed among the 
motives for the bureau's participation in civic action, 
the "opportunity to increase the capability of the Bu­
reau and the Navy Civil Engineers Corps in the face of 
a diminishing construction program." 20 Every effort is 
made by the Bureau to promote "the expansion of the 
Navy Civil Engineer Corps' assistance to the counter­
insurgency civic action programs in Latin America," by 
encouraging other government agencies such as AID, 
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to make use of its services.*7 Ideas were expounded on 
the ways and means of eliciting from Latin American 
governments, requests for United States Navy assist­
ance and personnel. An appealing thought that was se­
riously advanced was that through civic action, navy-
to-navy (not to the public) assistance could be rendered 
and relationships improved. As one benefit of the pro­
gram, it was pointed out that the bureau had been able 
to "retain some senior Petty Officers that would [other­
wise] have gone out of the service." 
Another motive for emphasizing civic action stemmed 
from the personal interest in the program expressed by 
President Kennedy. (It can never hurt to show an active 
concern with the boss's pet project.) Accordingly, Ad­
miral Drustrup underscored White House interest in 
the program when addressing a conference of Navy 
officers in September 1962: "This program has the strong 
interest of President Kennedy. we understand Pres­
ident Kennedy is personally interested in finding an im­
mediate and favorable solution to the problem of how 
the military will assist AID in its world-wide activities. 
We are therefore, in a program that has high-level inter­
est and support." 28 The purpose of the navy conference 
was clearly stated in the title page of the report: "Ob­
jective of Chief of Civil Engineers Latin America Con­
ference. The formulation of a plan for providing increased 
Naval Civil Engineering assistance in the counter­
insurgency program for Latin America." 
That comparable institutional interests entered into 
the calculations of other United States services and 
agencies involved in the program is known from infor­
mation regarding the air force,29 Army Corps of Engi­
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neers, and others. Indeed, with an increasing number of 
agencies participating in civic action, it is inevitable that 
there should be instances of interagency and interservice 
competition. In interviews and correspondence civilian 
and military officers who have spent some years in civic-
action assignments freely refer to competitive—as well 
as co-operative—activities of different agencies and serv­
ices. Without making unhappy comparisons, it has also 
become clear to the authors as this study progressed, 
that different civilian and military bureaucrats recall 
that it was their own initiative that persuaded another 
slow moving agency to undertake civic action. Later, 
each claimed credit for having put civic action programs 
into effect at an early date. Some of the confused claims 
and counterclaims can be explained on the basis of 
timing or semantics: 1960 was a time when the phrase 
"civic action" was used to describe functions that the 
military had for many years fulfilled. 
Opposition to Civic-Action Programs 
There were elements in the branches of the United 
States services that objected to the concept of military 
civic action. The objection was, in some cases, based on 
the fear that the new activities to which the troops 
might be assigned would detract from their military 
bearing, and that the result would be a detraction from 
their military strength and a reduction in the time allo­
cated to strictly military training and drill. Some of the 
arguments advanced were specious—such as the length 
of time the recruits remained in active service. Where 
the recruit's stint is two years or even one, the question 
still remains: Wouldn't that time be better spent in a 
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constructive civic-action project than in close-order drill 
or on guard or barrack duty? Some objections arose no 
doubt from the military's own traditions and, in some 
cases, a right-about-face attitude was assumed when 
the word was given that the President and his military 
adviser, General Maxwell Taylor, took strong personal 
interest in the program. In this regard, Mr. Stewart 
Alsop related: 
If a Communist-supported guerrilla movement is to 
be resisted effectively, there must be a solid basis of re­
sistance within the threatened country. But the weapons 
and the military expertise can be provided from outside. 
This is the chief reason why Kennedy has insisted on a 
greatly expanded guerrilla and anti-guerrilla training 
program. At first he met the sullen opposition of the 
conventionally trained military men in the Pentagon, 
and this irritated him. But the Kennedy message is be­
ginning to get through. "They're beginning to recognize 
the nature of the problem," Kennedy says, "And what 
they're doing at Fort Bragg is really good." 30 
During a number of conversations and in correspond­
ence with the authors, officers holding important civic-
action assignments both before and after 1960 have 
indicated that there was opposition to the idea and a 
slowness in its acceptance in their respective services. 
A United States foreign assistance official thought in the 
early 1950's that the use of army engineers would be 
productive but did not succeed in getting any assigned 
to enonomic development projects. Some State Depart­
ment officers were reluctant and skeptical of the whole 
concept, fearing that any addition to the power and pres­
tige of the military in Latin American would result only 
in an increased political role in the government. An 
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experienced observer thinks that both diplomatic and 
military officers in the United States had misgivings.3' 
After the program was officially up-graded by presiden­
tial vigor in its presentation, with the Special Group 
cutting red tape to guarantee counterinsurgency and 
civic-action operations at high speed and with Attorney 
General Robert Kennedy following up on performance, 
the lesser ranks acquiesced and even accused other agen­
cies of delay and reluctance in embracing the newly 
popular program. 
It is probable that similar difficulties of competition 
and collaboration characterized the behavior of the 
Latin American military as they approached the modifi­
cations in traditional norms and procedures incumbent 
upon the adoption and strengthening of counterinsur­
gency and civic action. United States military officers 
and civilians with considerable experience in these mat­
ters have stressed to the authors that Latin American 
opposition to civic-action programs has come from two 
different sources, one passive and one active. The former 
arises out of the apathy of Latin American military who 
feel that civic action detracts from their ability to defend 
their country by diverting military personnel and effort 
into what are essentially civilian tasks. This attitude is 
reflected in Resolution XLVII of the Inter-American De­
fense Board, which, after recommending that highway 
and colonization projects be undertaken by the Armed 
Forces, quickly hedged about the recommendations: 
"The use of military personnel for this purpose, to the 
extent and degree that the specific condition in each 
country may determine, should not compete with pri­
vate civilian activity nor decrease the capability of their 
Armed Forces for the accomplishment of their specifi­
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cally military risks required by the General Military 
Plan." (For full text of Resolution XLVII, see Ap­
pendix D.) 
An even more active opposition has, on occasion, risen 
to a high pitch by business interests whose affairs—and 
profits—were felt to be threatened by incursions of the 
military. Paraguay and Venezuela have been reported 
as countries where opposition on these grounds came 
from building and road construction contractors. It will 
be noted that the Inter-American Defense Board's Reso­
lution XLVII quoted above also makes provision for 
the safeguarding of private enterprise. 
In the case of military civic action one cannot speak 
of a program developing as the result of a doctrine. Pro­
gram and doctrine developed simultaneously, although 
the doctrine nave greater impetus to the program in the 
early 1960's. The first Civic Action Military Training 
Team (CAMTT) was sent to Guatemala in November, 
1960. This was the result of an army study of 1959 
(approved in May, 1960), which developed a "low-cost, 
no-cost" program. It merely meant that the major army 
contribution would come in the form of advice and 
assistance from military assistance advisory groups, mili­
tary mission members or the small CAMTT'S. The Guate­
malan experience soon showed that more funds would 
have to be made available. In January, 1962, another 
CAMTT sent to Ecuador found itself handicapped in the 
same manner. It was that very month that the Wash­
ington Past reported that: "President Kennedy has ap­
proved in principle the limited introduction of a con­
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troversial, Pentagon sponsored foreign-aid program 
known as "military civic action.' " The army, the article 
went on to say, was authorized to prepare specific pro­
grams for assisting the armed forces of Communist-
threatened underdeveloped countries to carry out eco­
nomic and social development projects in their respective 
countries. It was stated that each program would have 
to be approved by the President,32 after careful review 
by the White House, State Department, and top Penta­
gon officials before being adopted. The report that long 
standing differences over this type of military aid had 
been settled by the administration was considered by the 
Post to be a fact of far reaching importance. 
As the concept of military civic action emerged, what 
function or role was assigned to it—countennsurgency, 
nation-building, economic development, improvement 
of the public image of the local military or of the local 
government, or improvement of civil-military relations? 
It soon became clear that almost any function or role 
one cared to ask about (especially if one were a mem­
ber of a congressional committee), that was one of the 
roles that civic action could fulfil. According to statutes 
it was supposed to be "helpful to economic development'' 
but only "to the extent feasible and consistent with 
other purposes." According to Secretary of Defense 
McNamara it was supposed to be "an indispensable 
means of establishing a link between army and popu­
lace." Secretary of State Rusk believed it would assist 
"in modernizing the basic facilities of all the American 
Republics" and "in strengthening the civilian economy. 
Keeping the local military busy (and perhaps out of 
politics), strengthening military ties across national 
borders (navy-to-navy, army-to-army), intelligence 
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gathering, educating the military, making them aware 
of the problems in rural areas of their respective coun­
tries, and getting a larger share of the budgetary pie— 
these were some of the less publicized purposes for civic 
action. With respect to the latter purpose, a rather 
unusual argument was advanced by a United States for­
eign service officer: 
Although the world is in no clanger of running out of 
crises, it does appear as though the USSR has concluded 
that its interests will not be advanced by a major war. 
This nuclear stand-off must inevitably lead to a gradual 
thinning out of standing armies. As this occurs, pressure 
will mount for a cutback in our own forces, and thus the 
freeing of some military resources. Precedent requires 
that those responsible for our national security resist any 
inordinate demobilization. To stand up to demands for 
reduction in the numbers now in uniform, U.S. military 
planners will be casting about for new missions to per­
form. This has already taken place in the enlargement of 
Army Special Forces. And such a search for missions 
would also favor an expanded Civic Action role. 
In conversations, one or more of these functions or 
roles were emphasisized by United States officers in the 
field, although they nearly always betrayed a special 
interest in economic development. What or whom among 
these sources could say what is the function of civic 
action? Perhaps everyone and no one. 
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Chapter 4

Administrative and Planning Agencies: 
A Program without a Bureaucracy 
For important functions of governmental 
administration, it is well known that the manner and 
means of execution, implementation, and co-ordination 
with different power-centers in Washington are elements 
essential in determining the success or the failure of the 
function. Inasmuch as counterinsurgency is generally 
considered in the realm of military tactics, the absence 
of a bureau, commission, or board charged with these 
activities is perhaps understandable. Yet, in the way 
that counterinsurgency doctrine is applied to Latin 
America it is in large part concerned with preventing or 
rectifying those conditions under which insurgency 
might arise. It is to that extent more than a military 
tactic. Not only does it require the co-ordination of 
activities of many agencies, all indications are that such 
co-ordination will be required over an indefinite period 
in the future. 
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In the case of civic action, the absence of a statutory 
bureau, commission, or board to shape its policy; to 
determine its philosophy; to seek for it the necessary 
funds; and to be its spokesman in appealing for congres­
sional or White House support, surely is an item of im­
portance. Not only is there no legislation or executive 
order placing such authority to be found, there is also 
no publicly stated interagency machinery for originating, 
planning, co-ordinating, and implementing the program. 
This is unique in Washington where there may be 
found various bureaucracies operating at full capacity, 
albeit without any very clear-cut objective, nor perhaps 
in response to a needed function. "A bureaucracy in 
search of a function" may well be a time-worn Wash­
ington joke, but the creation and supervision of the 
military civic-action function is strangely bereft of a 
publicly known bureaucratic base upon which to mount 
its operations. 
Perhaps there would be no need for a separate inter­
departmental board if one could assume that at each 
working, operational, planning, and policy level adequate 
liaison is maintained between the International Security 
Affairs office (ISA) of Defense Department and the 
State Department's deputy assistant secretary of state 
for politico-military affairs (G PM) in the Office of the 
Deputy Undersecretary for Political Affairs. But there 
is also in the Defense Department the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff with a special assistant for counterinsurgency. 
There are the responsibilities of USCONARC for training. 
There are the IADB and the Army, Navy, and Air Force 
colleges. Within the Department of State, there is the 
Office of American Republics Affairs, whose head is 
Administrative and Planning Agencies 93 
also special adviser to President Johnson on Latin Amer­
ican Affairs and United States co-ordinator for the 
Alliance for Progress. There is also the ubiquitous CIA. 
Also concerned in Latin American affairs is the Inter-
American Committee for the Alliance for Progress 
(CIAP). There are the Export-Import Bank and the fi­
nancial agencies of IBRD and IMF, wherein the depart­
ments of Treasury and Commerce might wish to influ­
ence decisions regarding Latin America. Finally, there is 
the Food for Peace Program and the Department of 
Agriculture's activities under Public Law 480. By send­
ing food that local officials could distribute in payment 
for labor on public-works projects, these programs could 
greatly expand the impact and effectiveness of Latin 
American civic action. Casual friendly telephone calls 
between Don ISA and the Department of State are 
scarcely adequate in this context to obtain and maintain 
government-wide enthusiasm and co-ordination neces­
sary to the successful operations of counterinsurgency 
and civic action, which are as wide in their scope as they 
are shaky in their legislative foundation. 
It is not proposed that a new bureaucracy be created 
in Washington. But at present, the administration and 
co-ordination of the counterinsurgency effort and of the 
civic-action component is vested in an organization that 
is not in continuous or daily session. There are many 
reasons for obtaining closer inter-departmental harmony 
in carrying out these objectives. Any one of several reme­
dies could be applied, such as the designation of one 
individual—presently in the government—to be the re­
sponsible co-ordinator. Alternatively the designation of 
an interdepartmental committee similarly made up of 
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individuals now in governmental service, could perform 
the necessary functions. If, as may be the case, a classifi­
cation of secrecy surrounds the existence and operations 
of a co-ordinating entity, the problem is of a different 
nature. This would involve the public's right to know 
of the existence of such an agency. 
II 
Administration in Washington 
Prior to the Kennedy administration, there existed 
an interdepartmental organization, the Operations Co­
ordination Board (OCB), whose chief function was to 
co-ordinate and supervise governmental activities in 
national security matters. Particularly during the Tru­
man and Eisenhower administrations, the OCB was 
given large responsibility for follow-up work to see that 
the decisions taken by the President and by the Na­
tional Security Council were put into effect. The OCB, 
in its necessarily unpleasant duty of checking, super­
vising, and insisting upon implementation of agreed-
upon decisions, over a period, came to be the target of 
complaints of officiousness, of being meddlesome, and of 
offering an opportunity for Washington-bound subordi­
nate bureaucrats to criticize and castigate high-ranking 
officials, especially those concerned with overseas opera­
tions. Although it is not known to the authors to what 
extent President Kennedy was aware of these difficul­
ties and criticisms during his years as senator, it was 
one of his earliest decisions upon taking presidential 
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office to abolish the OCB. To abolish the organization 
however, did not bring to an end the necessary function 
for which it was created: co-ordination and check-up to 
insure fulfilment of executive decisions. 
The new President, running into a period of hard 
decisions and spectacular failure of interagency co-ordi­
nation in the invasion of Cuba in March, 1961, would 
hardly have been expected publicly to acknowledge that 
an error had been committed in the abolition of the 
OCB. Since the function remained, what was to be done? 
In part, the President by a statement at the time of 
abolishing the OCB laid considerable co-ordinating re­
sponsibility on the secretary of state.1 An additional 
measure was the creation of a co-ordinating and imple­
menting body, smaller in size and different in title. Its 
creation was made plausible by the Cuban, Congo, and 
Asian crises then demanding attention. Its meetings and 
decisions understandably, if not necessarily, were kept 
largely from the public gaze. 
The Special Group (Counterinsurgency) 
Thus, shrouded in considerable mystery (to which 
some journalists contributed even while revealing some 
of the basic facts of the membership of the organization 
and its functions) came the Special Group for counter­
insurgency. The Special Group appeared to be an out­
growth of the committee (consisting of Attorney General 
Robert Kennedy; the Director of the CIA Mr. Allen 
Dulles; Admiral Arleigh Burke; and General Maxwell 
laylor), which President Kennedy created to inquire 
into the Bay of Pigs disaster in 1961. Out of that investi­
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FIG. 1.—Composition and organization of the Special Group for counterinsur­
gency. (Military Review, XIV, No. 4 (April, 1965), 27.) 
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gation came a recommendation for the creation of a 
high-level co-ordinating group to supervise all govern­
mental activities in counterinsurgency and comparable 
situations of unconventional warfare activities. It was 
called "a sort of Joint Chiefs of Staff for the control of all 
agencies involved in counterinsurgency" by General 
Taylor. Created by President Kennedy in January, 1962, 
the Special Group's membership included Attorney Gen­
eral Robert Kennedy, Deputy Undersecretary of State 
for Political Affairs Alexis Johnson, Director of CIA 
Mr. McCone, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen­
eral L. L. Lemmtzer, Deputy Secretary of Defense Ros­
wcll Gilpatrick, the Foreign Aid Administrator Fowler 
Hamilton, Director of the United States Information 
Agency Edward Murrow (invited to join in August, 
1962), and Special Assistant to the President for Na­
tional Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy.2 The chairman 
was General Maxwell Taylor, then military adviser to 
the President. 
Subsequently, Mr. Averell Harriman became chairman 
and continued in that capacity through 1965 after resign­
ing as deputy undersecretary of state. Nominally a 
member, Attorney General Katzenbach did not attend 
meetings in 1965. This tends to corroborate newspaper 
reports that Robert Kennedy was the energizing force 
within the Committee in 1962 and 1963. 
The Special Group customarily met every Thursday 
afternoon in the executive office near the White House 
(formerly the War, State, and Navy department build­
ing), with two basic functions. One was to achieve 
co-ordination and to speed up the action within the 
government agencies in order to implement policy de­
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cisions regarding counterinsurgency programs in various 
parts of the world. The second function was to initiate 
and supervise research and examination of new ideas, 
doctrines, and techniques for counterinsurgency pur­
poses. An example of the first function was a survey 
made of the police systems in underdeveloped nations, 
with a view to determining what the United States might 
be able to do in the way of an international police 
academy for the education and improvement of such 
police forces. In September, 1961, the President had 
instructed AID to set up a Police Academy for Latin 
America. But when administrative difficulties ensued 
in February, 1962, the Special Group was asked to ex­
pedite the project with the result that later in the year 
an Inter-American Police Academy was started at Fort 
Davis in the Panama Canal Zone. The academy was 
later transferred to Washington, where a number of 
sessions of the courses have now been completed. 
Illustrative of the second function (the supervision 
of research and examination of new ideas, doctrines, and 
techniques for counterinsurgency purposes) was the de­
cision to increase counterinsurgency training within the 
United States Government and to insist that representa­
tives of United States agencies abroad develop a single 
co-ordinated plan for combating Communism. This last 
decision resulted in the creation of a system of Internal 
Defense Plans (IDP), which will be discussed later. 
According to the Wall Street Journal, the Special 
Group decided that co-ordination of counterinsurgency 
efforts abroad should be effected through greater em­
phasis upon the Country Team collaborative process/ 
The Country Team, informally structured several years 
earlier, consists of the chief representatives of the em­
Administrative and Planning Agencies 99 
bassy, the military attaches, the USIA, the AID, the 
CIA, military missions (or MAAG'S), and of other agen­
cies represented in the foreign country. It meets fre­
quently under the close supervision and leadership of 
the ambassador. At least one observer has credited the 
Special Group with considerable success: (1) in settling 
disputes within the Country Teams; (2) in acting on 
the teams' recommendations; (3) in guiding the teams 
by defining their aims, and (4) in initiating measures 
to spur a variety of counterinsurgency operations.4 
The Special Group also insisted that specialized coun­
terinsurgency training be given to United States military 
and civilian officers before assuming their field assign­
ments abroad. Out of this came the Interdepartmental 
Seminar, conducted by the State Department's Foreign 
Service Institute. (See Chapter V for a description of the 
Seminar.) 
The membership and functions of the Special Group 
were summarized by a member of the faculty of the 
United States Army Command and General Staff Col­
lege as follows: 
Established at Executive level and comprised of high-
ranking members from those departments and agencies 
primarily concerned with foreign policy and national 
security matters, the Special Group is charged with the 
responsibility for preparing plans to prevent or defeat 
subversive insurgency in specific areas of the world. It 
also establishes broad policy guidance, integrates all pro­
grams for dealing with subversive insurgency, and en­
sures the best use of all available resources in a united 
effort/' 
In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs on November 18, 1963, Assistant Secretary of 
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State Martin shed light on another procedure that, for 
Latin America, may well have taken up some of the 
slack resulting from the abolition of the OCB.G He told of 
a number of United States governmental agencies that 
were assisting the governments of Latin America in 
dealing with the "insidious threat" of Communist sub­
version and in strengthening their internal security 
capabilities. The procedure called for an informal organi­
zation, the Latin American Policy Committee, which 
comprises senior officials of all agencies concerned. In 
its weekly meetings with Mr. Martin, agreements on 
future programs were reached and, if a higher level de­
cision was needed, issues were submitted to higher au­
thority. 
There is no mention in Mr. Martin's testimony of the 
relationship that eventually might develop between the 
Latin American Policy Committee and the Special 
Group, although each has the stated purposes of 
strengthening internal security capabilities and co-ordi­
nation. It may be presumed that Mr. Martini commit­
tee could go to the Special Group for additional help in 
implementing policy decisions when help was needed. 
It is highly probable that, in view of the membership of 
the Special Group, it could and would pass on guidance 
and instructions to Mr. Martin, who could then use his 
own committee to see that decisions were carried out at 
the working level. Such implementing functions and 
follow up of high level policy decisions had been among 
the chief duties of the now defunct Operations Co-ordi­
nation Board. This is but another example of the function 
remaining even though the machinery had been abol­
ished. It hardly seems conceivable that there should be 
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conflict between the Special Group and this committee 
because of the prestigious personnel on the former. There 
might, however, be room for a certain amount of over­
lapping and duplication of effort. 
Inasmuch as the meetings of the Special Group are 
reported in 1965 to be less frequent than the earliei 
practice of weekly sessions, it must be left to the in­
dividual employees in the departments of State and 
Defense and other agencies in Washington to perform 
those co-ordinating functions that might occur to them 
to be necessary or expedient. 
Although it may be surmised that the counterinsur­
gency functions performed by the Special Group, from 
time to time, include attention to, and decisions bearing 
upon, military civic action, there is but slight official or 
published evidence upon which to support the supposi­
tion. It has been reported that when the former Director 
of the USIA, Mr. Rowan, attended a session of the 
Special Group, he expressed an active interest in the 
military civic-action topic under discussion and indicated 
a desire that his agency perform a more vigorous role in 
advocating civic action and in publicizing its results. 
This meeting may well have had excellent results insofar 
as governmental publicity regarding civic action is con­
cerned, but it is not a substitute for an interagency com­
mittee or board in continuous session whose normal 
duties would be to supervise and control and co-ordinate 
all aspects of the program. 
In both the State and Defense departments, co-ordi­
nating responsibilities have been laid out and personnel 
appointed to fulfil them. During 1961, both the Presi­
dent and the secretary of state spoke to the higher 
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echelons of officers within the Department of State on 
the need for more speed in reaching recommendations 
and decisions on foreign-policy matters. In the course of 
such remarks to that audience as early as February 20, 
1961, Secretary Rusk reiterated what President Kennedy 
had stated publicly the day before—that the assistant 
secretaries of state would be expected to carry an in­
creased burden of active formulation and co-ordination 
of foreign policy. 
The State Department's deputy assistant secretary of 
politico-military affairs (G/PM) is charged with pro­
viding guidance, co-ordination, and liaison with the De­
partment of Defense and the military services on po­
litico-military matters and relationships. He is also 
charged with assisting senior officers of the Department 
in their relationships with senior officers of the Depart­
ment of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the mili­
tary services. It is conceivable that the Deputy Assistant 
Secretary's Office could reduce, in a limited degree, the 
need for formal interdepartmental machinery, that is, 
for differences between state and defense on policy inter­
pretation, implementation, and priorities. But this would 
not be the case with the other agencies and departments 
that might be deeply involved, such as the departments 
of Agriculture and Treasury or the Bureau of the Budget. 
G/PM is a small unit directly subordinate to the Office 
of the Deputy Undersecretary of State for Political 
affairs,' which provides a central point of focus and 
co-ordination on military matters for all geographic 
bureaus of the department—several of which already 
have their own political-military staffs. This unit was 
fashioned to provide both the Defense and State depart­
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merits' personnel with a common and obvious point of 
contact. One of the chief activities of G/PM has been to 
strengthen national security by both planning and 
operating in this field. However, the co-ordination of 
economic and military assistance on behalf of the secre­
tary of state is a function delegated to the Administrator 
of AID and his program co-ordination staff. In the 
language of the V. S. Government Organization Manual, 
1962-63, in addition to direction of foreign assistance 
programs, "The Administrator reports directly to the 
Secretary of State and the President and is charged with 
central direction and responsibility for the economic 
assistance program and coordination of the military and 
economic assistance programs." There is, therefore, 
an obvious overlap with some of the work of G/PM. 
Also within the purview of the G/PM is the support 
and supervision of the political advisers, of which there 
are seven career Foreign Service officers assigned to 
United States military commands including United 
States Southern Command (us so COM) at Quarry 
Heights, Panama Canal Zone. One Foreign Service offi­
cer from G/PM is assigned on a full-time basis to be 
adviser to the commander of the Special Warfare Center 
at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The G/PM also deals 
with the officer exchange program (inaugurated in the 
Eisenhower administration) between State and Defense 
departments. By the end of 1965, approximately fifty 
officers from each department have filled a two year as­
signment in a comparable position at an appropriate 
level in the other Department. Another step in policy 
and training co-ordination is the assignment of State De­
partment faculty advisers to the National, Navy, Army, 
and Air Force war colleges and to the Inter-American 
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Defense College, the Industrial College of the Armed 
Forces, the Armed Forces Staff College, and the Air 
Force and Naval academies. 
In an effort to achieve closer co-ordination, nearly all 
of the State Department's and AID's political and eco­
nomic activities concerning Latin America, including 
those relating to the Alliance for Progress, were com­
bined by then Assistant Secretary of State Mann, in 
1964. As a consequence, there is an immediacy and 
proximity of State and AID administration in Latin 
American affairs that is not visible in the other geo­
graphic areas. This somewhat reduces the necessity for an 
additional co-ordinating body or person. But within 
the combined State/AID Bureau of Inter-American 
Affairs, there are to be found offices including (a) 
the United States Representative to the Inter-American 
Economic and Social Council and (b) the Office of Re­
gional Political Affairs, which centralizes the bureau's 
relationships with the Pentagon. Moreover, there still 
remain as integral parts of the staff of AID a Military 
Assistance Division and a Public Safety Division. These 
two have not been combined with State's Latin Ameri­
can Bureau and continue to perform duties related to 
military assistance and local police projects in Latin 
America. Through these different channels, different 
aspects of counterinsurgency and the military civic-
action program in Latin America flow. 
In response to a congressman's questions, General 
Andrew O'Meara, then commander in chief of the 
United States Southern Command, stated in 1964 that 
civic action is primarily coordinated with the AID pro­
gram and very closely coordinated. In some areas the 
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Peace Corps people are in a position to enter into some 
of the civic action in which we engage. Generally, they 
are on a more dispersed type of operation where they 
don't fit too closely to a road building or a school-build­
ing program or something of that sort. As far as the 
coordination with AID is concerned, in the last year or 
18 months we have made very great progress on that. It 
is in a very satisfactory state right now. When we first 
started about 2\ years ago, some of the AID adminis­
trators didn't think this was a very good way to spend 
AID money, not as good as big dams, and so on. All that 
has gone by the board. The ambassadors are pushing it 
vigorously and the coordination is really the best and 
some of our best supporters for civic action are AID 
directors.8 
An additional lever of co-ordination in the field is the 
availability to the ambassador of a 350,000 per annum 
"impact fund." If a worthwhile project of immediate 
significance comes up for which there is no AID program 
or if there is no other source available—this covers the 
time element for quick and emergency authorization— 
or if there is a pivotal element missing to complete the 
project, the impact fund can be drawn upon. This can 
also apply to existing and on-going programs. There is 
a separate 325,000 emergency disaster fund on which 
the ambassadors may draw. When and where there is 
obstruction or lack of co-ordination, the ambassador 
can in some instances resolve the impasse by use of this 
fiscal authority, where or if other measures are ineffec­
tive. As a minimum he can give fresh impetus to a lag­
ging civic-action program if he thinks it necessary or 
desirable to do so. 
In addition to the creation within the State Depart­
ment of the G/PM, other attempts to obtain a continu­
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ing co-ordination and implementation of policy, both in 
Washington and in the posts abroad, have been initiated 
by the Department of State. One of these measures was 
introduced by Secretary of State Herter and Secretaiy 
of Defense Gates in setting in motion a plan for an ex­
change of outstanding civilian and key military person­
nel for selected positions in each department. Counter­
insurgency and civic-action programs are, of course, but 
one small fraction of the total subjects and positions 
covered by this exchange. 
One problem, illustrating the need that either a single 
individual or a continuous interagency committee or 
board be held responsible for civic action, is the question 
of funding. As it is, there is a somewhat ambiguous 
arrangement between the Department of Defense and 
AID, whereby the former finances those expenditures 
for military civic action in Latin America that can be 
styled as equipment and maintenance in support of 
military and paramilitary forces and for related training. 
AID has the financial responsibility for expenditures 
styled expendable soft goods, such as school materials, 
medical supplies, surplus food supplies (Public Law 480), 
as well as timber, cement, steel roofing, and other con­
struction materials. The quest for financial support can 
be a key factor in determining the kinds of projects to 
be undertaken. Accordingly there are likely to be dis­
agreements between departments. The fitting of pro­
jects into the national development plans, the priority 
among projects, the timing, and the amounts of United 
States financing, usually receives agreement within a 
Country Team. But final approval or disapproval may 
reveal an unbecoming scramble for authority and for 
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policy implementation. Higher echelons may also dis­
pute whether the direction should be toward nation 
building, economic development, or improving the image 
of the indigenous military. The result may be an inter­
agency hassle over budgeting. Officers interviewed by the 
authors intimated that there are occasional lacunae be­
tween AID and MAP in planning and funding. There is 
also some lack of follow-up or maintenance of projects 
once they are started or completed. There is no regular, 
single Washington headquarters or office to manage, to 
co-ordinate, to supervise, or to support civic action, ex­
cept the Special Group mentioned before, which meets 
at intervals and is not in continuous session. 
Press reports in mid-1965 more than hinted at a lack of 
co-ordination between the departments of State and 
Defense in one area of counterinsurgency and civic ac­
tion, i.e., research. Page one headline treatment reported 
that research questionnaires to members of the Chilean 
Armed Forces, and consultations with professors were 
conducted in Chile by the Special Operations Research 
Office in Washington, on behalf of the United States 
Army. Chile's "internal war potential and effects of 
government action" were under examination. The re­
ports added that on December 17, 1964, an army "task 
statement on Camelot" referred to the project as being 
concerned with "equipping and training indigenous 
forces for an internal security mission, civic action, 
psychological warfare or other counterinsurgency action. 
. . . " Apparently Ambassador Dungan in Santiago pro­
tested the study's being undertaken without his knowl­
edge. The news account added that in April, 1965, Lieu­
tenant General W. W. Dick, Jr., seeking $1.5 billion for 
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the army's research and development budget for 1966, 
replied to Congressman Lipscomb's inquiry as to com­
parable research by the State Department that "I am 
not familiar with what they may have." The State 
Department budget request for both intelligence and 
research was for ?4,200,000.° 
Assuming that if even slight supervision on an inter­
agency basis is performed by the Special Group, there 
is still to be taken into account the possibilities expressed 
by Mr. Charles Thayer in his volume Guerrilla: 
Since the majority of its members are civilian political 
figures, the Special Group as presently constituted effec­
tively assures that political aims remain dominant over 
temporary or purely military objectives [but] 
it has many of the earmarks and disadvantages of 
other ad hoc solutions. As an informal group meeting 
once a week, it owes its effectiveness largely if not exclu­
sively to the dynamic personalities and prestige of its 
individual members. With no permanent constitutional 
existence, it is at the mercy of whatever influences are 
currently dominant in Washington. Thus with a change 
of administration it might well disappear without a 
ripple from the scene, leaving the old concepts to guide 
the formulation of policy. Even more likely if less ener­
getic and able persons were to replace present members, 
it would in all probability join the long rank of other 
ad hoc committees which like ghosts haunt the govern­
ment's corridors and payrolls.10 
The revamping of United States governmental organi­
zations for dealing with the internal security of non-
Communist countries was accompanied by another im­
portant development. The evolution of United States 
hemispheric security doctrine from that of defense 
against external armed attack to that of defense against 
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subversion had been accompanied by increasing doubts 
concerning the utility of the inter-American security 
system. A series of special meetings to deal with cases 
of an alleged Communist threat had convinced the 
United States that existing inter-American security ma­
chinery was a weak reed on which to lean. One of the 
developments growing out of this situation was a realiza­
tion of the importance of bilateral arrangement in dealing 
with problems of internal security. Accordingly, notes 
were exchanged with a number of governments regard­
ing their commitment to employ United States-furnished 
armaments for internal defense purposes. The list of these 
exchanges of notes is found in Table 1, in Chapter II. 
The text of the notes may be found in Appendix G. 
Internal Defense Plans 
Another step in emphasizing bilateral arrangements 
for hemispheric security was the preparation of "Internal 
Defense Plans'' for selected Latin American countries. 
These plans are apparently unilateral as far as prepara­
tion is concerned and can be called bilateral only in the 
sense that they are the basis for recommendations to, 
and negotiations with, the country concerned. An Inter­
nal Defense Plan to meet the requirements set out by 
the Department of State would contain a political and 
economic appraisal of the host country, the adoption of 
measures to strengthen vulnerable points of the local 
society, the development of political policies and military 
capabilities to maintain internal security, and the mobili­
zation of local governmental resources to support those 
policies and capabilities.11 (See Appendix B.) 
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The chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission 
(the ambassador or his deputy) as head of the United 
States Country Team is charged with the development 
of the Internal Defense Plan. In addition, the Country 
Team comprises the chief representatives of the United 
States agencies on the staff of an embassy abroad. It 
would be expected that the AID man on the Country 
Team would recommend economic and financial pro­
grams; the USIA representative, the psychological opera­
tions; the intelligence man (CIA or otherwise), appro­
priate measures in his field of competence; and the mili­
tary representative, the equipment, personnel, and train­
ing that would be required. The embassy would be 
responsible for over-all evaluation and co-ordination and 
for enlisting the co-operation of the host government. 
The Internal Defense Plan, once drafted by the Country 
Team and forwarded to Washington with the approval 
of the ambassador, might very well be the subject ot 
modifications and additions by government agencies in 
Washington. It would be normal, for example, for such 
a document to be submitted to the chairman of the 
Department of State's Planning Council. 
Difficulties of Co-ordination 
In each of the United States embassies, there are 
military attaches. In some instances, the attache's office 
is composed of officers and enlisted men of the army, 
navy, and air force. Additionally, in most of the Latin 
American countries, there are either military missions 
or military assistance advisory groups (MAAG'S). The 
function of the missions and MAAG is normally specified 
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in government-to-government agreements, placing the 
mission and MAAC; advisers in the position of advising 
and counseling the host military establishment. Thus 
they are not carried in the diplomatic lists or considered 
to be staff members of the United States Embassy. The 
MAAG'S have a particular responsibility for advising 
and training on the use of military equipment sent to the 
host government. On occasion, specified duties involving 
advice on military hospital construction and administra­
tion, small arms instruction, and administration and 
teaching in the military schools are undertaken by MAA<; 
personnel. 
This is quite distinct from the functions of the at­
tache's office, which can be summarized as falling gener­
ally under two headings: the representation function 
and the intelligence gathering function. Operating as 
they do in a different relationship to the United States 
embassy and being responsible as they are to different 
headquarters in the Pentagon, these distinct military 
advisers have, on occasion caused ripples of disagreement 
in the field. An attache seeking information may be dis­
pleased at the unwillingness of United States MAAG 
officers who refuse to divulge information pertaining to 
local military developments. An ambassador, seeking 
technical military advice in order to determine what his 
recommendation to Washington should be regarding the 
kind and amount of military assistance to the host 
government might receive contradictory advice from an 
artillery man in the attache's office, as compared with an 
engineering officer in a MAAG. However, the opportuni­
ties for divergence should not hide the opportunities 
that exist for collaboration and co-ordination—oppor­
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tunities which are normally utilized and which a tactful 
ambassador can develop and exploit to the benefit both 
of the United States and of the host government. 
One of the principles emphasized at the United States 
training institutions is that military civic action should 
have local and indigenous initiative in the choice of 
tasks. Nonetheless, it is quite likely that embassy scru­
tiny and judgment is exercised at various stages before 
a country program is accepted. This scrutiny may occur 
in conversations between the ambassador and a MAAG 
officer working on civic-action assignments. The embassy 
may also consult with the military attache (who may 
have an opinion at considerable variance with the MAAG 
officers). Discussion of such topics with appropriate host 
government officials and with the local AID representa­
tives may shed additional light on the advisability of 
adopting a specific course of action, as well as assuring 
that local collaboration will be forthcoming. Under the 
existing division of responsibility for civic-action deci­
sions, issues such as comparative priority of projects, 
funding, and timing may be pivotal factors in Country 
Team discussions and in the ultimate recommendations 
made within the embassy. The recommendations for­
warded to Washington may be modified at an inter­
mediate level by the United States Southern Command 
to make them compatible with the hemispheric-wide 
plans and operational capabilities. Finally, embassy rec­
ommendations to the State Department and AID head­
quarters in Washington are taken into account by the 
decision-makers simultaneously with the views of MAAG 
forwarded by the Southern Command to the assistant 
secretary of defense for international security affairs 
Secretary of Assistant 
Defense for Special 
Operations 
Counter-Deputy Secretary 
of Defense 
_L 
Assistant Secretary 
of Deferise for 
International 
Security Affairs 
_L 
Director of 
Military Assistance 
insurgency 
Assistant 
1 
Special Assistant 
for Counter­
insurgency 
I 
Navy

Chief Navy

Officer

Director 
Special 
Warfare 
Counter­
insurgency 
Army Chief 
of Staff 
Deputy Chief of

Staff for

Operations

Continental

Army Command

(Conarc)

Special Assistant 
for Special 
Warfare 
Assistant Deputy 
•	 Chief of Staff for 
Special Operations 
Air Force

Chief of

Staff

Director 
Civil Affairs 
(Civic Action) 
Unified 
Command 
Military

Assistance

Advisory Group

Civil-Affairs

School

Special Other 
Warfare Conarc 
Center Schools 
Special 
Warfare 
School 
FIG. 4.—United States Department of Defense organizations for counterinsur­
gency and civic action. (Special Warfare and Civil Affairs Mission, U. S. Continental 
Army, Continental Command, Fort Monroe, Va., 1965.) 
116 Internal Security and Military Power 
ASD/ISA. Within the Pentagon, ISA forwards the plans 
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who, in turn, send to the 
respective service chiefs those sections of interest to 
them. It is clear that there is the necessity for clear­
ances and co-ordination at different levels. 
The totality of co-ordination efforts also involves many 
levels of high officials in the State Department and its 
Policy Planning Council. Also participating are the Geo­
graphic Assistant Secretary's Office (and the regional 
AID director), the Office of Deputy Undersecretary for 
Political Affairs, and the deputy assistant secretary of 
state for political/military affairs (as shown in Figure 3) 
for co-ordination and liaison with the Department of 
Defense. 
But, at a much earlier stage, the inputs for this de­
cision may have proved to be determining for the pro­
fessional disciplines within the MAAG'S—i.e., sanitary en­
gineers, aviation or armor specialists, and transportation 
or medical officers will tend inevitably to orient the local 
program recommendations along the lines of their own 
specialties. Is this a proper test to determine what kinds 
of civic action should be proposed? What scientific, sta­
tistical, or objective criteria are applied to choose proj­
ects? The same questions are relevant to the makeup 
of the MTT's (mobile training teams) sent by the 
Pentagon to a Latin American country. What scientific, 
objective criteria are used in selecting the members of 
the MTT? If educators or transportation men are put 
on the MTT, can we expect anything but educational 
or transportation projects to be studied and recom­
mended? This puts AID and the embassies in thefield at 
a considerable handicap in expressing their views of 
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what the best choice of civic-action projects should be. 
Stated another way, this means that, in effect, decision-
making is accomplished at a much earlier stage than is 
generally realized and by individuals unknown and per­
haps not responsible for United States relations with the 
host country. It is decision-making by subordinate mem­
bers of the United States military establishment. 
Having reviewed the organization and co-ordination 
within the United States government for counterinsur­
gency and civic action, let us examine the corresponding 
organization in the Latin American countries. Are there 
differences between planning in Washington and prac­
tical operations in the field? 
Ill 
Administration in Latin America 
Under the direction of the United States ambassador 
abroad, Country Teams have the responsibility of work­
ing with their opposite numbers within the host govern­
ment for planning, training, operating, and publicizing 
civic-action projects. Difficult as it may be in some cir­
cumstances for the United States Country Team to 
obtain total harmony and the continuing co-ordination 
of all aspects of the civic-action program, an additional 
hurdle must be overcome in the liaison with different 
agencies and at different levels of the host government. 
Much depends on the good will and acceptance of active 
leadership by the chief of state and his military officials. 
Even the acceptance of the concept and promise of 
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firm support by these persons requires a co-ordination 
and follow-up function in order to achieve results. 
Although most of the activities now called civic action 
have been carried on for a long time, they were not 
thought of as "a program" and no reason for co-ordina­
tion was apparent. In some cases they were engaged in 
as a normal or traditional duty of the armed forces; in 
other cases, it was on an ad hoc basis at the request of 
another government agency. These permutations are still 
a prominent feature of administration and implementa­
tion of what is now called civic action. Some countries 
have recently set up special organizations for co-ordina­
tion and implementation of civic action. In many cases, 
however, they either remain largely on paper or, in any 
event, accomplish little administration and co-ordination. 
The operational procedures laid down for these tasks 
vary substantially from country to country. Some have 
created a co-ordinating agency on the ministerial level, 
making it directly responsible for the planning and direc­
tion of military civic action. Others maintain special 
military units devoted exclusively to carrying out civic-
action tasks. The remainder works within the regular 
military organization itself to accomplish these activities. 
The armed forces of some countries act on their own 
initiative, independent of civil authority and employing 
their own funds and manpower. In others, civic action 
is accomplished at the request of civilian agencies with 
the armed forces supplying technical direction, personnel, 
materials, and equipment. Although it would be im­
possible to select "representative" examples from a 
widely divergent continent, the following will show some 
of the varieties of administration. 
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Colombia.-A presidential decree in November, 1962, 
created the National Committee on Military Civic Ac­
tion and gave it the mission of co-ordinating civic-action 
activities throughout the entire nation. It includes the 
ministers of government, war, agriculture, public health, 
national education, and public works. This committee 
may also include official, semi-official, and private en­
tities, as well as private individuals who wish to for­
ward its purpose. The minister of war serves as an execu­
tive secretary for the committee. 
Chile.-The government of Chile has relied on a variety 
of ad hoc measures for administration and implementa­
tion. A decree of March 26, 1960, created the Military 
Work Corps as an independent agency under the com­
mander in chief of the army. Any entity of the National 
and Municipal Public Administrations (official, semi­
official, or autonomous) is empowered to carry out works 
in conjunction with the Military Works Corps, the cost 
being charged against funds that are budgeted to the 
respective entity. By another executive decree, the army 
factory and machine shop, and the navy shipyard and 
machine shop, operate with the Corporation for Produc­
tion Development, subject to a supervisory council. Di­
rected by military officers, both of the military entities 
engage in contract work for civilian users. By Executive 
Decree of November 10, 1942, the army and the Corpora­
tion for Production Development were empowered to 
carry out jointly a program of training conscripts in the 
operation of tractors. By another decree of December 19, 
1958, the National Defense Ministry and the Ministry 
of Agriculture were made responsible for a forest fire-
fighting brigade. The Chilean Air Force collaborates with 
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the Ministry of Public Works, the Institute for Geologi­
cal Research, and the National Electric Power Agency 
in conducting an aerial photographic service. 
Venezuela.-In Venezuela, forest fire-fighting, refores­
tation, and the development of nurseries are undertaken 
by collaboration. The Ministry of Defense, the com­
manders of the armed forces, and the Armed Forces of 
Co-operation1- join with the following civilian agencies: 
Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, the National 
Universities, Ministry of Public Works, and the Federa­
tion of Air Clubs. Plans are administered by the Joint 
Military Staff through the respective armed services. 
The Office of the Commander of the Army has responsi­
bility for operation of agriculture and livestock schools 
to train recruits in modern techniques. The Ministry of 
Education establishes Popular Culture Centers in all 
military installations for literacy training and additional 
collective centers for literacy are operated by military 
personnel in various areas without schools. The Engi­
neering Service of the Ministry of Defense co-operates 
with the Ministry of Public Works in highway and air­
field construction in the remote provinces. The Engineer­
ing Service directs and executes the construction, the De­
partment of Public Works provides the finances and 
machinery. 
El Salvador.-The national organization for civic action 
in this country has a director general in the Ministry of 
Defense, a National Central Committee, a public re­
lations unit, and regional and local committees. The 
National Central Committee members are the ministers 
of education, interior, agriculture, health, public works, 
and defense. The director and the Central Committee 
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prepare annual civic-action programs. Local military 
commanders perpare and submit detailed civic-action 
operations plans to the Ministry of Defense in accord­
ance with, and supplementary to, the national plan. If 
locally available resources are inadequate, requests for 
assistance are to be submitted to the higher level com­
mittee for consideration. A monthly report on civic-
action accomplishments is required to be forwarded to 
the Ministry of Defense and to the chief of the general 
staff of the armed forces. The Salvadorian 1965 Civic-
Action Plan has a logical and careful time schedule of 
operations reflecting this tight administrative hierarchy. 
The plan, largely conducted by the army's engineers, 
gives priority to building repairs; rural-road, sports-
field, and bridge construction; and clearing land for 
farming. The plan spells out the kind and amount of 
supplies and equipment that local military commands 
are authorized to use for civic action with a specified time 
when heavy equipment will be used in a specific zone. 
Plans and reports are required for this, as well as for 
the other detailed arrangements for literacy, health, and 
public welfare programs. Dates, places, and amounts of 
supplies are specified. Altogether, it is a well-knit twenty-
three page operation plan in four main fields. Public 
relations elements are stressed throughout. 
Bolivia.-For a number of reasons the arrangements 
developed in Bolivia for the administration of civic 
action are of particular interest. In 1952, the advent of 
the revolutionary regime meant the eclipse of the old 
army, and after a slow buildup, during the past several 
years, the new armed forces were given increasingly im­
portant roles in economic development of the country. 
122 Internal Security and Military Power 
There was wide geographic distribution of the armed-
forces activities and a great range also in the nature 
of the work they undertook, including road-building, 
community development, colonization, agriculture, edu­
cation, potable water, and river improvement. In 1955, 
a colonization division of the armed forces was created 
that built roads, cleared lands for settlement, planted 
and marketed crops. Men who pioneered by working in 
this division were given improved farm land. Substantial 
United States economic aid and MAP assistance was 
given to Bolivia on a per capita basis (this was the 
largest amount of help for any Latin American country). 
An unusual aspect was that United States assistance 
came entirely from AID and none from MAP because 
of the historical origins of the program. Through AID, 
there were made available counterpart funds derived 
from the sale of United States agricultural surpluses.13 
Thus the Country Team at La Paz was able more di­
rectly and quickly to obtain funds for projects that 
were agreed upon locally. It has also been reported that 
the local AID officials, enthusiastic about the civic-action 
program, gave an unusual amount of time and influence 
to further its progress, and received active co-operation 
from the embassy and the MAAG chief. Furthermore, 
Air Force General Barrientos, who assumed the presi­
dency after the overthrow of Paz Estensorro in Novem­
ber, 1964, was a strong advocate of civic action, both 
before and since assuming the presidency. 
Administrative changes in 1965 were notable. In Jan­
uary, 1965, the Bolivians assumed primary responsibility 
for project-planning and distribution of funds through 
the National Office for the Promotion of Human Re­
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sources under the auspices of the minister of economy. 
All governmental ministries (i.e., Defense, Health, Public 
Works, etc.), which have a capacity or need for civic 
action, send representatives to this office during the 
planning sessions to recommend projects. AID and 
United States military technicians and advisers support 
their counterparts in this office by advising and assisting 
them in the preparation of a national civic-action pro­
gram. Meanwhile, the armed forces have been reorgan­
ized to create nine regional civic-action staff sections 
with responsibility to foster, implement, manage, and 
report upon the progress of civic-action projects in their 
respective regions. The nine newly organized regional 
offices are focal points for civic action in what has been 
previously a very decentralized operation. Similarly, 
several community-development centers are to be estab­
lished for the training of community-development, vil­
lage-level workers and for distribution of such items as 
water pumps, building materials, and Food for Peace 
supplies to stimulate self-help civic action and com­
munity development programs. 
The Barrientos government made up of an all-military 
cabinet, received United States recognition a month after 
taking power. A military officer, Colonel Julio Sanjines 
Goitia, an engineering officer, was named Bolivian am­
bassador to the United States in 1965. Obviously having 
absorbed some of the ideas of United States civic-action 
planning, Colonel Sanjines issued in 1964, a forty page 
pamphlet, in English, entitled Civic Action: Role of the 
Armed Forces in the Social and Economical Develop­
ment of a Country. The pamphlet's prologue was signed 
by Colonel Truman F Cook, then chief of the United 
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States Military Mission to Bolivia. Citing the official 
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff definition of "Mili­
tary Civic Action," Colonel Sanjines' pamphlet goes into 
the doctrinal and organizational aspects of civic action 
and submits a model plan of organization-with charts 
and diagrams. He contemplates the creation of a fifth 
department in the Office of the Commander in Chief of 
the Armed Forces. This Department would prepare and 
co-ordinate an Armed Forces Plan to pursue economic 
and social objectives, including agrarian reform, directed 
by a technical section and an economic section. Both 
immediate impact programs and long-range programs 
are fully listed. The fifth department would have plan­
ning and co-ordinating and controlling duties with the 
actual execution of projects being left to the three mili­
tary services. If the plan should become a part of the 
national development plan, the resources for its execu­
tion would come from the national budget and foreign 
loans and credits, otherwise its funds would derive from 
the armed forces resources. (The pamphlet, issued at 
La Paz, bears the imprint of AID's Audio-Visual 
Center.) 
Argentina.-The Argentine armed forces have a long 
history of civic action dating back to the origins of the 
republic. There are no military units that devote their 
full time to civic action. The air force is reported to have 
no formal plan for civic action in the future. In such 
areas numerous small projects are undertaken, such as 
rescue and disaster relief; literacy education; medical 
services; and road, bridge, telegraph line, and school con­
struction.14 Transportation to remote areas in the south, 
both of goods and of people, is a typical navy service, as 
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is weather forecasting. The Argentine program has not 
received assistance from AID or other United States 
civilian agencies but has benefited from MAP equip­
ment for construction purposes. United States Army 
mission officers helped to establish a course of instruction 
in civic action in the military schools and arranged for 
Argentine officers to attend the Civil Affairs School at 
Fort Gordon. The compilations of the United States 
Southern Command indicated a heavy emphasis on 
public relations and mentions sports events, band con­
certs, and similar activities. Military publications pay 
serious attention to civic-action projects and training.15 
Mexico.-While the Mexican armed forces conduct 
many projects of a civic-action nature, there is no gov­
ernment- or defense secretariat-directed civic-action pro­
gram per se. It is a program undertaken when needed 
and as needed by the thirty-four zone commanders in 
conjunction with the state governors. In the absence of 
a central program, the military at all levels are encour­
aged in such projects. Only three, apparently, have any 
central co-ordination at the secretary of defense level. 
These are: (1) Civil education: the armed services have 
built many 1-2 room school houses in rural areas; they 
also provided basic education instruction in areas where 
teachers are few. (2) Antideforestation and antipoppy/ 
marijuana patrols accomplished jointly by the army with 
naval air and air force elements. (3) Highway and poll­
ing-place surveillance during tourist seasons.16 Other 
actions of interest are school rehabilitation, reforestation, 
antimalaria campaigns, building of secondary roads, and 
disaster relief. All military schools in their curriculums 
have courses emphasizing the importance of civic action 
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to internal security. They use many United States mili­
tary texts and instruction materials. However, Mexico 
does not accept any grant assistance from the United 
States. Even offers of medical supplies and athletic 
equipment have been politely refused. The reason that 
the Southern Command compilations of civic-action proj­
ects do not give any data about Mexico is the absence 
of a MAP for that country. It should not be inferred 
that there is no civic-action program because of the lack 
of publicity in the United States. The contrary is the 
case; following the revolution of 1910 and its aftermath, 
Secretary of War Joaquin Amaro adopted a strong 
policy of putting the recruits to work at road-building 
and public works. Under Presidents Obregon, Calles 
Cardenas, and Camacho these functions were continued 
and expanded, especially in educational matters. 
Honduras.-An editorial in a journal,17 devoted entirely 
to military civic action, stated that Article 316 of the 
Honduras Constitution provides for the collaboration 
of the armed forces with other governmental agencies 
in the fields of agriculture, education, communications, 
colonization, and literacy.18 A director of civic action, 
with the rank of major and a member of the staff of the 
Ministry of Defense and Public Security, directs and 
centralizes control over the entire program, including 
air force projects. Some of the many diverse projects 
included provision of medical services and sanitary and 
drainage facilities, and the construction of roads, schools, 
public buildings, and furniture for schools. Significant 
attention is also given to public relations. A strong 
effort at co-ordination is made by the Honduran govern­
ment with the help of the chief of the armed forces, 
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Brigadier General Oswaldo Lopez Allennaro. The pro­
gram could be considered to combine as a purpose and 
intended result the strengthening and continuance of the 
military role in the country. Repeatedly, articles in the 
Honduran publication Revista Militar stress the social-
economic purposes of the military government's work to 
assist the public through several kinds of civic action. 
Coincidental with this, and equally pertinent in the 
issues of Revista Militar, are descriptions of the activities 
of the United States Military Mission to Honduras.18 
This review published several articles on civic action, de­
veloping the idea of bringing the public closer to the 
government and to the army in order to erect a successful 
barrier against guerrillas and insurgents. 
Guatemala.-ln November, 1960, a Department of the 
army civic-action team was sent to Guatemala at the 
request of President Ydigoras, who soon created a civic-
action section in the Ministry of Defense staffed by 
Guatemalan civic-action officers trained by the Country 
Team. This team visited military installations in, and 
traveled extensively throughout, each military zone. A 
civic-action plan that was developed for the country in­
cluded the selection of a number of low-cost projects for 
the military units to undertake in each zone. Among the 
projects were irrigation, dispensary services, road im­
provements, school construction, water purification, sani­
tation measures, and communication improvements. The 
recommendations of the team were accepted by the 
President and ordered into effect. The President also 
requested the assignment to the Army Mission in Guate­
mala of a permanent, full-time civic-action officer to 
guide and direct the activity. Several months after the 
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United States team's return, President Ydigoras, in his 
State of the Union Message to the Guatemalan Congress, 
declared: "There has now begun to infiltrate within the 
Army a new spirit of cooperation in favor of community 
development at the site of each military unit."20 Al­
though civic-action-type activities have been undertaken 
by the Guatemalan Army for many years, the idea for 
implementing a program of civic action in Guatemala 
was stated to have been inspired by Resolution XLVII 
adopted by the Inter-American Defense Board in 1960. 
The text of the Resolution is given in Appendix D. 
In 1961, and again in 1962, civic-action survey teams 
conducted examinations of the existing program and 
recommendations were submitted to the Guatemalan 
government that requested and received the assignment 
of a full-time civic-action adviser to the army. In April 
of 1963, the AID office in Guatemala appointed as civic-
action co-ordinator a man previously the civic affairs 
officer at United States Southern Command. In order 
to further co-ordinate the AID/MAP support of civic-
action projects, a Guatemalan civilian, previously em­
ployed by the Guatemalan Army as a civilian medical 
adviser to the civic-action program, was hired by CARE 
as business manager to administer the CARE, Civic Action 
Co-operative Project. This established close co-ordina­
tion between these agencies to insure maximum utiliza­
tion of equipment, funds, and labor. 
The organization for the conduct of civic action by 
the Guatemalan armed forces is unique in that the 
United States civic-action officer acts purely as an 
adviser; the Guatemalan armed forces conduct the en­
tire program. Projects are developed in community 
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relations councils organized in each of the military zones 
or the areas adjacent to the major military installations. 
These councils, consisting of both military and civilian 
members, meet each month to discuss and propose 
projects that can be mutually supported and can be 
of great benefit to the community. One of the military 
members of this council is a Guatemalan officer assigned 
as civic-action project officer for this particular area. 
Present at the meeting may be the United States civic-
action adviser, AID civic-action co-ordinator, and a CARE 
representative. If the project developed does not require 
United States funds or equipment, then the military and 
civilian elements of the local community proceed with 
the plans. When additional funds or equipment is 
needed, the project is submitted to the Guatemalan 
general staff civic-action section for review. This section 
then may co-ordinate it with the various ministerial 
offices concerned. If funds or equipment is not locally 
available, the project is then presented to the United 
States civic-action adviser for review and co-ordination 
with MAP, AID, CARE, and the embassy, leading to Coun­
try Team approval. Thence they are forwarded for 
financing support by AID or MAP or possibly both. When 
the equipment or supplies arrive, they are turned over 
to the local unit working on the task.21 "Credit for the 
affirmative response from Guatemala can be linked 
clearly with the personalities and past experiences of 
two men—the Guatemalan president and American Am­
bassador [Ambassador Muccio, who had observed civic 
action in Korea]. The then president, Migel Ydigoras 
Fuentes, had been an army general. He also at one time 
had been the Director General of Roads."22 
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The administration of civic action within the Guate­
malan Government takes the form of a special section 
of the army general Staff entitled "Public Relations, 
History, Cultural and Civic Action." In each brigade, 
in military zone headquarters, and in the air force and 
navy elements of the armed forces, there is a Civic Ac­
tion Projects Office. The Community Relations Council 
organized in the local communities must also be con­
sidered to be a part of the organizational structure. 
Local conferences are held annually to brief and to guide 
the project officers. Four Guatemalan officers trained in 
United States schools in civic action were employed in 
various phases of civic action until late in 1964, when 
three of them were reassigned to other duties. The 
United States civic-action adviser is in daily contact with 
his Guatemalan counterpart AID, CARE, and the appro­
priate ministries of the government. The use of com­
munity relations councils has been held to be of great 
benefit in establishing an active program and in improv­
ing military-community relations. Many small but im­
portant projects are completed with local military and 
civilian labor, equipment, and funds, thus affording both 
the local military commander and community leaders a 
pride of accomplishment and a desire to do more self-
improvement. Different communities place different 
priorities on the things that they want and are willing 
to work for. 
The frequent articles on the inauguration or comple­
tion of civic-action projects normally feature the presence 
and the words of the military head of government. An 
example is the February, 1964, issue of the Guatemalan 
publication Ejercito, in which President Enrique Peralta 
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opened a number of roads, schools, and a saw mill in 
an undeveloped area of the country in the province of 
Peten. The president was accompanied by a number 
of cabinet members and the United States ambassador. 
Other issues of Ejercito in 1964 report conferences in the 
Ministry of Defense regarding the publicity campaign 
for civic action. One Guatemalan officer had just returned 
from attending the Information Training School con­
ducted at Fort Slocum, New York. Probably as a con­
sequence, each issue of the military magazine carried 
extensive articles and photographs of civic-action proj­
ects, as well as numerous reproductions of articles ap­
pearing in local newspapers. Bridge- , road- , and school-
building, potable water wells, and medical clinics are 
the activities most frequent to be publicized. Reforesta­
tion, cattle-raising, veterinary services, and the printing 
and distribution of school books are also given attention, 
as well as school lunches, distribution of shoes for school 
children, and instances of disaster relief. The military 
press reports in detail on the organization and function 
of local civic-action committees. 
Unusual Aspects of Civic Action in Central America 
Compared with the countries south of Panama, the 
Central American countries' energetic and enthusiastic 
adoption of military civic action is notably different, as 
has been demonstrated. The experienced observer of 
Latin America can detect in the speeches of its leaders 
and the publications issued by its defense departments 
the ideas and arguments advanced by United States 
spokesmen for civic action. The same ideology and the 
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same phrases are utilized. There is much publicity. Ci­
vilian and military officers of high rank co-ordinate and 
administer civic-action programs. By virtue of the in­
tensity of attention and the great expense attendant 
upon the military's participation in these functions, an 
impression is created of an all-out effort and an all-
encompassing military establishment. 
It is significant that the governments of Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua are militarily oriented. In 
Honduras and Guatemala, connections with the United 
States Embassy and the United States military missions 
are close, frequent, and widely publicized. In Nicaragua, 
the military's administration of rural police, education, 
communications, transport, intelligence, and construc­
tion activities provides a concentration of control by the 
Somoza family in many facets of the country's life. A 
study of civic action as practiced in Nicaragua raises 
the question as to whether the result is a general encour­
agement to the government to intervene in economic 
matters. The reader may consider that this factor may 
have much wider application than just in Nicaragua. 
Quite distinctive is the situation in Costa Rica where 
the Civil Guard, scarcely a professional military organ­
ization, performs police functions but has undertaken 
some projects of construction, engineering, education, 
and health measures similar to those considered to be 
civic action. If any of the Central American countries 
were lacking in ideas for organization of their counter­
insurgency and civic action, a conference on that subject 
held at Fort Gulick, Canal Zone, in November, 1964, 
more than took care of any gaps. A half-dozen Latin 
American delegations attended. A monumental adminis­
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trative hierarchy was proposed at national, regional, and 
local levels. A national assembly representing all levels 
would meet twice a year to establish the guide lines and 
program for civic action. The execution of the plan would 
be in the hands of a Board of Directors consisting of 
spokesmen for each of the government ministries 
affected. A technical assistance council would consult 
and audit the projects, and a co-ordination committee 
would integrate the work of the government and private 
entities. There would be comparable organizations at the 
regional and local level. The flow of ideas and plans 
would be forwarded from the national to the local com­
mittees. 
This plan would prohibit the naming of projects for 
individual military officers; only the armed forces should 
be mentioned as the sponsor. The funds for all of this 
should come from the National Defense Budget. The 
conclusions of the report prepared at the end of the meet­
ing were of a somewhat similar and flamboyant nature: 
Experiences derived from the successful accomplishments 
of civic action programs in countries such as the Philip­
pines, Venezuela, Colombia, and others, make it possible 
to consider civic action as the most effective means of 
combatting insurgency and the expansionist plans of 
communism in the Latin American countries. These ex­
periences show that civic action is the best weapon by 
which to gain public approval in our countries, obtain­
ing the support of the populations, stability in legitimately 
established government and gaining the affection and 
respect of the people for the Armed Forces.23 
The overstatement of objectives, coupled with un­
necessarily complex and burdensome bureaucratic ma­
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chinery to manage what is at best but one aspect of the 
nation's counterinsurgency and defense policy, can be 
as injurious to successful results as is apathy or lack of 
planning at the other extreme. Several of the Central 
American programs suffer in this way. There is a likeli­
hood that the expanding jurisdiction claimed for civic 
action may discourage private commercial enterprise. 
In these countries of limited resources, it may not be 
highly economic or efficient exploitation of those re­
sources to permit them to pass into the hands of the 
military. The intimation that the programs are planned 
to help keep the existing military regimes in power yields 
other misgivings as to the political purpose for which so 
much was hoped at the time of the acceptance of the 
civic-action doctrine. 
In 1962, a first Central American Conference on Civic 
Action was held in Guatemala City, and in December, 
1963, a second conference was held in El Salvador. A 
third met in Teguicigalpa in 1964 and a fourth was sched­
uled for 1965. In each of these conferences, delegations 
were present from Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, 
Nicaragua, and Panama, but not from Costa Rica.24 
Top-Level Direction and Team Work 
It may be that the existence of an organizational 
structure can be taken as an index of a successful (or 
serious) attempt at civic action. Some close observers 
have remarked that a key prerequisite for successful 
civic action is the commitment by top echelons. This 
might be civilian or military. But we cannot assume that 
the existence of some formal organizational structure 
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reflects the acceptance by the "top echelon" of a work­
able formula. In addition to top level support, there is 
in military civic action a special need for continuous 
team work—a quality for which Latin American admin­
istrators are not particularly noted. 
By its very nature the execution of civic-action proj­
ects infringes upon the opportunities, responsibilities, 
and bureaucracies of various ministries such as Public 
Works, Communications, Agriculture, Education, Pub­
lic Health, etc. Indeed, there is a double danger here in 
that follow-up maintenance of projects (also a less than 
perfectly fulfilled function in most Latin American 
countries) may very well obligate the other ministries 
after the military civic-action team has completed the 
construction. Thus, the turning over of a road, a school 
house, or a communication installation would require 
supplies, administration, upkeep, management, training 
and arranging of personnel, and budget demands on the 
regular ministry. This can, and does, place a strain on 
any interdepartmental relationship, in countries more 
devoted to the science of administrative practice than 
are the Latin Americans. The problem of efficient use 
of limited resources cannot be ignored. In countries 
where there are such shortages is the military the means 
by which the greatest economic benefit can be obtained? 
At another level, the team-spirit requirement to ob­
tain local support by citizens and officials in civic-action 
projects is elemental if one of the basic objectives of civic 
action is to be attained; that is, an improved public 
image of the central government and of the military. 
This is easier said than done. Skeptics abound in the 
villages and in the country. They are likely to think of 
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a road project in terms of the enhanced property value 
for a local political boss and to suspect profiteering some­
how or somewhere in connection with the arrival of 
expensive supplies or heavy equipment. They may be 
disappointed to learn that a new school will be used 
largely for the benefit of the army officers' children, or 
they may be made jealous by gossip of greater advan­
tages accruing to another neighborhood. 
A basic problem rarely discussed is the local citizens' 
reaction to the civic-action effort that is designed to 
benefit them. What and where are the means to reach 
the public? It is not likely that villagers or country folk 
will be much more than onlookers unless positive steps 
are taken to go further than merely to arouse their 
curiosity. The working together with the military on a 
project of benefit to their area will improve the public 
image of the military, which is one of the proclaimed 
objectives. But in order to accomplish this co-operation, 
public relations or educational programs may be found 
to be necessary to establish the need for, and the utility 
of, departures from traditional ways, (usis can have a 
significant role in helping with the public relations as­
pect, and United States "Food for Peace" may be utilized 
to provide incentive for civilian co-operation.) This can 
be done if the people work on a project of their own 
rather than standing by and watching strange men in 
uniforms doing strange things. A performance with im­
mediate impact will often provide the experience and 
encouragement for a later, more ambitious undertaking, 
responsive to the country's long-range economic needs. 
Herein lies an opportunity to put into effect the much 
discussed ideology, "We are in a struggle for men s minds 
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and souls," with the much discussed co-ordination of 
all agencies, USIA, Food for Peace, and United States 
Military and diplomatic personnel. 
1. A United Press International news report, carried in the Feb­
ruary 20, 1961, issue of the Nczv York Times, under the heading 
"President Ends Top Policy Body,'' stated: "President Kennedy moved 
today to strengthen White House control over national security and 
foreign policy actions and assure that Federal agencies adhere 'to the 
policy of the White House in those fields.' Mr. Kennedy said he intends 
to maintain direct communications with the responsible agencies 'so 
that everyone will know what I have decided.' Much of the responsibil­
ity for the Board's work will be centered in the Secretary of State. 
'This is part of the President's program for strengthening the respon­
sibilities of individual Government Departments and insuring close 
White House liaison with them.' He said he expected senior officials 
who had served on the Board to keep close informal touch with each 
other on problems of common interest. Mr. Bromley Smith is to con­
tinue to work with Mr. Bundy "in following up on White House de­
cisions in the area of national security,' the President said. 'In their 
varied ways, we intend that the net result shall be a strengthening of 
the process by which our policies are effectively coordinated and carried 
out throughout the Executive Branch,' he explained." 
In hearings before the House of Representatives Appropriations 
Committee in 1963, presumably referring to the Special Group, General 
Taylor stated that a completely new structure which might be called 
in effect, a Joint Chiefs of Staff of all agencies involved in counter­
insurgency had not existed prior to January, 1962 (Subcommittee of 
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insurgency) [consists of the] Undersecretary of State of Political 
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Chapter 5

Training 
A variety of activities performed by mili­
tary units, ranging from riot control and other internal 
security measures on the one hand to such programs as 
road-building, disaster relief, and exploration on the 
other, had been performed as a matter of course for 
decades prior to 1960, both in the United States and in 
the other American republics. Such functions were not 
new, although the terminology and context in which 
they were discussed at some length in chapters 2 and 3 
placed special emphasis on these functions in the years 
1960-62. And the impetus supplied by President Ken­
nedy (in keeping with the slogan of the recent electoral 
campaign "to get the country moving"), Attorney Gen­
eral Kennedy, and Special Military Adviser General 
Maxwell Taylor was of considerable force. Repeated 
statements were made in regular and special messages 
to Congress, in press conferences, in TV appearances, 
in talks or messages to military meetings, and to groups 
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of government employees. Promotions and special assign­
ments were handed out; transfers of personnel pointed 
up the active and direct personal interest taken by the 
President and by the Special Group. Spokesmen known 
to represent the President's views delivered lectures 
and wrote articles appearing in official and professional 
publications. Countennsurgency and military civic action 
were de mode: they were "in." Funds were appropri­
ated, and the theory of countennsurgency and civic 
action flourished. To put these concepts into action, 
orientation and indoctrination was necessary. Civilian 
and military personnel, accordingly, at all levels, needed 
to be exposed to, and drilled in, the theory and practice. 
The concern of the President and his top assistants 
was reflected in efforts to train United States as well 
as the Latin American armed forces for countennsur­
gency operations. Additions of new courses, or material, 
were made to the curriculums of the country's major 
military training institutions. 
In 1961, the President asked Congress for funds to 
support an increase in army personnel strength to per­
mit expansion of guerrilla warfare units. These units 
were soon increased by approximately three thousand. 
Early the next year, the Army Special Forces numbered 
3,800, with 937 more in training at the Special Warfare 
Center at Fort Bragg. This strength, scheduled to expand 
to 5,000 by June 30, 1962, actually reached 5,600 early 
in 1963. 
On June 10, 1962, the State Department announced 
that in co-operation with other agencies of the govern­
ment, it was inaugurating a series of seminar courses 
called the "National Interdepartmental Seminar on 
Problems of Development and Internal Defense." For 
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administrative purposes the seminar was organized un­
der the jurisdiction of the State Department's Foreign 
Service Institute. The official announcement declared 
that, "The Seminar demonstrates the United States* 
determination to assist the less developed countries of 
the free world in developing balanced capabilities for the 
total defense of their societies against internal as well as 
external threats." 1 
The broad purpose of the seminar, popularly known 
as the "Counterinsurgency Course," is to develop more 
co-ordinated and harmonious operations at the Country 
Team level. To this end, it seeks to relate the study of 
insurgency to the political, economic, and social context 
in which it occurs. Medium and senior grade officers of 
all agencies represented abroad are familiarized with 
each other's business and with the resources of the United 
States government to assist the less-developed countries 
of the world in suppressing insurgency. Each seminar 
lastsfive weeks and is repeated six or seven times a year." 
According to a State Department report, an average 
class of sixty-five "will include three or four Ambassa­
dors, a couple of Generals, and eight or ten Colonels, 
ten to fifteen Mission Directors or other senior AID 
officials, six or eight country Public Affairs Officers and 
a sprinkling of Deputy Chiefs of Missions, Counselors of 
Embassy and Principal Officers." :i 
In view of the requirement for special air-borne forces 
to meet counterinsurgency problems, the air force, in 
1962, announced the activation of a Special Air Warfare 
Center at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida. This center 
now conducts training in special air operations and de­
velops special warfare technique in counterinsurgency 
operations. It also works closely with the army's Special 
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Warfare Center at Fort Bragg. The marine corps also 
gives counterinsurgency training and indoctrination at 
all levels. The Fleet Marine Force receives instruction 
in special warfare techniques. 
The Military Assistance Institute (MAI), Arlington, 
Virginia, offers a month-long course ten times a year 
with 100 officers in each class in preparation for the 
technical instruction and administrative duties that 
would be performed abroad as members of Military 
Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG'S). Lectures by offi­
cers from the departments of State and Defense, the 
Agency for International Development (AID), and the 
United States Information Agency, as well as attention 
to area studies, comprise the program of instruction of 
MAI. The director of MAI placed eighth in a list of 
ten principal MAAG policies in which MAI is to orient 
the student "to the extent consistent with U.S. objec­
tives and policy, identify and assist in civic action 
projects." The ninth was to "develop counterinsurgency 
forces and plan for their utilization." It is of interest to 
note that fourth in the list of ten directives was to 
"further the sales of United States-produced military 
equipment to meet valid country requirements." 4 
School of the Americas 
The Army Caribbean School in Panama,' renamed 
the United States Army School of the Americas on July 
1, 1963, was founded February 1, 1949, for instruction 
of United States Army technicians. A secondary mission 
was to instruct Latin Americans. Today, the formal mis­
sion of the school is to support the United States Army 
Southern Command effort in South and Central America 
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by conducting, in Spanish, training courses for Latin 
American military personnel designed to strengthen the 
internal security of their republics in peace and war. 
Since its inception through 1964, 16,343 Latin American 
students (officers and enlisted men) from nineteen 
countries and 9,876 United States students have grad­
uated from the school. Approximately 1,400 graduated 
in 1963 and about the same number in 1964. The 16,343 
Latin American graduates as of the end of 1964 repre­
sented the following countries: 
Country Number 
Argentina 259 
Bolivia 1,124 
Brazil 165 
Chile 281 
Colombia 1,366 
Costa Rica 1,639 
Cuba 291 
Dominican Republic 233 
Ecuador 1,478 
El Salvador 358 
Guatemala 958 
Haiti 50 
Honduras 810 
Mexico 178 
Nicaragua 2,969 
Panama 1,420 
Paraguay 507 
Peru 805 
Uruguay 202 
Venezuela 1,195 
146 Internal Security and Military Power 
In the case of Brazil and Haiti, the language obstacle 
has limited attendance. Some other countries with small 
representation have well-established military-school sys­
tems of their own. Furthermore, the representation shows 
a large number of graduates from the nearby countries 
where traveling expenses would be a minor factor. This 
includes both Panama and Costa Rica, countries which 
are often described as "having no armies.'' In each case, 
however, many essential military functions—going be­
yond police duties—are performed by units of the na­
tional guard in those two countries. 
The school's normal student load at any one time 
would consist of between 350 and 500 Latin American 
students. The courses run throughout the calendar year, 
with the exception of December. Two cadet courses are 
conducted regularly. One is given annually during Janu­
ary for Peruvian military academy cadets who are given 
an exposure to many of the courses given at the school. 
The other, a regular cadet course, forty weeks in length, 
has representatives from two to four of the Latin Ameri­
can academies. Faculty and staff consist of officers and 
enlisted men, of both the United States and Latin Ameri­
can military establishments. The school has two instruc­
tional departments: the internal security department and 
the technical department. Courses vary in length from 
the two-week counterinsurgency orientation course, the 
shortest, to the forty week command-and-staff, and 
cadet courses. 
In shifting its instruction from hemispheric defense 
to internal security, the School of the Americas has ex­
hibited the same shift in emphasis that was observed in 
Washington, both in legislative and executive branches 
of the government in the same time span. The instruc­
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tion covers the entire spectrum of military arms and 
services from basic subjects to advanced planning and 
organizational concepts. But nearly every course has 
some application to counterinsurgency which in the past 
two years has received an increasingly greater share of 
the time in the various course curricula. Accent is placed 
on the need for collaboration between the military and 
other governmental agencies that are engaged in counter­
insurgency activities. 
A recent listing gave the school's Department of In­
ternal Security the folowing subjects: Counterinsur­
gency operations, military intelligence, military police, 
command and staff, infantry, jungle operations, and 
air-borne. Thus, that department provides instruction 
in every aspect of counterinsurgency: military, para­
military, political, sociological, and psychological. Stimu­
lation of economic growth by military civic action is 
emphasized. Illustrative of this emphasis are courses in 
operations and maintenance of heavy engineering equip­
ment. After the closing of the jungle warfare training 
center at Fort Sherman, a course in jungle operations 
was added to the School of the Americas' curriculum. 
Skills necessary to fight in the jungle are taught in that 
course, contrasted with the United States Air Force's 
Tropical Survival School located at Albrook Air Base 
in the Canal Zone, which is designed to teach grounded 
pilots how to survive in the jungle, pending rescue. 
At the School of the Americas, civic action has, since 
July, 1961, been included as a part of a ten-week course 
on counterinsurgency. The civic-action aspects of the 
course deal with problems and methods of organizing n 
program, the theory and practice of community devel­
opment, public relations and publicity, and national 
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economic development theory. A three to five day field 
trip takes the students to a selected Panamanian village, 
for a practical survey and report. The reports analyze 
the community's problems in agriculture, education, 
community organization, public health, and natural re­
sources. Recommendations based on these studies are 
turned over to the Panamanian National Guard for 
whatever use it chooses to make of them. Officials at the 
School had (as of April, 1965) submitted a proposal for 
an annual three-week course devoted entirely to civic 
action. Approval was made contingent on the number 
and quality of students who would be sent by interested 
Latin American governments. 
A number of officials of the School feel that most of 
the related technical courses offered there accomplish as 
much as the teaching of civic action per se. For example, 
courses are offered in the maintenance and operation of 
small motor vehicles, tractors, cranes, and earth moving 
equipment. An elementary course in communications 
and a basic medical technicians course for non-commis­
sioned officers are equally related to civic action. All of 
these skills are obviously basic to any civic-action 
program. 
The Army Special Warfare Center and School 
Much of the improved quality of training at subordi­
nate schools and posts is due to the leadership and plan­
ning of Major General George T. Duncan, chief of staff 
at the United States Continental Army Command 
(CONARC), who issued a comprehensive directive in May, 
1964, for mobile training teams, special and back-up 
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forces, and for the army reservists. Under the super­
vision of CONARC is the Army Special Warfare Center 
at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. It was created in 1956 
with the responsibility of developing doctrine and train­
ing selected personnel in the special forces and psycho­
logical warfare units. In 1960, the center was given the 
additional duty of developing doctrine and conducting 
training in counterinsurgency operations. An important 
element in the center's activities is the Army Special 
Warfare School, to which the navy, air force, and marine 
corps, as well as the army, send officers for training. By 
the end of 1963, 112 Latin Americans had attended the 
Special Warfare School. The table below shows the 
number of students from individual Latin American 
countries: 
Country Number 
Argentina 19 
Bolivia 23 
Brazil 2 
Chile 6 
Colombia 5 
Costa Rica 1 
Ecuador 14 
El Salvador 1 
Guatemala 13 
Haiti 1 
Honduras 1 
Mexico 3 
Nicaragua 8 
Peru 4 
Venezuela 11 
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The courses at the Special Warfare School are on such 
subjects as special warfare, psychological or counterinsur­
gency operations, and unconventional warfare. Minor 
attention is given to civic action, although there are 
some short courses in this subject. These latter courses 
discuss the applicability of civic action in countries fac­
ing varying threats to their internal stability. The ad­
vantages to the country—and to its military personnel 
—arising out of military civic action, are stressed. The 
procedures to funnel assistance to host countries, through 
the United States diplomatic missions and the MAAG'S, 
and the funding formula are also covered. For a precis 
of the Counterinsurgency Operations Course, see Ap­
pendix F. 
In 1963, Assistant Secretary of State Martin reported 
that Latin American military personnel were receiving 
training at Fort Gulick, Canal Zone (the School of the 
Americas) and at Fort Bragg, "in riot control, counter­
guerrilla operations and tactics, intelligence and coun­
ter-intelligence, and other subjects which will contribute 
to the maintenance of public order, and the support of 
Constitutional governments." 5 He added that "This as­
sistance is being provided for the control of Communist-
inspired civil disturbances, for vigilance and control of 
movements and subversives and arms inside those coun­
tries and across their borders, and for the maintenance 
of observation and patrol of rural areas for detection and 
dispersion of guerrilla movements." 
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The Army Civil Affairs School, Fort Gordon, Georgia 
At Fort Gordon, courses in the program of instruction 
for civic action extended over a period of six weeks (as 
of July, 1964). Although some civilians attend the 
courses, the students are mainly warrant or commis­
sioned officers. They may be under assignment to a 
MAAG or mission group, to civic-action mobile training 
teams, as civil affairs augmentation to special action 
forces, or to command staff or faculty positions pertinent 
to training in countermsurgency. The curriculum covers 
subjects such as the concept and basis for civic action, 
organization of non-military agencies, military organiza­
tion involved in civic action, and psychological opera­
tions in countermsurgency. Study also includes cultural 
influences, administration logistics, and the development 
and demonstration of military civic-action projects. 
Instruction is carried on by conferences, lectures, demon­
strations, seminars, research, and practical exercises. 
Some military personnel from friendly governments 
attend the courses. 
In the survey of operations problems and the choice 
of types of projects susceptible of civic action, attention 
was paid to engineering, and public works, health and 
sanitation, agriculture, education, public administration, 
communications, economics, village-level projects, "han­
dling people in masses," and relocation of populations. 
Time was also devoted to sociological aspects of civic 
action with emphasis on community development and 
the economics of development programs. Reading assign­
ments for the students included Department of Defense 
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classified staff studies; the traditional books written by 
Rostow, Milikan, and Osanka; congressional committee 
reports; the Department of Army field manuals; and re­
ports prepared by research organizations. The section 
of the course on non-military agencies included examina­
tion of the organization, objectives, and policies of the 
USIA, AID, and international agencies such as the UN, 
WHO, FAO, and UNESCO. CARE and other private agencies 
were also covered. One week was spent on the experi­
ences in Vietnam. From the Philippines came illustra­
tions drawn from the Huk insurgency, of agrarian 
reform, the conduct of free elections, and caring for 
civilians in army hospitals to supplement military civic 
action. From the Korean experience (AFAK) came the 
idea originated in 1953 by General Maxwell Taylor, then 
Korean commander, that surplus construction materials 
be used by the United States military personnel to help 
Korean reconstruction. (President Eisenhower approved 
of the plan, as did United States Congress, which au­
thorized this program in November, 1953, and eventu­
ally appropriated #20 million for its support.) The pur­
pose of the course is "to provide commissioned officers, 
warrant officers, and selected civilians with a working 
knowledge in planning, developing, programming, admin­
istering, and expanding, as necessary, military civic 
action programs and activities." 
In the Fort Gordon lesson plan, "The Concept of 
Civic Action," one encounters the official definitions, 
doctrine, and orientation.'1 It starts with excerpts from 
President Kennedy's inauguration speech and his March 
and May, 1961, messages to Congress, in which he em­
phasized that military assistance would in the future 
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more heavily emphasize internal security, civil works, 
and economic growth. The lesson plan states that one 
of the key directives on civic action that governs all 
agencies of the United States national government is 
National Security Action Memorandum No. 119, issued 
in December, 1961. Here the President defined three 
situations wherein civic action would be useful: 
1. To strengthen military-civil relationships in coun­
tries combating active internal subversion. 
2. Military civic action projects should not impair 
the military role of the armed forces in countries threat­
ened by external aggression. 
3. Local military forces can contribute to economic 
and social development, where neither internal subver­
sion or external attack is imminent. 
The method used at Fort Gordon is first to ascertain the 
economic and social causes of insurgency. Having done 
this, the armed forces, representing as they do an im­
portant force for cohesion and unity, should, it is pointed 
out, devote more of their effort and resources to re­
lieving these causes of distress; the method to be used 
is civic action. 
The navy, air force, and marine corps assigned per­
sonnel to the various courses and schools devoted to 
special warfare and civic action that are operated by the 
Department of the Army, including those at Fort Bragg, 
North Carolina and Fort Gordon, Georgia. Navy and 
army personnel have also attended the schools and 
courses administered by the air force. Officers from each 
military service attend the national Interdepartmental 
Seminar on Problems of Development and Internal De­
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fense and other courses offered at the State Depart­
ment's Foreign Service Institute. Of officer assignments 
to Latin America, by far the largest number of United 
States military personnel are from the Department of 
the Army. Approximately 85 per cent of all mobile team 
members are from the army, the remainder being from 
the air force, navy, or civilian agencies. 
The Inter-American Geodetic Survey 
Illustrative of the many facets of training and con­
sultation by personnel engaged in collaboration with the 
Latin American military is the operation of the Inter-
American Geodetic Survey (IAGS) since 1946. Since 1955, 
IAGS has been a separate, subordinate command of the 
United States Army Southern Command, operating at 
Fort Clayton in the Panama Canal Zone. Corps of 
Engineers' officers and civilian employees largely staff 
the IAGS. Agreements were negotiated with all of the 
Latin American governments, except Argentina, Uru­
guay, Cuba, and the Dominican Republic, to arrange 
for the exchange of technical data on mapping, trans­
lations, fixing elevations and tide levels, and other 
scientific and technical aspects of geodetic, topographic, 
and cartographic activities. The normal complement at 
IAGS has grown to over 750 individuals, about one third 
of them military personnel. In a number of Latin Amer­
ican countries, small field offices are established both to 
supervise air- and surface-mapping work, and to furnish 
liaison and training services to the host government. A 
large portion of the "resources expenditures" as the 
IAGS describes it, now amounting to approximately 
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$12,000,000 per year, is for the aircraft, service vehicles, 
precision instruments, and communication equipment. A 
cartographic school has been maintained by the IAGS 
since 1952. It provides training with bilingual instructors 
in astronomy, cartography, field surveys, photogram­
metrv, geodetic computing, drafting, and aerial photog­
raphy. In 1964, approximately two hundred Latin 
Americans attended this school, bringing to over sixteen 
hundred the total number of Latin Americans receiving 
training since 1952. This total includes civilians, military 
officers, and enlisted men. Facilities, services, and equip­
ment are supplied by the United States government for 
the courses that vary from five to forty-three weeks in 
length. Subsistence costs of Latin American students, 
when requested by their sponsoring governments, arc 
often paid from MAP or AID funds. 
In 1963, IAGS contracted with the AID'S Regional 
Office for Central America and Panama (ROCAP) to 
provide extensive technical assistance and training and 
special purposes maps for a general inventory of physical 
resources in the Latin American countries. For these 
purposes the IAGS set up a Natural Resources Division 
in 1964 that has actively collaborated with all the coun­
tries of Latin America except Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, 
Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela. This colaboration 
took the form of sending or receiving consultants on 
land classification, water resources, and national pro­
grams of resources inventories. The Natural Resources 
Division works closely with ROCAP and with the Inter-
American Institute for Agricultural Science (IICA) at 
Turrialba, Costa Rica. An additional Central American 
program now under way, is for land surveys and to 
assist the Central American Bank in determining the 
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feasibility of loan proposals for resources development. 
These programs are directly related to short- and long-
range Alliance for Progress programs and have received 
AID financial support in the amount of somewhat less 
than one million dollars per year. 
Latin American participants in the IAGS activities 
comprise both military and civilian personnel. Inasmuch 
as the United States military involved are, for the most 
part, specialists, there has been an unusual continuity 
of relationships between Latin American and North 
American participants in both military and civilian 
categories, which is perhaps unique in the history of 
either military or economic assistance projects. The IAGS 
has intentionally emphasized continuing personal rela­
tionships with the result that a reservoir of good will 
and friendly officials in host governments have allowed 
it to continue its work despite a number of major politi­
cal disturbances and still to retain an acceptable working 
relationship with each new government, IAGS Carto­
graphic School Alumni Clubs have been formed in twelve 
Latin American countries. 
Mobile Training Teams 
"Mobile Training Team" is the term used to describe 
a unit (usually funded by the Department of Defense 
or AID), which is sent to advise or train personnel of a 
foreign government in a variety of techniques and, in 
turn, to enhance that government's ability to provide 
further training. Since the Third Civil Affairs Detach­
ment, United States Army Forces, Southern Command, 
Fort Clayton, Canal Zone, was activated in April, 1963, 
its specialists (forty officers and thirty enlisted men) 
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have served as mobile training teams in fourteen West­
ern Hemisphere republics, where they have been active 
primarily in civic action. These teams are sponsored in 
the various countries by the United States Army mis­
sions at the request of the particular national govern­
ment involved. They are called upon to advise or teach 
about matters concerning engineering, medicine, con­
servation of natural resources, agriculture, animal hus­
bandry, education, colonization, community develop­
ment or disaster relief, cattle breeding and diseases, food 
processing, communications systems, water supply, con­
struction machinery maintenance, transportation, and 
sanitary engineering. 
Teams normally ranging in size from one to six, have 
on several occasions been requested to extend the orig­
inal brief time allocated for their Latin American duty. 
Some teams concentrate on a specific objective, as was 
the case of a medical team sent to Bolivia in 1963 to 
help combat an outbreak of hemorrhagic fever. A team 
from the United States Eighth Army Special Forces 
Group in the Canal Zone exercised a broader mission in 
Costa Rica in 1963, by helping to conduct counterinsur­
gency training of 200 Costa Rican Guardia Civil officers 
and enlisted men. A six-man team spent several months 
in Colombia, under AID auspices, to survey and initiate 
a widely diversified program of civic-action projects 
encompassing road maintenance, dispensary sites, com­
munications facilities in remote areas, potable water 
systems in villages, and a basic educational and voca­
tional program for the armed forces. 
A survey mission was sent to Peru in April, 1963. 
Working with two Peruvian colonels, the mission helped 
the army in the planning of a national office (directly 
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under the chief of staff) for administration and imple­
mentation of civic action. Later the Peruvian Navy and 
Air Force requested similar assistance. Another survey 
was carried out in Venezuela in April and May, 1964. 
The report, prepared upon the return of the mission, 
made a number of general recommendations with respect 
to administration, organization and emphasis of civic 
action in that country. By July, 1963, the army had sent 
thirty-three civic-action mobile training teams (MTT) 
to twenty countries and 140 other technical MTT's 
were used to improve the technical proficiency of local 
troops. 
On several occasions the United States Army Engi­
neering School, located at Fort Belvoir Virginia, gave 
special training to members of Mobile Training Teams 
before they were deployed to Latin America on specific 
civic-action assignments. It also received Latin Ameri­
can officers, in 1965 enrolling three each from Argentina, 
Brazil, and Venezuela, and one each from Chile, Colom­
bia, and Peru. During 1963, two teams, one consisting 
of twenty-five individuals, had short training stints of 
a few days before proceeding to Ecuador for six months 
on road construction surveys; a team of three was pre­
pared for three months' service in Peru on supply and 
maintenance problems. In 1964, six teams, ranging from 
three to twenty-two men, had up to three weeks train­
ing at Fort Belvoir, before proceeding to Chile, Brazil, 
and Ecuador for two to six months. These teams had 
such missions as construction, well-drilling, engineering 
supply, and operation of rock-crushers. That five of the 
nine teams were dispatched to Ecuador suggests the 
probability that the services of the early missions proved 
so useful that repeated requests for engineering services 
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were made. It also demonstrates that the nature and 
extent of a civic-action design may be influenced to a 
large degree by the make-up of the United States MAAG 
mission—or of the local military office in charge of 
liaison with the United States MAAG—where professional 
background and interests of the individual would dictate 
the choice of projects to be undertaken. 
The Navy: SEABEE Technical Assistance Teams (STAT) 
The navy also has mobile training teams drawn from 
naval construction forces. The latter are comprised of 
ten mobile construction battalions (MCB) and two 
amphibious construction battalions. These battalions 
are divided between the Atlantic and Pacific fleets. A 
typical MCB has from eight to seventeen officers and 
from 250 to 500 enlisted personnel. The majority of the 
officers are Navy Civil Engineering Corps officers, most 
of whom are graduate engineers and many are registered 
professional engineers. Each MCB has organized two 
SEABEE technical assistance teams (STAT). A typical 
STAT would consist of a Civil Engineer Corps officer and 
a dozen naval ratings, including construction equipment 
operators, steel workers, builders, electricians, utility 
men, surveyors, draftsmen, and hospital corpsmen. Each 
STAT is prepared to train local personnel or to perform 
by itself the necessary work in a great variety of con­
struction, repair, and rehabilitation situations. 
A STAT operated in Ecuador, from 1959-62, where it 
helped in the construction of a new naval academy at 
Salinas. In Haiti, in 1960, a STAT constructed a floating 
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bridge and highway approaches to re-establish trans­
portation across flooding Lake Miragoane. In 1962-63, 
a STAT rehabilitated the main pier at Port au Prince 
using Haitian government funds and United States 
Navy Construction Battalion tools and equipment. One 
officer and twenty men were engaged on the project. In 
Chile from 1960-63, a STAT rehabilitated the earthquake 
damaged waterfront and quays at Talcahuamo naval 
station, south of Valparaiso. One CEC officer and five 
United States Navy enlisted men worked on this project 
for twenty-four months. In the Dominican Republic in 
1963, a STAT established and operated a skilled man­
power development center to train electricians, plumb­
ers, and automobile mechanics. In each of these in­
stances, the STAT operations were to construct as well 
as to train. The AID program for Costa Rica sought to 
rehabilitate the countryside after a volcanic disaster. 
The SEABEES constructed a dam to stop the mud flow, 
and trained technical operators and maintenance men 
for heavy machinery. Thirty-three SEABEES under the 
command of an officer were engaged in this effort during 
1964 and 1965. Adding considerably to the effectiveness 
of the small number of STAT'S is the background support 
upon which they can draw from the varied professional 
engineer resources of the Navy Department's Bureau of 
Yards and Docks. 
The United States Air Force Training 
The accepted concept of civic action was expressed b> 
General Curtis E. LeMay, former air force chief of staff, 
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in an address at St. Louis, Missouri, on October, 1963, in 
setting forth the doctrine toward which air force train­
ing was directed. In his words: 
The purpose of the non-military operations, such as civic 
action, is to help eliminate the economic cause of discon­
tent that provides the hreeding ground for insurgency. 
I place special emphasis on the air aspects of the civic 
action phase hecause it involves the principle of nation-
building and humanitarian contributions. . In this 
way our prospects are improved for preventing or re­
lieving the conditions of unrest which could be exploited 
by insurgent elements in conducting guerrilla operations." 
General LeMay cited training flights of the United 
States Air Commandos in Latin America in airlifting 
medical teams and emergency equipment or supplies, 
and flying rescue teams to Bolivia, Panama, and Peru. 
The air force offers a three-week counterinsurgency 
course six times a year for seventy-five students in each 
class for middle-ranking officers. One of the three weeks 
is spent at the Air-Ground Operations School at the 
Special Air Warfare Center. The subjects covered are 
the theory and case studies of counterinsurgency, 
strategy and tactics, the operations of the Country 
Team, and the role of the air force in counterinsurgency. 
The United States Air Force School for Latin America 
functions at Albrook Air Force Base at the Canal Zone 
under the United States Air Force Southern Command. 
Ninety-five per cent of its instruction is given in Span­
ish, covering technical and administrative training in 
air force specialties, to officers, airmen, and Latin Amer­
ican government civilian personnel. From 1943 to the end 
of 1963, there were 6,200 graduates (of whom only 460 
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were officers) from twenty different countries. By June, 
1965, the total was expected to be 7,250. An average 
class has 21 officers, 17 cadets, and 231 airmen. Courses 
were given in aircraft maintenance, electronics, radio, 
instrument training and repair, engine and weapons 
mechanics, supply, personnel administration, and medi­
cal specialties. The school does extensive translation of 
training publications. Latin American officers and air­
men are frequent guest instructors. Enriched and ad­
vanced courses are given to outstanding students on 
instructional methods and management. English-lan­
guage instruction is given to all students. The School 
also plans to operate a course (Special Air Operations 
Course—applicable to counterinsurgency) jointly with 
the 605th Air Commandos, the School of the Americas 
at Fort Gulick, and a Sqadron at Howard Air Force 
Base in the Canal Zone. 
At the suggestion of Secretary of Defense McNamara 
during a visit to the Canal Zone late in 1962, a medical 
program to be operated by the United States Air Force 
was included in the then rapidly developing military 
civic-action program. "The proposal was discussed and 
enthusiastically received by Command Surgeons from 
nearly all Latin American countries at the Second Latin 
American Medical Conference held at Albrook Air Force 
Base in March 1963." s It was thought that the air force 
would be particularly suited to assist in the hinterland 
areas inaccessible by road and water and would thus 
become the agency charged with the preparation of 
training and operations. Illustrative of the varied pur­
poses which the air force had in mind was the following 
statement to justify its training program: 
164 Internal Security and Military Power 
Several possible benefits of the program were recog­
nized—development of medical and sanitation programs 
in heretofore untouched areas, extension of the people-
to-people program, the possibility of improving the image 
of the military in the eyes of the people, reduction of 
breeding grounds of insurgency, and subsequent stabili­
zation of governmental structure and democratic prin­
ciples that could aid the ultimate goal of hemispheric 
solidarity. 
A preventive medicine civic-action team (PMCAT) was 
devised with public health and medical laboratory tech­
nicians. Two classes with some fifty students in each 
were trained in both 1963 and 1964. Each class lasted 
approximately six months and emphasized sanitation, 
pest control, immunization, dental treatment, and basic 
medical courses. The students came from the Dominican 
Republic, Honduras, Kcuador, Bolivia, and Paraguay. 
In January, 1964, this program became a part of the 
United States Air Force School for Latin America 
(USAFLA). A revised syllabus was prepared, and six hun­
dred hours of instruction were given in first aid, anat­
omy, laboratory procedures, sanitation, nutrition, and 
personal hygiene; field trips to remote areas of Panama 
were made for practical demonstrations. In 1965, the 
program was extended. Medical civic-action mobile 
training trips with a physician and air force medical 
specialists included a four or five day visit to a remote 
community without medical services. As many as a 
thousand patients would be treated on a trip. For psy­
chological reasons, anyone who presented himself would 
receive some kind of treatment as a first step in estab­
lishing the good relations found to be necessary before 
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starting with a community hygiene and sanitation cam­
paign. Trips were made to Honduras, Guatemala, and 
Ecuador. Paraguay was the first, with others to follow, 
in establishing its own medical mobile training trips as 
its own personnel were trained. An attempt to bring 
Amazonian jungle witch doctors into the program did 
not work out because of language and other difficulties. 
The United States Air Force plans to spend $6.3 million 
in a five-year, four-phase program. The first phase con­
templates the training of five-man teams supplied with 
a package of drugs, chemicals, dressings, preventive 
medicine, and laboratory equipment. In the second 
phase, the medical specialists are to be trained in first 
aid, and sent back to their respective countries with 
first aid training kits. The third phase will provide a 
light Cessna 188 aircraft for local medical training teams 
in participating countries. The last phase would develop 
greater air-lift capacity for a complete medical dispen­
sary. Considerable attention is given to public relations. 
Special Air Warfare Center, Bglin Air Force Base, Florida 
The Special Air Warfare Center (SAWC) conducts a 
variety of training, the majority of which is concerned 
with either the operation or maintenance of aircraft in 
counterinsurgency activities. In 1964, SAWC trained some 
1,400 men of whom approximately one-half were enlisted 
maintenance specialists. The students are provided 
academic instruction in subjects related to counterinsur­
gency, as well as practical training in survival tech­
niques, small-arms marksmanship, combat measures, 
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prisoner-of-war training, and language study. Some ot 
the students receive parachute training, SAWC does not 
admit civilians to its courses, nor foreign military per­
sonnel. Training for the latter is conducted in the host 
country by SAWC military training teams upon invita­
tion by the host government, SAWC prefers to dispatch 
teams whose training programs are tailored to the 
counterinsurgency requirements of the requesting gov­
ernment because this method demonstrates to the host 
government how its own resources and manpower can be 
utilized to combat insurgency, SAWC conducts frequent 
joint training and exercises with the Army Special War­
fare Center at Fort Bragg when the emphasis is on spe­
cial warfare activities, SAWC has no regular liaison with 
the United States Air Force School for Latin America, 
the Schools of the Americas, or with the Army Civil 
Affairs School, although it participates with these insti­
tutions from time to time on specific projects. 
Air Commando Operations 
The 6O5th Air Commando Squadron, based at How­
ard Air Force Base in the Canal Zone, is formed of ap­
proximately 520 personnel and 46 aircraft. Its special 
function, styled officially "Special Air Operations," is 
to train, in collaboration with United States Army Spe­
cial Forces, Latin American personnel in techniques of 
special air operations. The training includes tactics for 
night and day air drops, low-level navigation, weapons 
delivery, and operations in unfamiliar territory. One 
objective is rapid action and close support of ground 
forces. The training includes ordnance delivery, recon­
naissance, aerial supply, and support with transport air 
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craft. Another mission of the Commandos is to "develop 
ways in which air power and air resources can be applied 
to help develop the economic and social potential of a 
nation."9 Demonstrating the types of assistance that 
Latin American air forces can provide for their own 
countries, the Air Commandos have airlifted medical 
teams and sanitation engineers to isolated villages and 
have sent mobile training teams to Latin American coun­
tries for on-the-spot instruction. A spectacular instance 
of collaboration was the delivery of medicine and sup­
plies during the 1963 outbreak of hemorrhagic fever in 
Bolivia. The Commando Squadron conducted training 
exercises for both United States and Latin American 
personnel in 1962 and 1963 in the Republic of Panama. 
Such projects as pure water supply, live-stock improve­
ments, road and air-strip construction were combined 
with training programs using these field operations as 
practical exercises. Frequently, local communities took 
substantial part in the civic-action programs. 
Variations of guerrilla warfare techniques, including 
ordnance delivery reconnaissance and supply functions, 
are conducted by the Commando units. Another unit 
operates an air force tropical survival school and train­
ing for Latin American aviation personnel. The Com­
mando units also participate in the mobile training 
teams that, upon request, provide on-the-spot instruc­
tion for civic-action programs. By July 6, 1964, the 
Bolivian Air Force was scheduled to have four air craft 
to transport preventive-medicine teams and flying dis­
pensaries as well as establishing 28 airfields and 52 land­
ing strips, which are not supported by commercial air 
lines. The Guatemalan Air Force, during 1963, empha­
sized air-freight and passenger services and the opening 
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of new areas for settlement, in addition to the work of 
preventive medicine teams. 
An Unusual Air Force Project 
There is a little-known, commercial-scientific co-op­
erative activity between Latin American citizens and 
organizations, on one hand, and the United States Air 
Force on the other, which is not directly related to 
weapons or to current military activities. This is a proj­
ect of basic and applied research, conducted by Latin 
Americans and paid for by the United States Air Force. 
Although it may be remarked that this activity is on 
the periphery of "military civic action," it is an example 
of a United States military sponsored activity with 
effects on a small segment of Latin American society. 
Between 1951 and 1961, the United States School of 
Aviation Medicine gave financial assistance to the Insti­
tuto Nacional de Biologia Andina, in Peru, and in the 
mid 1950's the Air Force Cambridge Research Labora­
tories (AFCRL) sponsored research at the Instituto 
Geofisico del Peru located at Huancayo, Peru. The ob­
jectives were to study high-altitude problems, including 
geomagnetic variations, night afterglow, ionospheric ab­
sorption, and neutron-monitoring. The Air Force Office 
of Scientific Research (AFOSR) in 1958 contracted with 
the Bolivian Laboratorio de Fisica Cosmica, located at 
an altitude of 17,000 feet, for cosmic-ray studies. In 
1959, additional air force contracts were let for work 
in Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina by the AFOSR 
life-sciences division. Some authorized research was on 
human biological problems and others on specific aviation 
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subjects such as the drag on supersonic air inlets, the 
aerodynamics of external jet flaps, and meteorology. 
The Bolivian attempt to detect high-energy gamma 
rays from space, and extra-terrestrial environment 
studies, has been considered by the air force to be one 
of its potentially most valuable Latin American en­
deavors. 
In 1962, a United States Regional Science Office was 
opened in Rio de Janeiro, combining and co-ordinating 
research interests of the United States National Science 
Foundation, the National Institute of Health, and the 
Department of Defense. This was followed by the receipt 
of applications for numerous additional research and 
scientific enterprises, some of which were accepted and 
financed by the air force or by its contractors in the 
United States. Among the subjects treated where equa­
torial magnetic variations, laser-searchlight techniques, 
and upper air conditions. An important aspect of the air 
force part of the work at Rio was to arrange for dis­
tribution of air force scientific reports to Latin American 
universities, institutes, and scholars. This "served to em­
phasize the open 'unclassified' nature of Air Force basic 
research activities and thereby helped to overcome the 
scruples originally felt by some Latin American re­
searchers about possible cooperation with a foreign 
military agency."10 In this case, as in the instance of the 
Inter-American Geodetic Survey, only a few institutions 
and individuals are involved with a limited effect upon 
the Latin American military. But this could be an ex­
ample of opening avenues of future relationships, pro­
ductive of substantive favorable results to the United 
States. 
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International Police Academy 
Although the United States had offered some training 
for Latin American police officers as early as 1955, the 
program was greatly stepped up in size, in the frequency 
of course offered, and the importance attributed to it in 
the early 1960's. In 1963, Assistant Secretary of State 
Martin noted that: 
In assessing the internal security situation in Latin 
America, we found that the civil police forces in many 
of the countries wanted assistance in police administra­
tion, training, and operational techniques and particu­
larly required greater mobility and more adequate sys­
tems of communications, largely related to riot control 
and other threats to public order. Consequently, the pub­
lic safety program, which is an integral part of the AID 
program, is designed to meet these requests. 
A year earlier, the Inter-American Police Academy had 
been opened in the Canal Zone; it changed its name to 
the International Police Academy in 1963 and moved to 
Washington in 1964. The total number of graduates of 
'he International Police Academy since its opening in 
December^ 1963, has reached 600. The instruction at the 
Academy is largely conducted by former police or FBI 
officers. The training is given in Spanish, and the general 
course lasts six weeks. 
The Inter-American Defense College 
Located at Fort Lesley McNair in Washington (the 
site of the National War College and the Industrial 
College of the Armed Forces), the Inter-American De­
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fense College was opened to student officers from all of 
the American republics except Cuba in October, 1962. 
Its stated mission is to conduct courses of study on the 
Inter-American System and the military, economic, po­
litical, and social factors that constitute essential com­
ponents of inter-American defense, in order to improve 
the preparation of selected personnel of the armed forces 
of the American republics for undertakings in interna­
tional co-operation.11 The College is a creature of the 
Inter-American Defense Board, which decided, in 1959, 
to establish it. Operating funds are provided by the OAS 
and are administered by the Board. Each member of 
the OAS may send up to five students, who are normally 
in the grade of colonel and are graduates of an advanced 
command or staff school. The first class consisted of 
thirty officers from fifteen countries. Two classes were 
graduated in 1963. The third class of thirty-four officers 
was graduated in July, 1964; and the fourth, with stu­
dents from fourteen countries, in May, 1965. The curricu­
lum is comparable to that of the most advanced military 
educational institutes. Considerable time is devoted to 
international geography, political and diplomatic affairs, 
and to a study of communist countries and their policies. 
Military and strategic planning and administration, with 
special emphasis on Western Hemispheric defense, are 
other elements of the twenty-two-week course. Lecturers 
come from the ranks of professors, civilians, and military 
officers of different nationalities. Most of the instruction 
is in Spanish and a considerable portion of the student 
officer's work is done in committees. A comprehensive 
presentation of military civic action in both its theoreti­
cal concepts and in practical application has been made 
to the College at each session. Specifics regarding Latin 
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American military organization and accomplishments in 
civic action were shown, and problems on this subject 
were assigned to the student committees. The availa­
bility to the students* home governments of United 
States technical advice and financial assistance for civic 
action has been made clear to the participants. 
1! 
Differences and Difficulties in Training Courses 
The strong impetus which President Kennedy gave to 
the educational and training aspects of counterinsur­
gency and civic-action programs in 1961 and 1962 im­
mediately resulted in enlarged operations at the Special 
Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, the School for Civil 
Affairs at Fort Gordon, the schools in the Canal Zone, 
and the National Interdepartmental Seminar on Prob­
lems of Development and Internal Defense. The atten­
tion and prestige attached to the National Interdepart­
mental Seminar has declined since the first session was 
opened by Secretary of State Rusk and closed by 
President Kennedy in a White House ceremony. During 
that session, the main series of orientation lectures was 
conducted by a distinguished group of professors from 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology led by pro­
fessors Miliikan, Hagan, and Pye. By contrast, the 1964 
and 1965 sessions were opened by the director of the 
Foreign Service Institute and the presentation of the 
certificates at the end of the respective courses was made 
by the directors of the seminars. Subordinate officers of 
State, AID, the Department of Defense, the United 
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States Information Agency, and the Department of 
Labor lectured. 
At the most advanced United States military educa­
tional institutions (the regular nine-month courses given 
at the National, Army, Navy, and Air war colleges) only 
one day or one lecture period was devoted to counter­
insurgency and civic action in the 1964-65 academic 
year. It must be borne in mind that a key objective at 
those institutions is not to specialize but to give broader 
and more comprehensive courses for officers previously 
specialized in one branch or one function of the military 
services. At the Armed Forces Staff College at Norfolk, 
Virginia, attended by officers from all branches of the 
military services, one session is devoted to countennsur­
gency and a part of another session to civic action.12 At 
the United States Army Command and General Staff 
College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where sixteen 
officers from Latin America were in attendance in the 
academic year 1964—65, no time was allotted to civic 
action as a separate subject, but a new topic on the ap­
plication of civic action in counterinsurgency is to be 
given for the first time in the last part of the year.13 The 
Industrial College of the Armed Forces has devoted 
many research assignments, as well as lesson plans and 
lectures, to counterinsurgency and to civic action as 
separate subjects. 
Most language training given to United States military 
personnel is under the control of the Defense Language 
Institute. Full-time intensive training is conducted at 
Washington, D.C., at the Presidio of Monterrey, Cali­
fornia; at the Foreign Service Institute of the State 
Department; at Syracuse, Yale, and Indiana univer­
sities; and at commercial schools in the national capital. 
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Many, but by no means all, of the people assigned abroad 
to MAAG missions receive language preparation before 
they depart from the United States. Forts Bragg and 
Gordon give some language training for a relatively 
short time as a part of their general courses. Refresher 
courses are given by the Defense Language Institute 
for four to eight weeks duration for personnel needing 
to bring back a former language proficiency. Currently, 
the Institute in its own facilities offers twelve and 
twenty-four week courses in French, Portuguese, and 
Spanish on a six-hours-a-day, five-days-a-week basis 
with a native-speaking instructor for at least two hours 
a day.14 
There is little training given to enlisted men in the 
unique aspects of civic-action duties, although most 
members of MTT's are in the enlisted men category. In 
the institutions that they are permitted to attend, such 
as the Defense Language Institute, the Air Force School 
for Latin America, the Special Warfare School, and the 
Civic Affairs School, only a small number of enlisted 
men have been assigned, and no formal courses were 
designed for them. An explanation offered for this is the 
following statement: 
Key to a successful civic action effort is comprehensive 
relatively high level planning, programming, supervision 
and administration—hence the emphasis on officer rather 
than enlisted skills. Neither the Civil Affairs School 
nor the Special Warfare School give an enlisted man 
civic action course—formal or informal.15 
The small number of enlisted men receive only a few 
hours of civic-action instruction as a part of other 
courses in counterinsurgency or civic-affairs administra­
tion. Generally, their training is in technical fields, not 
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in the problems and issues of cross-cultural relationships, 
or pertaining to attitudes or methods specifically perti­
nent to civic-action duties. Even these courses are brief 
and provide little or no time for study of the foreign 
areas and peoples involved. Finally, most of the enlisted 
men receiving even this sparse preparation were destined 
for assignments to Vietnam or to MAAG groups stationed 
in parts of the world other than Latin America. The lack 
of language training has been mitigated in some cases 
by the sending of enlisted men to MAAG'S in Latin Ameri­
can countries who had an understanding of Spanish as 
a result of their childhood in Puerto Rico or one of the 
Southwestern states. 
The limited training given to enlisted men may be 
justified for administrative reasons and for the economy-
conscious because the length of time that they would 
spend in the military service is relatively short, and 
there presumably would be but a grief time to reap the 
benefits from the investment of training time. Indeed, 
the admittance of enlisted men to some of the courses at 
Fort Bragg and Fort Gordon was restricted to those 
who had a relatively long period of time still remaining 
in their term of military service. A consequence may 
often be that the lower ranks of United States military 
personnel sent to Latin America on MAAG assignments 
are untrained in civic-action ideology and are soon to 
leave the military service. They may, therefore, have 
something less than enthusiasm or a spirit of dedication 
toward their work. 
This is a continuous problem, often the subject of 
complaint by host government officials faced at frequent 
interval with new technical assistants. It must be added 
that with respect to the need for area orientation and 
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language training that the enlisted ranks are probably in 
much greater need of this than are the commissioned 
officers. The latter are possessed of greater educational 
background, are older, more experienced, and have a 
professional sense for opportunity and accomplishment 
based on a life-long career expectancy. They could, there­
fore, be expected to adjust more quickly and to serve 
more effectively than the short-term, young, inexperi­
enced enlisted men. But it is the former rather than the 
latter who receive the lion's share of the educational and 
training facilities. 
With respect to the officers, there appears to be a 
growing tendency, entirely laudable, to reduce the fre­
quent rotation of military assignments. In order to make 
effective use of their previous experience and to fully 
receive the dividends of the training courses, more officers 
are now receiving repeated assignments to MAAG and 
civic-action duties. An illustration of this trend was the 
assignment as director of the MAAG group at La Paz, 
Bolivia, of Colonel Jess Unger of the Corps of Engineers. 
He combined area and linguistic qualifications and had 
held previous assignments as engineering adviser officer 
to the MAAG missions in Ecuador (1949-51) and Bolivia 
(1956-58). 
There is reason to believe that departure from the 
normal peacetime cycle of assignments of army officers 
from school to command-of-troops to staff duty to 
school has been considered by many officers as a definite 
threat to their professional careers and their promotion 
opportunities. (This is less applicable to Corps of En­
gineers officers.) Accordingly, service in MAAG'S or on 
civic-action assignments was to be avoided. When the 
orders came anyway, the tour of duty might be some­
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thing less than full of enthusiasm, imagination, and ac­
complishment. 
A highly respected United States military officer, upon 
visiting United States MAAG'S in Latin America, encoun­
tered in some places an indifference and apathy toward 
civic-action tasks on the part of the United States mili­
tary. The training in specialized techniques, it must be 
admitted, does not uniformly result in dedication. The 
whole question of selection and assignment of personnel 
particularly adapted to the unusual nature of counter­
insurgency and civic-action functions is of considerable 
significance, not underestimated by the authors despite 
their inability to pursue that subject in depth. 
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Civic Action and Counterinsurgency 
As long as there have been governments, 
there have been those who have tried to wrest power 
from them, legally or illegally. In recent years the word 
insurgency has come to be applied to the activities of 
those who try illegally to wrest power from a govern­
ment. Historically, of course, there have been interna­
tional components in such activities, as well as interna­
tional implications arising out of such internal activities. 
But the cold-war struggle to align the most remote 
corners of the earth with one or another of the power 
blocs (or to keep them out of one or the other) has made 
the international implications of insurgency more ob­
vious. In our time, we have seen insurgency become an 
important instrument of foreign policy among the major 
powers. We have seen also the development of various 
doctrines of insurgency and counterinsurgency. 
One of the more important of the recent developments 
in the evolution of these doctrines has been the emphasis 
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upon the creation of insurgency rather than merely tak­
ing advantage of a propitious situation. For example, in 
La guerra de guerillas, Ernesto ("Che") Guevara main­
tained that a revolutionary situation can be created and 
that it is not necessary to wait for revolutionary pre­
conditions to arise.1 Nikita Khrushchev had already 
given the Soviet view on this when he asked, "Can 
conditions be created where a people will lose their 
patience and rise in arms?" and answered, "They can."2 
In response to recent developments and refinements in 
the doctrine of insurgency, various doctrines of counter­
insurgency have also been elaborated. As these doctrines 
have developed, they have come to emphasize those 
activities aimed at preventing insurgency from arising, 
as well as activities intended to contain it once it has 
begun. Thus, a document prepared for the enlightenment 
of members of Congress defines counterinsurgency as 
"all military, political, economic, psychological activities 
directed toward -preventing and suppressing resistance 
groups whose actions range from subversive political 
activity to violent actions by large guerrilla elements to 
overthrow a duly established government."3 
An increasing number of writers dealing with military 
tactics pointed out that insurgency and guerrilla warfare 
are not exclusively a problem in military strategy, tac­
tics, and training. The militatry aspect is but one com­
ponent and, when guerrilla warfare is waged successfully, 
military tactics are co-ordinated with political, social, 
economic, and psychological factors. The same would be 
true of counterinsurgency. But, as one observer noted 
in 1961, although the military had by then come up with 
a military solution to the insurgency question, "our 
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[United States] political planners have had extreme 
difficulty in matching their political solutions."4 
Both civilian and military planners in the United 
States soon looked to domestic and foreign military units 
as one (but not the only) agency for dealing with some 
of the political, social, economic, and psychological fac­
tors. One of the means through which the military would 
work in dealing with the non-military aspects of counter­
insurgency would be civic action. Civic action by the 
military, it was believed, would at least help to discour­
age popular support for insurgent movements and, 
possibly, even encourage the local population to assist 
the military in operations against them. 
Until very recently, social scientists in the Western 
world have devoted little attention to the nature of 
social conflict and societal potential for the use of 
violence.5 In the Soviet Union, it has been studied in 
depth. Those in the United States who sought to define 
the relationships between civic action and counterin­
surgency, therefore, had little theoretical foundation on 
which to build. But civilian and military policy-makers 
could not afford to wait for the uncertain product of 
some of the projected research into these questions. 
They had little choice but to act on the basis of ex­
perience in other parts of the world and on the basis of 
"reasonable assumptions" concerning human nature and 
human relations. 
United States officers in Latin America and in Wash­
ington have made a number of assumptions concerning 
the role of civic action as a counterinsurgency measure.0 
We merely summarize here the more relevant assump­
tions dealt with in greater detail earlier. 
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1.	 It can be a subtle means of having troops in a 
strategic location. In an area where there is a 
threat of insurgency, it might be wiser to send in 
a battalion that devotes at least a part of its time 
to construction or other useful labor. It can secure 
valuable intelligence, and its presence might dis­
courage potential insurgents without antagonizing 
the uncommitted. 
2.	 It can serve to alleviate some of the intolerable 
conditions of rural inhabitants and thus make them 
less inclined to join or assist insurgent movements. 
3.	 It is a means of improving the image of the mili­
tary, the central government, or both, thus en­
listing the co-operation of local inhabitants when 
the army is in pursuit of rural insurgents. 
4.	 By contributing to the general economic develop­
ment of the country, it will reduce the danger of 
insurgency. 
5.	 It is a means of educating the armed forces and 
civilians by bringing the military into contact 
with rural problems, inducing communities to work 
together and by teaching the officers and enlisted 
men useful civilian skills. 
There is, of course, nothing necessarily contradictory 
about these objectives. A village water supply that im­
proves the standard of living might also improve the 
image of the military, contribute to the general economic 
development, induce a community to work together, and 
serve as a visible sign that the central government is in­
terested in the community. The problem arises only when 
there is a question of priority: a project that might make 
a favorable impact in one community versus an economi­
cally beneficial but obscure project in another com­
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munity. It was often pointed out by United States 
officers in the field, however, that an impact,7 type of 
project, whether of immediate economic benefit, might 
contribute to the general economic development if it 
reduced the problem of insurgency and disruption of 
normal economic life. The problem here is that there are 
no practical criteria for establishing a priority, and al­
most any project can be justified as a counterinsurgency 
measure (or of economic benefit) if argued on sufficiently 
theoretical grounds. A criterion often used was a state­
ment of need by local civic leaders. This might not bear 
any relation to a national economic-development plan. 
II 
Some Civic Action Projects 
Nearly all of the armed forces of Latin America have 
been used by their governments from time to time to 
provide services that would ameliorate local hardships— 
disaster relief, construction of a road to an isolated area, 
or medical assistance to remote areas. Although contem­
porary terminology was not used, there are historical 
examples of a military junta or a civilian government 
using these activities as a means to gain popular support 
and to consolidate their power. It is probable, however, 
that in the majority of cases a branch of the armed 
forces took on, or was assigned to, a particular task of 
this nature simply because it was the only agency 
available at the time. This is particularly true in the 
case of providing communications to remote areas, ad­
ministering frontier areas, and similar activities. Once 
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involved, they simply continued to carry out these 
duties since no replacement was found. In other coun­
tries, such as Paraguay, where military dictatorships 
have ruled during most of their national history, it is 
logical that many functions normally handled by civil­
ians would be turned over to the armed forces. 
Since 1961, activities that would ameliorate the hard­
ships of a traditionally impoverished community have 
been more consciously and explicitly linked with the 
idea of preventing or removing opposition that might 
take the form of violence. Small impact-type projects— 
a potable water system, a school, or a farm-to-market 
road—were recognized as the kind of project readily 
within the capability of most Latin American military 
establishments and at the same time the type of project 
that could be completed rapidly, thus providing the 
greatest impact. It was to these projects, and the mili­
tary units selected to carry them out, that the United 
States lent the major part of its support under the 
Military Assistance Program or through AID-Alliance 
for Progress fund grants. The Counter-Insurgency Plan­
ning Guide published by the United States Special War­
fare School advised that "initial priority should be given 
to select high-impact projects aimed at establishing the 
credibility of the Civic Action program. If longer range 
projects are undertaken, they should be accomplished 
in stages to permit partial use and allow intermediate 
evaluation of their effectiveness." 
Despite the Defense Department's interest in impact 
projects, initial emphasis on engineering battalions 
tended to encourage some over-ambitious road-building 
projects in several countries. But problems of supply 
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and maintenance of heavy equipment and failure to 
complete projects resulted in a redirection of activities 
in some countries where United States assistance was 
involved. In others, road-construction programs have 
had notable success (Colombia, Peru, and Paraguay). 
The smaller impact projects are now receiving most 
United States emphasis in Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, 
Ecuador, and some Central American countries. 
In some Latin American countries the contribution of 
existing or projected civic-action projects in the area of 
counterinsurgency is less than in others. As examples, 
we note five countries (there may be others) where the 
programs seem least relevant to the society in which they 
operate—Argentina, Costa Rica, Mexico, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela. One or more of the following reasons explain 
this: (1) There is a relatively advanced stage of eco­
nomic development and high standard of living, and, 
thus, there is lesser impact of specific projects (Argentina 
and Uruguay); (2) active welfare and development pro­
grams carried out by the civilian government over­
shadow military civic-action projects (Venezuela, Costa 
Rica, and Uruguay); (3) actual or potential insurgency 
is or has been in the larger urban areas where civic-action 
projects have not been emphasized or have been so small 
as to be insignificant in the light of urban problems 
(Argentina, Venezuela until recently, Uruguay, and 
Mexico); (4) the military already has a good reputa­
tion, largely because it has exercised restraint in its 
political activities (Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Mexico). 
It may also be noted that in all of these countries, with 
the possible exception of the peronistas in Argentina, 
the great majority of people have been integrated into 
TABLE 3* 
DRAFTEES IN LATIN AMERICA, BY NUMBER, 
AGE WHEN DRAFTED, AND LENGTH OF SERVICE 
Number of Number 
Country Male Youths Service 
Age When Length of Service Taken into Eligible Drafted 
Each Year Annually 
Argentina  . . 165,000 90,000 20 Army, 1 year; 
Air Force, 1 year; 
Navy, 2 years 
Bolivia 40,000 7,000 18-19 1 year|| 
Brazil 700,000 80-85,000 18-19 1 year|| 
Chile 75,000 13,000 19 1 yearll 
Colombia . .  . 155,000 20,000 18-19 Army, 2 years; 
Navy, 2 years; 
Air Force, li years 
Costa Ricaf . 
Dominican 
Republicf. 
Ecuador . . .  . 40,000 7,000 20i 11 months 
El Salvador 30,000 2,700 18-19 1 year 
Guatemala  . . 40,000 3,000 18 2 years 
Haitif 
Honduras^  . . 
Mexicof . . . . 
Nicaragua§ . 
Panamaf . .  . 
Paraguay . .  . 20,000 11,000 18 2 years# 
Peru 20,000 15,000 18 2 years 
Uruguay! • • 
Venezuela  . . 80,000 7,000 18 2 years 
• Source: Hearings on Foreign Assistance Act, 1965, by Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, House of Representatives, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. March, 1965, p. 350. 
t All volunteers. -„ 
t Conscription available for 18-month period of service, but volunteers nu 
needs. § Conscription authorized, but volunteers fill needs. 
II Usually released earlier.

# One year if in Chaco.
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the political system, although in Venezuela this has been 
a very recent development. 
The Southern Command's report for a ten month 
period (March 1, 1964, to January 1, 1965) lists the 
following "most important civic action projects which 
will benefit the largest number of persons," in Argentina.8 
For the army, it lists nineteen bridges (completed or 
under construction) five sections of road construction 
(mileage not given), two projects of wharf or dock con­
struction (size of operations not indicated), a drain 
construction, and a levee flood protection project. The 
navy and air force undertakings were more limited and 
specialized in humanitarian projects (emergency trans­
portation or disaster relief), sporadic public relations 
(5,000 school children brought to Buenos Aires to visit 
the Air Force Museum), or activities that most civilians 
are unaware of (such as hydrographic services). Al­
though these are undoubtedly worthy efforts, it is diffi­
cult to see how even a doubling of them would have any 
appreciable effect on any of the aspects of counterinsur­
gency described above. 
In Venezuela, a somewhat similar situation prevails." 
The army's principal civic activities were confined to road 
construction in the remote Gran Sabana area, far re­
moved from the scenes of insurgency. Three projects, 
when completed, were to provide about 340 kilometers 
of road. Expected completion date or progress to date 
was indicated for only one of the projects—twenty-five 
kilometers completed (out of a projected ninety) in 
the first three years. Compared with the vast road-
building program of the Ministry of Public Works during 
recent years (nearly seven thousand kilometers in five 
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years), these figures are insignificant.10 The army has 
also instituted a program of industrial and agricultural 
training which will have lasting benefits to the recruit 
after he has left the service. This program is only be­
ginning but can make a worthwhile contribution to the 
government's total educational efforts. 
The Fuerzas Armadas de Cooperation (FAC) have 
for years been engaged in civic-action projects and ac­
cording to virtually all observers have the best reputa­
tion among the rural population. They were organized 
for a variety of functions, including interior police duties, 
and highway, border, and forest patrol. Stationed in 
very small units throughout the country, they have 
carried on literacy training programs, sanitation pro­
grams, and other educational activities. During 1964, 
there were 59 centers for adult education with 44 full-
time instructors, 79 part-time instructors, and 1,318 
students. In addition, the FAC operated 35 schools for 
children with an enrolment of 1,300. The FAC, however, 
is a very small force (about ten thousand men) and is 
used only rarely in antiguerrilla operations in the interior. 
It is organized into small detachments and is unaccus­
tomed to operating in groups larger than about twenty 
men. 
In the North Andean countries (except Venezuela) 
and in two of the Central American countries, civic 
action seems to be having a greater impact. This is only 
partly because of the more ambitious civic-action pro­
grams carried on by the armed forces in these countries. 
All of these countries, it should be noted, are among the 
lesser developed countries of Latin America. Thus, pro­
grams that would be relatively unimportant in the total 
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national picture of the more developed countries might 
be important in the lesser developed countries and make 
a deeper impression for this reason. 
The Southern Command's report (March 1, 1964— 
January 1, 1965) shows five major areas of civic action 
in Bolivia:11 road construction (especially for coloniza­
tion areas), clearing of land for colonization, school 
construction, community development, and primary 
medical treatment for remote areas. During the last 
half of 1964, approximately 130 kilometers of roads had 
been constructed or improved. Engineering battalions 
were maintaining about 5,000 kilometers of roads and six 
different road-construction projects totaling about 325 
kilometers of road were under way in 1965. About 
sixty-five kilometers had been completed at the time and 
projected completion date for all projects ranged from 
1965 to 1968. Semimilitary units, similar to the United 
States Civilian Construction Corps, were also clearing 
colonization areas for agricultural development and con­
structing homes and public buildings. At least one air­
strip had been completed to provide communications 
between a major colonization area and established 
centers. 
Reports on school construction vary slightly, but at 
least one hundred rural schools had been constructed 
between 1962 and 1964. Among these were forty-two 
out of a total of sixty-two that had been assigned to 
civilian contractors but were later taken over by the 
army. The army was scheduled to build 156 schools 
during 1965 with an eventual goal of 1,000. 
The projects listed above, especially school construc­
tion, are sometimes a part of a broader community de­
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velopment program, the idea of which is to encourage 
the community to contribute something of a solution 
to its own problems. The latest Southern Command 
report showed five such projects under way. Water sys­
tems, schools, public health facilities, and street improve­
ment programs were the major projects under construc­
tion. Only a small military force (usually from one to 
four officers and ten or fewer NCO's) is used to mobilize 
as much of the community as possible. 
Another of the more impressive programs has devel­
oped in Peru.12 Six Peruvian engineering battalions and 
one separate company are working on construction and 
maintenance of penetration roads. A seventh battalion 
is now being formed and equipped for this work. The 
projects listed for five of the six battalions totaled 768 
kilometers, but estimated completion date was given for 
only about one-half of them—1964 to 1970. These roads 
are being, or have been, constructed through some of 
the most hazardous terrain in the world and have re­
quired, in at least some cases, the rapid conversion of 
combat battalions into engineering battalions. In many 
cases, they have worked in areas where private con­
tractors were uninterested and where the army has been 
able to do the work at a lower cost. When completed, 
the roads are expected to open colonization areas of more 
than three and one-half million acres of rich and poten­
tially productive agricultural land. President Belaunde in 
1965 announced that he intended for the military to 
be responsible for one-half of all new road construction 
undertaken in Peru. 
The other major activity in Peru has consisted of 
vocational training for recruits. Starting only in April, 
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1962, at the Lima training center, the program comprised 
four centers in early 1965, training 3,000 men a year 
in ten different trades. Concentration is upon simple 
trades desperately needed throughout Peru, such as 
plumbing, carpentry, electronics, mechanics, and simple 
building construction. A vocational agricultural center 
was scheduled to open in 1965. USAID, through modest 
grants, has assisted this program of the Peruvian mili­
tary under the Alliance for Progress. A wide variety of 
other activities of the Peruvian armed forces, such as 
communication with and medical services for remote 
areas, are worthwhile activities but only marginally con­
nected with counterinsurgency and, thus, not considered 
here. 
In neighboring Ecuador,15 the armed forces have also 
increased their civic-action programs. Beginning in 1962, 
the main emphasis was upon farm-to-market roads. Four 
problems appeared very quickly: (1) Activities at­
tempted were beyond their capabilities—too many road-
construction projects were started without sufficient 
equipment and know how; (2) there was a lack of 
maintenance of heavy equipment; (3) the tendency 
arose to pull out equipment from one project to begin 
another; and (4) disagreements over projects occurred 
when officers, including the minister of defense, wanted 
to institute projects for personal, political reasons, or 
when officers in charge of project priority determination 
were transferred. (Ecuador had seven ministers of de­
fense in a period of one and one-half years.) 
At one point, the United States Agency for Interna­
tional Development refused to grant any additional 
funds (for a discussion of AID's role in civic action 
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see page 108), but agreement was subsequently reached 
for their restoration. Although continuing to work on 
road projects already started, concentration has now 
turned to less ambitious projects that can be completed 
within a reasonably short period. The Southern Com­
mand's 1964-65 report shows four road-construction proj­
ects totaling 173 kilometers under construction and one 
major project for construction of potable water distri­
bution systems. There are also twenty-eight smaller 
impact-type projects, including such things as construc­
tion of schools, water systems, short roads to isolated 
villages, electric power lines, and sewerage systems. 
These twenty-eight projects were strategically spread 
throughout the country and involved only a few military 
personnel (usually two or three) serving as technicians, 
directors, advisers, or co-ordinatdrs. The armed forces 
or AID also provide equipment locally unavailable. The 
community usually furnished the bulk of the labor, 
partly as a matter of necessity and partly as a conscious 
effort to involve the local community in the solution of 
its own problems. 
In April, 1962, the Colombian military forces and the 
United States Army Mission developed a plan of civic 
action that would be carried out by Colombian military 
personnel and would involve such activities as construc­
tion of penetration and farm-to-market roads, commu­
nity development, health and sanitation programs, well-
drilling, and educational programs.14 Under this plan 
for civic action, the Colombian military would supply 
the equipment and materials and the work would be 
accomplished jointly by the military and area populace. 
On completion, the project would be turned over to the 
community authorities. 
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For our purposes the most important areas in which 
civic-action work is in progress are: 
1. Road Construction and Maintenance: Some 300 
miles of secondary, farm-to-market roads (later extended 
to 690 miles) were planned for construction or recon­
struction. In 1963, Colombian Army engineering battal­
ions were reorganized, new training methods were intro­
duced and work had begun in four locations (depart­
ments of Huila, Caldas, Tohma, and Santander). 
2. Medical Dispensaries: Eighteen medical dispen­
saries (all of which have now been completed) plus two 
floating dispensaries on the Putumayo and Magdalena 
rivers and a flying dispensary were programmed. Staffing 
is by both civilian and army and air force medical 
personnel. 
3. Potable Water Supply: Three well-drilling units 
were provided under the MAP program. Crews have been 
trained and four of forty programmed wells have been 
completed. One of these is in Quebrada Negra, Tolima, 
where a complete chlorination, filtration and distribu­
tion system was also built by the army for the 
community. 
4. Tolima highway: This project calls for the con­
struction of ninety-six miles of highway between Ataco, 
Tolima, and Palmira, Valle, plus thirty miles of con­
necting road in one of the most active violence areas. 
Army units are working from both ends, and MAP 
equipment has been provided to support this project. 
5. Armed Forces Literacy Education: A program of 
literacy education has been introduced in military basic 
training centers for illiterate recruits. Helped by AID-
supplied electronic teaching equipment, the program 
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teaches reading, writing, and simple arithmetic on the 
"one teach one" principle in which the recruit is urged 
to teach one other person to read and write. Two cycles 
of trainees totaling 7,000 have completed training since 
November, 1963, with the result that the percentage of 
illiteracy in the army has droped considerably. 
In late September, 1962, a new plan was devised. This 
was called an "Impact" program and would stress 
projects within the areas where internal security was a 
big problem. This was an obvious attempt to stamp 
out the causes of the violence as well as an attempt 
to better the "image" of the military in the eyes of 
the people of the areas. One of the projects given top 
priority was the construction, improvement, and main­
tenance of roads so that commerce could flow once more, 
as well as providing a means of opening areas to motor­
ized patrols. Necessary reorganization of Colombian 
Army Engineer Battalions was started and new training 
methods were introduced at the Colombian Army En­
gineer School. It was decided, to provide better practical 
experience, that emphasis should be placed on "on the 
job" type training. By doing this, heavy engineering 
equipment could be placed on construction site, and 
construction could go on concurrently with training. 
Equipment was to be provided from Military Assistance 
Program (MAP) funds with soft goods support (ma­
terials and fuels) from United States AID funds. 
We have not attempted to fit Brazil into either of the 
two categories of countries discussed above. Few if any 
of the armed forces of Latin America have had as good 
a record in the field of civic action as have the Brazilian 
armed forces. Few if any of the armed forces of Latin 
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America have as favorable a popular image as have the 
Brazilian armed forces. It is tempting to draw an easy 
cause and effect relationship here between civic action 
and a favorable popular image. Unfortunately, there are 
too many other factors that would have to be measured 
first—their record of political intervention, the social 
origin of their officer corps, their record in national wars, 
Brazil's relationship with neighboring powers, and many 
other factors. In their civic action, the Brazilian armed 
forces have concentrated principally on three areas: (1) 
road and railroad construction, (2) opening of the 
frontiers and servicing remote areas, and (3) in-service 
training of recruits in civilian skills.15 The largest en­
gineering operations carried out since the nineteenth 
century have been in the area of road and railroad con­
struction. In 1965, four construction battalions were 
located in the South and four in the Northeast. Each 
one employed from 800 to 2,000 civilians in addition 
to the military personnel. It was pointed out to the 
authors that the military is often the easiest and quick­
est available federal agency that can act as a means of 
insuring the government's presence in remote areas and, 
for this reason, they have had an early start in the civic-
action field. 
In the area of vocational education, the army engineer­
ing institutes turn out nearly two hundred fifty engineers 
annually, most of them with an engineering degree. 
About four hundred enlisted men are given a six month 
technical training course and another two hundred, a six 
month advanced course. The navy and air force each 
have smaller vocational training programs. Although 
these numbers might not appear very large, they become 
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significant when seen in perspective. For example, in 
1961, the total number of engineers graduated from 
public and private institutions was 1,441. Thus the army 
engineering institutions provide a significant percentage 
of the country's engineers. 
The Guatemalan civic-action program is the most 
ambitious of the Central American programs. Most re­
ports merely describe the projects, however, making an 
accurate quantitative survey impossible. The following 
will illustrate the five most important areas: road con­
struction, school construction, school hot-lunch pro­
grams, literacy training, and mobile medical teams.16 In 
a period covering roughly 1964 and early 1965 about 32 
kilometers of roads had been completed through dense 
jungle (bad weather had caused long delays), 16 kilo­
meters had been improved, and 17 bridges had been 
constructed. In the school hot-lunch program, 301,498 
children were served in 3,073 primary schools. The army's 
role in the program was primarily transportation of 
food and construction of warehouses (twenty-five re­
ported). Literacy training brought 9,853 adult students 
to 503 centers during the period. In addition to this, the 
army was engaged in producing and printing primers 
for these and other literacy training programs. Only a 
few cases of school construction were reported, but this 
may or may not be indicative of the extent of the 
program. Mobile medical teams reported about 75,000 
inoculations in various parts of the country as well as 
other types of medical treatment. A large number of 
small programs, conducted in co-ordination with local 
civic-action councils, continue as a matter of course and 
serve to improve relations with civil communities (e.g. 
painting of buildings and minor repairs to churches). 
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III 
The Effect of Civic Action 
Where United States military missions have included 
a general evaluation of civic action in their reports to 
the Southern Command, they have usually advised that 
it has improved the image of the military. Although their 
criteria for evaluation are not always given, in most 
cases they mention only an increase in favorable pub­
licity in the press. The United States civic-action officer 
in Argentina reported, for example, that "although it 
is early to determine accurately the extent of the effect 
of the overall program on public opinion, it is believed 
that the Civic Action effort in this country is being well 
received by the civilian population and that the image 
of the military has improved during this past year.17 
The realization that both USIA and United States mili­
tary missions public information officers help to get 
civic-action items placed in the press—and urge the host 
government's military elements to be "public relations 
conscious"—tends to diminish the significance of this as 
evidence of "improvement of the military image." 
The reports vary, of course, but there is a prominent 
feature in most of them that makes the reader suspect 
that the reporting officer's objectivity is clouded by his 
own enthusiasm. The rather laudatory descriptions of 
the long tradition of civic action in some countries make 
one wonder why the image of the military is not already 
Highly favorable. And, although only a slight increase in 
civic-action projects is reported in some countries, we 
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are often told that "the image of the military has im­
proved during the past year." 
The House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs 
also concluded during its hearings in 1965 "that the civic 
action program has improved the image of the military 
in Latin America by manifesting the interest of the 
military and the armed forces in the well-being of the 
people." 18 This unqualified conclusion of the subcommit­
tee was based on a series of hearings in which the only 
evidence presented on this point was a statement by 
Lieutenant General Alva R. Fitch, deputy director, De­
fense Intelligence Agency. He noted that "the changes 
in the composition and attitudes of Latin American 
armed forces, often manifested publicly by beneficial 
civic action projects have in turn created increased 
public support and respect for the military in most 
countries."19 On the basis of this the subcommittee found 
that "the civic action program has improved the image 
of the military in Latin America." Apart from this rather 
cavalier use of the general's more cautious statement, it 
might be questioned whether the latter would be con­
clusive evidence even if he had been as categorical as 
were the findings that were based on his statement. No 
one at the hearings showed any apparent interest in the 
basis for his conclusion or raised any questions concern­
ing it. 
Experience in Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia 
suggests that civic action can act as a temporary deter­
rent of insurgency. Three points of clarification should 
be emphasized with respect to this statement. First, the 
evidence is suggestive rather than conclusive. Second, 
we say temporary in order to emphasize that the impact 
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of any project is likely to be shortlived and likely to 
stimulate further demands for development and reform. 
Third, it has been in the more underdeveloped countries 
that these measures have apparently had the greatest 
impact. 
In Peru and Ecuador, there have been cases where 
engineering battalions have moved into areas where 
scattered violence had previously erupted, and have 
managed to restore order. There are also signs of ap­
parent success of Colombian civic action in the army's 
campaign against rural bandits. Another example cited 
to the authors was the influence of the presence of four 
engineering battalions on the Peasant Leagues in the 
northeast of Brazil. It was believed to be acting as a 
damper on the volatile political climate that is accen­
tuated by a chronic drought problem and the extreme 
poverty of the masses. Virtually all United States mili­
tary personnel in the various Latin American missions 
are of the opinion that these projects were helping to 
prevent insurgency. Civilian personnel tend to be less 
certain and divided in their evaluations. But there is 
very little concrete evidence to support the conclusions 
of these observers except for the lack of insurgency in 
the areas where impact-type projects are underway, a 
fact that they are often the first to admit may or may 
not be related to the projects. 
One of the few field studies that has tried to ascertain 
the effects of specific projects came up with rather 
mixed conclusions.2" It was found that the program in 
Bolivia had engineered no particular gratitude on the 
part of the civilian beneficiaries. Most of the civilians 
interviewed expressed suspicion as to the army's mo­
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tives in engaging in civic-action projects, especially when 
it was working under contract. The study also found 
little evidence that the people feel any great gratitude 
toward the army for building a school. In fact, some 
people indicated suspicion as to the army's motives say­
ing that they thought it was "making money." Some 
felt that their community could have done the job alone. 
Most of them did feel, however, that the army had 
changed for the better in recent years. The study also 
concluded that with skilful propaganda, the communities 
could easily be convinced of the value of civic action, 
especially since in most of the towns, the army's project 
was the only thing the residents could remember that 
the national government had ever done for them. 
A United States civilian official with many years of 
experience has also expressed doubts: 
The program has some value in educating the military 
to a sense of public purpose but it is costly education. It 
has less value in changing the public reputation of the 
military. It is too obvious a system of image-making. 
Sporadic offers of a medical clinic's services (e.g. once 
a fortnight) may make a garrison popular that day with 
those in pain. The intellectuals, or merely the intelligent, 
can't really believe they have a new model army just 
because there is talk of civic action and a few realities. 
The University is skeptical. I tried to have the civic 
action officers make a proposal to beautify (grade, land­
scape, etc.) the University grounds, and build some ath­
letic fields. It did not come off. Something like this how­
ever, could do the job of sincerity. 
Whatever the initial impression, it is unlikely that the 
good will created by amelioration of hardships will last 
long beyond the immediate impact of the project. Not 
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only do people have a way of taking improvements for 
granted almost as quickly as they have been provided, 
but they become aware that further improvements are 
possible and ought to be forthcoming. Margaret Mead 
has explained one of the reasons for this attitude: 
Where only the chief or the feudal lord lives in a large 
house and all other men in houses which are small and 
mean, the distinction is not between richness and poverty, 
but between privilege and absence of privilege in a sys­
tem based on rank or caste or class. But when it is pos­
sible for a majority of the population to have some given 
thing—a tin roof, a well, a pump, inside plumbing, a 
donkey . —then the smaller number who cannot 
acquire it do not regard themselves, and are not regarded 
by others, as members of a different or lesser breed. In­
stead they come to feel, and others come to feel that they 
are simply poor.21 
These observations are borne out by the record of the 
Betancourt administration in Venezuela. His administra­
tion brought the benefits of an ambitious program of 
public works to rural inhabitants who had been ex­
ploited for centuries. As well as producing gratitude on 
the part of the recipients, these efforts generated a de­
mand for more of the same and protests that progress 
was too slow. Until recently, insurgency in Venezuela 
was primarily an urban problem rather than a rural one. 
There are three probable reasons for its transfer to the 
countryside: (1) The increased efficiency of the police in 
controlling riots and acts of terrorism in the urban areas, 
(2) the realization on the part of the insurgents that 
they would be unable to accomplish their objectives in 
the cities, and (3) the expectation on the part of insur­
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gent leaders that they could capitalize on growing dis­
content in the rural areas (ironically, as we have noted, 
a discontent abetted by the reforms already introduced). 
On the other hand, most non-official observers (jour­
nalists, scholars, and businessmen) are in agreement that 
the image of the armed forces has improved in Venezuela 
since the fall of Perez Jimenez in 1958. To the extent 
that this is true, it could scarcely be the result of civic 
action. Only the FAC and the army have to any extent 
been involved in civic action and, as the report of a 
United States survey mission observed, "present Army 
emphasis is on long-range road building projects which 
have little immediate impact."" Furthermore, these 
projects are usually located in remote areas where they 
come to the attention of few people. It is far more 
probable that the military's image has improved as a 
result of its restraint in political involvement. The many 
complimentary references to this fact by government 
and party (including the opposition) leaders have 
brought it to the attention of the nation. 
So far as the current problem of rural guerrilla activity 
is concerned, most military and civilian authorities are 
inclined to rely on the government's agrarian reform pro­
gram and feel that the army's public relations should 
take the form of conducting its antiguerrilla operations 
properly. Furthermore, they argue, if there is discontent 
in rural areas and failure on the part of the local popula­
tion to co-operate openly with the army, there is at the 
same time no indication of large-scale support for the 
guerrillas. Thus, although the guerrilla problem will con­
tinue to be a vexing one, the guerrillas will be unable to 
gain the mass support necessary to transform sporadic 
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guerrilla activity into a mass movement capable of over­
throwing the government. 
In both Bolivia and Peru, civic-action programs have 
recently been associated with some measures of reform. 
In Bolivia the old army was destroyed in 1952 and a 
new one created that was more in sympathy with the 
aims of the National Revolution. This helped give cre­
dence to claims that the new army was no longer the 
servant of the tin barons and the oligarchy. Civic-action 
programs were also reinforced by a broad program of 
land, tax, and educational reform; and, in its search for 
resources, the MNR (Movimicnto National Revolucio­
nario, National Revolutionary Movement) turned to the 
new army. Fortunately for the MNR, pro-MNR army 
officers were returning from exile and, like those who 
remained in the army after the 1952 purge, needed a 
raison d'etre for themselves and their institutions. Civic 
Action thus coincided with the interests of both the 
party and the armed forces. 
In Peru, more than in most of the Latin American 
countries, the armed forces, especially the army, have 
had a tradition of civic action, especially in engineering. 
1 his has provided both a more favorable attitude and a 
capability upon which to build. After the military coup 
d'etat that ousted the Prado government and annulled 
the elections of 1962, the armed forces found themselves 
directly responsible for the administration of the country. 
Pacing a tense political situation, they were the more 
nreptive to a role that would improve their public 
image. When Belaunde was elected in 1963, he took pains 
to emphasize the virtues of the armed forces, and well 
he might. They had annulled the results of the previous 
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elections where he had come out second to Haya de la 
Torre. Since taking office, Belaiinde has tried to utilize 
the armed forces as well as students and other groups in 
a program of national development and moderate reform. 
According to government sources, insurgency has not 
become a serious threat. But the part played by civic 
action can only be a matter of conjecture, and whether 
reforms are moving fast enough to discourage future 
insurgency remains to be seen. Furthermore, according 
to a New York Times report of June 25, 1965, the Peru­
vian minister of government "admitted the existence of 
communist guerrillas in central Peru." 
Following nearly two decades of failure, Colombian 
military units have more recently been successful against 
rural bandits after employing the technique of civic 
action. By this means, the army has apparently suc­
ceeded in gaining the confidence of traditionally sus­
picious and often hostile campesinos to the point where 
they no longer co-operate with the bandits and in some 
cases even assist the army with valuable information.23 
This is a significant accomplishment, and it has suc­
ceeded in bringing peace to at least some of the hitherto 
lawless areas of the country. But, unfortunately, it does 
not tell us much about the effectiveness of such meas­
ures against political insurgents. The bandits were, for 
the most part, individuals who terrorized the country­
side for no other reason than robbery and a passion 
for killing. Under these circumstances they would hardly 
be very popular with the local inhabitants.24 The fact 
remains, however, that the peasants did protect the 
bandit by their silence in the face of military questioning 
until the advent of a directed civic-action program. 
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In Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Honduras by virtue 
of the local propaganda and the extent of participation 
of the armed forces in civic-action projects, an impres­
sion is created of an all-out effort by an all-encompassing 
military establishment. In all three countries, the govern­
ments arc essentially military-oriented. The Guatemalan 
president is Colonel Peralta and the Honduran president 
is Brigadier General Lopez. In Nicaragua, the current 
president, Dr. Rene Schick, is boxed in by members of 
the Somoza dynasty holding such positions as minister 
of foreign affairs and commander of the armed forces. 
The local military has a role in the administration or 
provision of rural police, in education, communications, 
transport, intelligence, and construction activities that 
provides a concentration of control in the influence of 
the Somoza family in many facets of the country s life. 
Civic action in these three countries appears to be 
more a means of institutional (or dynastic in the case 
of Nicaragua) self-preservation than an attempt to get 
at the country's fundamental economic and social prob­
lems. Building a few schools, roads, or other public works 
cannot for long mask the absurdity of meaningless and 
ineffective laws or decrees on land reform (usually 
proposing to turn over little-desired public lands to 
peasant families), tax reform, and bureaucratic cor­
ruption. As much as anything, the reason for the tem­
porary peace prevailing in Guatemala and Honduras 
may be explained by the imprisonment or exile of dif­
ficult student, labor, and peasant leaders. But this is 
only treating the symptoms rather than the causes of 
insurgency and, at best, postponing the inevitable con­
frontation of problems. 
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IV 
As a part of the effort to improve the counterinsur­
gency capabilities of the Latin American Armed forces, 
the United States has tried to engage them in a variety 
of projects useful to civilians, especially in the rural 
areas. Although there has been little in the way of 
careful and objective evaluation of the effects of these 
projects (it is probably too early), we have noted some 
evidence that they are meeting limited objectives in a 
few of the Latin American countries. 
The civic-action projects discussed above are desirable 
both from a humanitarian and a practical standpoint. 
Anything that adds to the material well-being of under­
privileged rural inhabitants is a worthy endeavor. It 
seems unlikely, however, that civic action will play a 
crucial role in counterinsurgency in Latin America. It 
is as much a mistake to think that insurgency is merely 
a problem of poverty as to think that it is a problem 
posed by a few Communists. If meeting the threat of 
insurgency requires more than the development of mili­
tary capabilities, it also involves more than a program 
of economic development and raising the standard of 
living. Furthermore, there are limits to which the Latin 
American military is willing to be converted, for pro­
fessional considerations, from a sword into a plowshare. 
Regardless of the type of government in power and 
whatever its programs, the development of social and 
political institutions capable of supporting that govern­
ment is essential for long-range stability. The armed 
forces could play a crucial role in supporting a govern­
ment while these processes are going on. But we have 
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already observed that, in the past, the armed forces have 
often stepped in and stopped this process. 
Where civic-action programs seem to be having a 
measure of success, it is because they are most relevant 
to the society in which they operate: (1) Where there 
is limited technical and administrative capability in the 
civilian sector, the contribution of the armed forces 
will be more visible by comparison and make a more 
favorable impact. (2) In the lesser developed country, 
almost anything that is done is a contribution of some 
significance and is visible as such. (3) The orientation 
of the armed forces themselves is important. Whether 
they are favorably disposed to civic-action programs 
has depended on a number of circumstances described in 
the preceding pages. (4) The rural orientation of civic-
action programs in Latin America would obviously make 
them more relevant to those societies where there is 
greater potential for rural insurgency. In the North 
Andean countries and in Central America, where large, 
exploited, and unintegrated Indian populations live in 
isolated mountain valleys, the potential for rural insur­
gency is the greatest. This may account for the greater 
receptivity to the idea of civic action shown by the 
armed forces in these countries. (5) In the longer run, 
success will depend on the extent to which the programs 
are tied to a broader program of social reform. If they 
arc merely one of a number of means used to perpetuate 
a military regime whose main objective is the preserva­
tion of its institutional prerogatives or those of a small 
oligarchy, it is unlikely that even an ambitious program 
can indefinitely stem the tide of insurgency. The pro­
grams in Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua seem to 
be of this orientation. 
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A part of the theory behind civic action is that bring­
ing the armed forces in as an integral part of programs 
of development and change will help to dispel their 
fear of change and of losing their dominant position in 
society. The experiment under way in Peru might in 
time shed some light on this. In Bolivia, one of the 
other countries in which the armed forces have shown 
a genuine interest in civic action, it quite obviously made 
no difference. In fact, General Barrientos, who headed 
the 1964 coup, had also been deeply involved in civic 
action. In El Salvador, where a reform-minded colonel 
is the president, the armed forces are now engaged only 
in scattered relief or good-will projects,2' with plans for 
expansion slowed by shortages of funds and skilled 
manpower. 
Although there are no indications of an abandonment 
of civic action and other non-military means of prevent­
ing insurgency, there are indications that the Johnson 
administration is giving increasing attention to the more 
purely military solutions to the problem of counterin­
surgency. There are, for example, signs of a revision 
of the Kennedy position with respect to military coups. 
The government placed in power by one such coup in 
Brazil in March, 1964, received "warmest good wishes' 
from President Johnson, and another coup in Bolivia 
later that year prompted no public statement of concern 
from the President or the State Department. There were 
also the much-debated and denied reports that, at a 
Washington meeting of United States ambassadors to 
Latin America early in 1964, the new assistant secretary 
of state for inter-American affairs urged that greater 
attention be paid to immediate national-security in­
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terests and a less passionate commitment to political 
freedom and social justice.26 We have already noted 
the decline in public and laudatory references to civic 
action eminating from presidential and State Department 
sources. 
If it is true that military solutions are receiving more 
attention, the dilemma of such solutions was demon­
strated by the fighting that broke out in the Dominican 
Republic in April, 1965. The situation that led the 
administration to order the landing of troops there may 
have emphasized the probability of similar situations 
in other countries. If fighting should break out, the local 
armed forces might be ranged on both sides and would 
be incapable of insuring that the outcome would be 
satisfactory to United States security interests. It is 
worth noting that it was another miliary solution to this 
dilemma that received sudden attention in 1965—the 
creation of an Inter-American Defense Force. 
The United States Senate has, over a number of years, 
shown an interest in the subject of an inter-American 
military force. In 1959, for example, Senators Morse and 
Church introduced an amendment to pending legislation 
that would apply savings from reductions in military 
assistance for Latin America to an international military 
force under the control of the Organization of American 
States.27 Another amendment was offered by Senator 
Smathers expressing congressional support for the crea­
tion of a Western Hemisphere police force. In 1963, the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations approved a 
figure of #25 million per annum to "be available during 
eachfiscal year for assistance to an international military 
force under the control of the Organization of American 
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States.28 The final legislative result of the 1959 and 1963 
Senate discussions, however, differed significantly from 
the Foreign Relations Committee's recommendations. 
In 1959, no reference was made to the proposed defense 
force. In 1963, it was provided that "a part" of an 
authorized $55 million "could be used during each fiscal 
year for assistance in implementing a feasible plan for 
regional defense." 29 
The invitation for the creation of an Inter-American 
Defense Force, suggested in various froms by Congress, 
appears not to have been advocated or pushed by either 
the State Department or the Pentagon. It is equally 
clear that the invitations did not meet with the approval 
of the Latin American governments. It was the Domini­
can revolt that brought an abrupt change. On May 6, 
the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of the American 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs approved a resolution spon­
sored by the United States and Latin American coun­
tries. It requested "governments of member states that 
are willing and capable of doing so to make contingents 
of their land, naval, air, or police forces available to 
the Organization of American States to form an 
Inter-American force that will operate under the au­
thority of this Tenth Meeting of Consultation."30 
Since that date, the President has, on a number of oc­
casions, emphasized his interests in the establishment of 
a permanent inter-American defense force to meet situa­
tions similar to that in the Dominican Republic. In an 
address on May 28, 1965, President Johnson stated that 
for the first time in the history of the Organization of 
American States [it] has created and it has sent to the 
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soil of an American nation an international peace-keeping 
military force. That may be the greatest achievement of 
all. It is clear that we need new international ma­
chinery geared to meet the fast-moving events. When 
hours can decide the fate of generations, the moment of 
decision must become the moment of action.31 
In a press conference held a few days later, the President 
expressed himself as "very delighted" that the inter-
American Force was functioning effectively. The obser­
vant reader will have noted that the meeting of Consul­
tation of May, 1965, took pains to retain in its own hands 
the control of the Inter-American Force. There was no 
mention of the Inter-American Defense Board, or of its 
defense plans. This joint decision was entirely civihan­
onented. This may also foreshadow a new trend. 
We have already noted Senator Fulbright's amend­
ment to the authorization bill for the fiscal year 1966 
Foreign Assistance. The amendment authorized up to 
$25 million for an Inter-American Defense Force under 
the control of the OAS. At a conference with the House 
of Representatives late in June, 1965, concurrence was 
obtained, with the stipulation that the costs of the cur­
rent OAS forces under the command of Brazilian General 
Alvin would not be charged against the $25 million 
authorization. The debate on new appropriation bills will 
offer another test of this proposed change in policy. In 
any event, another approach to the problem of contain­
ing insurgency and subversion has been made. The door 
is opened for new doctrine and new procedures. The 
effect upon the doctrine and measures adduced in the 
early 1960's may be to end a chapter and to begin a 
new one. 
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Chapter 7

Armies for Progress? 
With the 1960's came a new emphasis on 
the problems of internal security in Latin American 
countries. This new emphasis was accompanied by a 
doubling of the amount of United States military as­
sistance granted. Was there a connection? It would be 
difficult to establish a direct relationship, but this much 
can be said: The emphasis upon internal security made 
it easier to persuade Congress to authorize additional 
expenditures for assistance because the role of the Latin 
American armed forces in internal security is a more 
plausible one and has been articulated in popular terms. 
From the United States side, the amount still looks 
small Compared with total foreign aid and military as­
sistance, and it can be appropriated with little trouble. 
The argument used is that training and equipment is 
necessary in order for the military to be able to preserve 
order and prevent a Communist take-over while the 
difficult task of reform and transition is being carried 
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out. From the Latin American side it is a different 
matter. In some countries the amounts of MAP are of 
real significance. And, as we have noted, recent military 
coups in Brazil, Bolivia, and the Dominican Republic 
do not give cause for optimism concerning the role that 
the military are ready to play. 
The military assistance program also brought increased 
contact between United States and Latin American 
military personnel. The contacts were supposed to have 
a beneficial effect on the social and political views of the 
Latin American officers. Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara assured a Senate subcommittee in that re­
gard that "the experience we have had indicates that the 
exposure of the military officers to our schools acquaints 
them with democratic philosophies and democratic ways 
of thinking which they, in turn, take back to their 
countries." * But evidence offered to support Mr. Mc­
Namara^s contention is scarce and of doubtful validity. 
It usually consists of statements by Latin American 
officers trained in the United States declaring their be­
liefs that the military should stay out of politics. Whether 
they held these views before they received training in 
the United States is not usually considered. Further­
more, there are examples of United States-trained officers 
who have participated in military coups against con­
stitutional government. 
In the instance of the Santo Domingo affair of May, 
1965, leading military figures on both sides of the dis­
pute, including Colonel Caamano, Colonel Wessin y 
Wessin, and Colonel Imbert, had received training at 
one or more United States military schools. Perhaps 
an outstanding example of this was the ousting of 
President Prado in Lima in July, 1960, a fortnight before 
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his constitutional term would have expired. Colonel 
Gonzalo Briceno, who arrested the president in the Na­
tional Palace, was trained at the Ranger School at Fort 
Benning, Georgia, later returning to Peru to develop an 
antiguerrilla commando unit. His breaching of the palace 
gates was accomplished by a Sherman tank, furnished 
by MAP. The members of the military junta included 
Major General Lindley Lopez, who attended the General 
Command and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, and 
Major General Vargas Prada, a graduate both of Fort 
Leavenworth and the Armored Tank School at Fort 
Knox. Other members of the Peruvian junta's cabinet 
had studied at the Fleet Sonar School in Key West, 
Randolph Field, Texas, and the Engineering School at 
Fort Belvoir. One member of the junta, Rear Admiral 
Torres Matos had received the United States Legion of 
Merit from Secretary of Defense Gates in the Eisenhower 
administration; another member, Major General Lindley 
Lopez, received the same decoration in 1961, from 
Secretary McNamara in the Kennedy administration.2 
There is another possible result of contacts between 
United States and Latin American military personnel 
that has only recently begun to receive attention. Un­
confirmed reports regarding Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, 
Bolivia, and the Dominican Republic have charged that 
United States military personnel by word or deed had 
an influence upon the action of the local military in time 
of political crisis. This may not always have been con­
sonant with the policy followed by the State Department 
and the embassy. 
Spokesmen for the deposed Paz regime in Bolivia 
charged that United States military attaches were 
secretly supporting the rebels, while the ambassador was 
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supporting the constitutional government.3 An editorial 
in the New Republic charged that "in Honduras, while 
U.S. Ambassador Burrows fought to prevent the over­
throw of President Villeda Morales, members of the 
U.S. military mission there openly supported the 
coup." 4 Another report that Ambassador Burrows had 
his MAAG and mission officers caution the Honduran coup 
leaders against their rumored moves suggests that the 
ambassador might have had some doubt concerning the 
attitudes of his own officers or the Honduran officers' 
concept of what those attitudes might be.b From Bolivia, 
there were also reports of a United States Colonel who 
was "visiting old friends in Bolivia on his way to Chile" 
in June, 1965. These friends reportedly included the top 
members of the ruling junta who immediately dispatched 
a mission to Washington to negotiate new financing for 
rehabilitation of the tin mines. According to New York 
Times reporter Henry Raymont, Bolivian officials had 
hinted that the Defense Department appreciated the 
urgency of the situation more than the embassy had." 
Relations of this nature emphasize to the local military 
the political involvement of United States military of­
ficers who are supposed to be setting examples for their 
Latin American counterparts. If the United States mili­
tary were to enter into local politics in the sense of 
influencing national decisions—a course of action which 
is a constant temptation—it would be engaging in an 
activity that is opposite of its intended goal: indoctrinat­
ing the local military to stay out of political intrigue. 
Perhaps this illustrates a gap in the authority and 
strength of the State Department and embassy control 
over the interference by United States military in the 
conduct of United States foreign policy and diplomacy. 
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It is not suggested that a United States military attache 
or MAAG officer was directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
or by the Unified Command at Quarry Heights, to dis­
cuss and influence political decisions within a Latin 
American country. Such actions are more likely the 
spontaneous and personal responsibility of the individual 
officer concerned. But the authority and responsibility 
for making comments and giving advice or warnings as 
to the consequences of political decisions or actions in 
a Latin American country, which are given by an 
embassy, derive from decisions reached at Washington, 
where they represent a consensus of military, economic, 
political, and other considerations that are taken into 
account there and transmitted to the embassy in instruc­
tions from the Department of State. For an individual 
United States military officer to tender his own advice 
or counsel, then, is for him to place his own ideas against 
those of his government. The obvious irresponsible 
character of such counsel, and the implications of diver­
gence from his own government's policy, unfortunately 
does not prevent such private endeavors from taking 
place. 
It is also possible that negotiations directed from 
Washington may not contradict embassy policy but 
might, nevertheless, emphasize the importance and pres­
tige of the military (United States and Latin American). 
In Honduras, when reports of the impending 1963 coup 
reached Washington, a United States major general was 
sent to inform the Honduran officers of the President's 
opposition to such moves.7 Action of this nature only 
serves to point out to the Latin American military that 
the United States recognized them as a government 
within a government. 
222 Internal Security and Military Power 
There appears to be another consequence of the 
affinity between the United States military and their 
Latin American counterparts. Frequently, the Latin 
American requests for military equipment are, despite 
their inappropriateness, endorsed and forwarded by the 
MAAG'S the Unified Command, and the Pentagon with­
out challenge (normally in that chain of command there 
is no qualified economist). The projects and the costs 
are more likely to be challenged only by the Bureau of 
Budget, AID (which has a goal of long-range economic 
development), or by congressmen in appropriation hear­
ings. Especially when projects are challenged by the 
congressional committee members, the military spokes­
men on occasion take refuge in general statements, 
security classification, and references to the fast rotation 
in duty stations, thus allowing the spokesman to avoid 
discussion of past events on the grounds that he was 
then charged with different responsibilities. In view of 
the basic differences and incongruities between the back­
ground, technical and professional training, and sociolo­
gical orientation of the North and South American 
officers, the logical reason for the affinity is hard to 
ascertain. It leads to the surmise that the basis is no 
other than that of comrades in arms. 
II 
Civic Action in Perspective 
What do the recently emphasized civic-action pro­
grams add to this picture? There is agreement among 
nearly all of the United States Military officers and many 
civilian officers in the field that the civic-action pro­
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grams are adding to the ability of the armed forces to 
meet the threat of insurgency, largely by improving 
their image among the rural inhabitants. 
Although these beliefs remain for the most part un­
tested and not without some doubts, they are based 
upon reasonable assumptions and some concrete evi­
dence that would justify a continuation of the programs. 
One of the strongest arguments in support of civic 
action, therefore, is that it is a temporary means of 
preventing insurgency. We have suggested, however, 
that a distinction must be made between those countries 
where the programs seem to have little relevance to the 
society in which they operate and others where the 
programs are more relevant. In the first category, we 
have listed Argentina, Uruguay, Mexico, Venezuela, and 
Costa Rica. Among the countries where the programs 
appear to be more relevant are the North Andean 
countries (except Venezuela) and the Central American 
countries (except Costa Rica). Inasmuch as civic action 
can at best be a temporary measure with reference to 
the problem of insurgency, it will soon outlive its use­
fulness unless the respective governments tackle the 
long-range problems of social reform and economic 
development. In this respect, the military governments 
of Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, among the 
Central American governments, do not offer much cause 
for optimism. Indeed, the ever-widening scope of civic-
action jurisdiction in those countries appears to have 
served—intentionally on the host government's part—to 
build up and to consolidate the existing military regimes. 
Where the government and the military are one and 
indivisible, it can only be expected that the techniques 
supplied by Fort Bragg, Fort Gordon, and Fort Gulick 
will be used to perpetuate such regimes. Professor Dana 
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Munro, for many years in active contact with the daily 
relationships between the United States and Caribbean 
countries and a life long observer of that area, concludes 
that earlier United States military training gave their 
armed forces "a potential power which only the ablest 
of the old style caudillos had."8 Herbert Matthews' 
phrase is "we put political power in the hands of the 
military and made them invincible." ° 
What of the argument that civic action is contribut­
ing to the economic development of Latin American 
countries and, therefore, to the solution of the long-range 
problem that we have referred to? Assuming that the 
military is not to be involved primarily in political and 
social reforms necessary for economic development, the 
role of the military in development should lie in its 
contribution to infrastructure. 
In a developmental situation, it is not the case that 
just any public works would further economic develop­
ment. Resources are scarce, and it is important that the 
building of infrastructure follow a rational time sequence 
and pattern. There should be some concern that the 
military activities be balanced against priorities estab­
lished by the country planners. Do the civic-action proj­
ects fit into the national plan? Is the administration of 
the program co-ordinated with either national or local 
civilian government agencies? Is there a national plan 
into which the projects can be fitted? Are there regional 
and local plans? Generally, the answer to these questions 
is "no." 
Infrastructure is taken to mean those "social capital" 
or "social overhead" requirements for the functioning of 
a modern economy. An Alliance for Progress report 
divides infrastructure into two categories: economic and 
social. Included in the economic category are power, 
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communications, and transportation projects. In the 
social category are health, water-supply, sewage, hous­
ing, and community development programs.10 It is im­
portant to note that the creation of infrastructure is 
intended to have a long-run and modernizing impact on 
the society. That is, a dam, a highway, or a sewerage 
system has an expectation of being in use for a number 
of years. A less concrete, but equally vital, long-run 
influence would be the role of education. A modern 
educational system might change attitudes for all time. 
It might mean that the society could never return to the 
cultural patterns of the past that inhibited economic 
growth. The long-run, modernizing role of infrastructure, 
then, is to be distinguished from other programs that 
perhaps leave the people better off in some sense but 
do not play a role in modernization. For example, the 
distribution of surplus food or clothing or occasional 
medical treatments make life somewhat easier to bear, 
but these activities do not provide self-education or 
talents to sustain economic growth in a developing econ­
omy. These activities should be more properly called 
welfare programs. As we shall suggest later, a large part 
of civic action falls into the category of welfare rather 
than infrastructure. 
A provision in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
implied that the military could make a contribution to 
economic development: " to the extent feasible and 
consistent with the other purposes of this part, the use 
of military forces in lesser developed, friendly countries 
in the construction of public works and other activities 
helpful to economic development shall be encouraged." 
This formulation of policy implies a priori that the mili­
tary can make a contribution to economic development. 
Although it may be self-evident that certain "public 
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works" help economic development, what are the specific 
public works contemplated by the United States Con­
gress? What are some of the "other activities helpful to 
economic development"? Are there other economic or 
political conditions that may affect the military's ability 
to carry out economic development? 
From official sources have emanated catalogues of 
"activities helpful" to economic development. But be­
yond some generalizations about the use of engineering 
battalions for building roads and draining swamps, the 
need for sanitation and medical care, and the usefulness 
of military training and education, there is little theoret­
ical framework from which to judge these activities in 
the context of economic development. Are each of these 
activities equally important to economic development? 
Or are some functions of military civic action more re­
lated to a simple concern for human welfare? For ex­
ample, the Ecuadorian Army initiated a project in the 
port city of Guayaquil to haul potable water for the use 
of people in the crowded slums of the city until such 
time as adequate water storage facilities could be con­
structed.11 The army quartermaster in Guatemala City 
supplied food to twenty-six stores and markets in the 
slum area of the city at reduced prices to alleviate the 
suffering there.12 Much of the medical work done by 
military units is of the same character. 
In order to maximize the psychological and political 
effects, the programs are selected for high-impact value: 
The most successful programs are those which produce 
fast, tangible and visibly beneficial results. Such projects 
are road construction to remote areas providing farm-
to-market travel, school construction and maintenance, 
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literary training, school hot lunch programs, medical and 
health programs, and youth camps. The least suc­
cessful projects are those which produce no immediate 
results.13 
Although all civic-action projects are expected to 
brighten the image of the military, some are more 
directly aimed at this goal than are others. The Colom­
bian Army has organized a band, for instance, to tour 
rural areas of the country, and the Paraguayan military 
provides bands for concerts and dances. In Guatemala, 
the army stages Christmas parties for children in hospi­
tals, donates shoes to poor children, and provides free 
haircuts for needy civilians. Military units of El Salvador 
in their "Operation Nino," drop candy and gifts on rural 
villages by parachute to demonstrate their Christmas 
spirit. "The Army Hour," is the Guatemalan military's 
radio gift to the people.14 
This kind of civic action has seemed especially at­
tractive to Latin American military units, which, it has 
been said, suffer no end of mental anguish about their 
generally low standing with the people. Public-relations 
activities are designed to correct all of that and to 
change the image of the military in the nation's eye 
"from an oppressive arm of the national government into 
that of an agency actively assisting in the economic and 
social development of the country." 15 
Replies to congressional questions and articles in mili­
tary reviews often state that civic action makes "a con­
tribution" or even "a valuable contribution" to the 
economic development of Latin America. General An­
drew P O'Meara, commander in chief, United States 
Southern Command, stated that "in addition to achiev­
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ing the objective of enabling the military to gain the 
confidence of the populace, and winning them away from 
the subversive revolutionaries, the money makes a dis­
tinct contribution to the economic development of the 
area and is thus a definite contribution to the goals of 
the Alliance for Progress." 16 Undoubtedly, a case can be 
be made that civic-action programs are making "a con­
tribution." Almost any bridge, road, or school will prob­
ably be of some benefit to the economy. But the more 
important question is how much of a contribution and 
at what cost. Few, if any, ask these questions (except 
for the cost in terms of dollars). Neither in congressional 
testimony nor in unclassified military reports is evidence 
to be found of the size or the importance of the contri­
bution made. 
A rough indication of the extent of the contribution 
that civic action is making to the economic development 
of particular countries and of Latin America as a whole 
could be provided by making two types of comparisons. 
The first of these would place the more concrete and 
measurable data on civic action against the total na­
tional effort in particular categories. For example, if (as 
President Belaunde of Peru has announced as a goal) the 
Peruvian armed forces will be doing one-half of the 
road construction in Peru, this gives a rough estimate 
of the contribution of civic action in that country. In 
Bolivia, the school construction program whereby most 
of the schools constructed since 1962 have been (and 
reportedly will continue to be) constructed by the army 
gives another rough estimate of contribution. All of this, 
of course, requires some knowledge of the total govern­
mental effort in any given category. If, for example, 
school construction is virtually brought to a halt, con­
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tributing a large share of such a contribution is not a 
very notable achievement. Similarly, the contribution 
of the Argentine armed forces (see page 124) does not 
seem very significant in a country with a defense budget 
of $342 million, 130,000 in service (in 1963) and a 
United States assistance program amounting to $9.3 
million. 
In making a second type of comparison, rough esti­
mates such as this can be used as a means to demon­
strate certain countries in which the military's contri­
bution to economic development is more important 
(and to give a rough idea of how much more important). 
We propose that the two categories of countries sug­
gested with respect to counterinsurgency provide a first 
step (see page 223). These distinctions are important 
because, although the appropriations for civic action 
are based upon recommendations and requests for speci­
fic countries, in congressional hearings they are usually 
discussed for "Latin America." Thus a useful program 
in Peru or Bolivia might be cited in support of a budget 
that includes assistance to several other countries where 
the programs may be making little or no contribution 
to national development. 
Furthermore, civic action has not been and cannot be 
uniform in purpose, concept, administration, organiza­
tion, or results in Latin America. It should not be set 
up as a blue print to be applied to each country. Room 
must be left for local variations, flexibility of operation, 
and even different objectives and purposes in different 
countries; obviously this means differences in procedures, 
administrative practices, and the choice of projects. By 
the same token, it is more than obvious that the tactics 
and methods employed in Korea, Malaya, or Vietnam 
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are rarely applicable to the Latin American atmosphere 
and tradition. Unfortunately, there has been a tendency 
in some quarters to apply the Asiatic experience to Latin 
America, where it was not pertinent or relevant. The 
Philippines, Korea, and Vietnam are new countries with 
a recent colonial past and with war-torn political and 
economic handicaps not duplicated in Latin American 
republics. The latter have enjoyed 140 years of national 
independence, many of them with no significant combat 
experience or war damage during that period and no 
strong close Communist enemy to threaten them. 
There is another reason to make distinctions from one 
country to another. The functions usually described in 
glowing terms as the activities and even the successes of 
military civic action, both in the United States reports 
and in the published accounts within Latin America, 
have usually fallen under the headings of construction 
projects for roads, schools, and wells; sanitation and 
health projects; and literacy. These functions have in the 
past been discharged by civilian agencies and ministries. 
In many of the countries they can be better accomplished 
by these agencies at present and in the future. It is 
self-defeating to establish government air lines to remote 
parts of the country on the basis of there being no 
previously existing commercial service. For the conse­
quence of that would be that the need being filled by 
government facilities there would be no incentive for 
private or commercial initiative, and years would go by 
with no increase in commercial air facilities. Ministries 
of government, education, agriculture, colonization, 
health and sanitation, forests and labor could also per­
form these functions without the creation of additional 
bureaucracies or expense. The consequence might very 
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likely be to improve the strength of the civilian economy 
and the civilian elements in society to withstand military 
take-over. 
Always to be taken into account, when attempting an 
assessment of the value of military civic action, is the 
not insignificant consideration that through military 
civic action thousands of man-hours are utilized in a 
more useful and economically beneficial way with psy­
chological by-products of public spintedness, participa­
tion in community development, or even a sense of satis­
faction derived from sharing in a national effort. 
With respect to political development, what is unique 
about civic action is that it allegedly prepares military 
men to participate actively in civil affairs, not as in 
earlier United States-sponsored programs to encourage 
professionalism. And it is on that point that the case 
for military reform appears to rest. Such participation, 
it is suggested, will engender mutual respect and trust 
between civilians and the military, encourage habits of 
co-operation, and promote a common dedication to the 
interests of the nation.17 The reported results of civic-
action programs in this respect are thus far anecdotal 
and of little help in making a general evaluation. They 
do, however, show some obstacles against which civic-
action planners must work. First, much depends on the 
outlook, interests, and ability of individual Latin Ameri­
can officers who are in charge of the projects. Some will 
be concerned only with the immediate goal of com­
pleting an assigned project without displaying any in­
terests in other goals such as community participation 
and organization. 
Second, generally speaking, the military in Latin 
American countries have lacked the political skills that 
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would permit it to operate successfully in civilian areas. 
By the very nature of its command structure, the mili­
tary profession is not a good training ground for the 
techniques and processes of negotiation and bargaining, 
highly important for political leadership. Although it 
lacks these capabilities, the military in Latin America 
normally possesses more of those specialized skills and 
resources suitable for completing a project in the shortest 
possible time. It is, in short, well prepared to undertake 
the kind of programs that are, in fact, emphasized in 
civic action. 
Third, the efforts of civic-action officers appear to be 
minimal in obtaining the collaboration of the local popu­
lation; and when there is active co-operation, it is pri­
marily for the immediate and temporary purposes of 
accomplishing the project at hand. Thus, a ready supply 
of manual labor is obtained, and a convenient channel 
of communication established by co-operating with local 
leaders. A civilian administrator of the military civic-
action program, for example, found it very useful to 
generate a spirit of competition in an Ecuadorian pro­
ject where the military worked from one end building 
a road, and local civilians worked separately from the 
other end. That this approach to the projects is wide­
spread is indicated from a recent Defense Department 
study: 
All too frequently the good things that civic action at­
tempts to bring to peasant communities are being thrust 
upon the people almost willy-nilly. Even such effective 
and useful things as malaria eradication . construc­
tion programs, improved wells, better road systems, if 
they are not generated with and through the community 
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involving large numbers of people the total effect 
of the civic action may well be psychologically counter­
productive with respect to the feelings and attitudes of 
the peasant population. At worst, such types of imposed 
civic action can positively alienate the populations on 
which they are forced, and at best such top-down, out­
side-in penetration can result in populations coming to 
passively accept and expect services from government 
and military without a concomitant self-help effort. 
By 1964, some of the practical difficulties in the con­
duct of civic action were reported in a brochure entitled 
"Military Civic Action" prepared by the Department of 
the Army. The brochure listed "problems" that confront 
civic action within a foreign country: personal ambi­
tions, bureaucratic jealousies, "pork barrel" tendencies, 
inaction by host-country military personnel, and the 
public's reactions. Also noted were the causes of troubles 
within the United States government that were obstacles 
to the army; i.e., shortages of personnel trained in either 
civic-action doctrine or in the technical skills needed, 
long delays in obtaining equipment, and other frustra­
tions. A detailed statement of the "problems" is found 
in Appendix H. A highly respected United States military 
officer after observing civic-action arrangements in a 
number of Latin American countries found among the 
I mted States officers a surprising amount of apathy and 
indifference and, in some instances, even ignorance of 
the standing instructions and manuals of procedure so 
laboriously and hopefully prepared and sent out from 
Washington headquarters. It is clear that the personnel 
assignments, training, individual initiative, strong leader­
ship within the MAAC, and harmony in the Country Team 
need to be in first-class order to achieve first-class results. 
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III 
The Future of Civic Action 
There is no indication that the execution of military 
civic-action programs in Latin America is likely to be­
come too large or get out of hand. At the same time it 
should be realized that military civic action should not 
be used as an argument to assist and to rationalize the 
granting of more authority to the military. It is one 
thing to encourage the Latin American military to en­
gage in civic action as a means of putting an existing 
military establishment to better use than has been the 
case in the past. In general, if it means tractors instead 
of tanks, encouragement of civic action could be justified 
even if there are doubts as to whether the military is 
the best and most economical agency to conduct such 
operations. But if we insist that civic action must not 
detract from military capabilities-and the United States 
Congress has made this stipulation, with the United 
States military's concurrence-then civic action is likely 
to mean tractors in addition to tanks. Thus there is the 
danger that civic action, like "an attack on the hemis­
phere, "standardization of weapons," or "Communist 
subversion threats" will become but another cliche ac­
cepted uncritically in the rush to support increased 
military programs for Latin America. 
The data reveal that the yearly average of United 
States military assistance to Latin America in the dec­
ade of the 195O's was $35 million. But for the years 1960 
to 1965, the annual average is no less than $70 million, 
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which is double the previous average amount. The sharp 
increase after 1960 may be noted in the figures below: 
This is evidence that, in fact, civic action has been 
in addition to other military expenditures. 
TABLE 5* 
UNITED STATES MILITARY AID TO LATIN AMERICA, 1952-61 
Fiscal Amount 
Year (In Dollars) 
1952 200,000 
1953 11,200,000 
1954 34,500,000 
1955 31,800,000 
1956 30,400,000 
1957 43,900,000 
1958 47,900,000 
1959 54,000,000 
1960 53,700,000 
1961 91,600,000 
"Source: Remarks by Senator Gruening in Senate debate, August 21, 1962, 
reported in Congretaional Record, p. 14414. 
The small size of the civic-action fraction of military 
assistance to Latin America, as shown in Tables 6 and 7 
and as careful and persistent perusal of the congressional 
hearing reveals, has been under-emphasized. The budget 
figures in the tables following help to put the program 
for Latin America as a whole into perspective. Table 6 
presents the proposed United States 1965 civic-action 
program. The amount is small relative to the gigantic 
one billion dollars and more annual Military Assistance 
Program expenditures in recent years. The approximately 
ten million dollars allocated to Latin America for fiscal 
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year 1965 comprises only 1 per cent of the Military As­
sistance Program budget and .3 per cent of the total 
foreign-aid program. It is clear that the civic-action pro­
gram must be evaluated in the light of a very limited 
allocation of funds. Described elsewhere is the arrange­
ment for joint funding of the program by the Agency 
for International Development (AID) and the Military 
Assistance Program (MAP). MAP provides the equip­
ment and most of the advisers, while AID furnishes 
consumable items, such as cement and gasoline. 
TABLE 6* 
PROPOSED PROGRAM FOR UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR 
CIVIC ACTION TO LATIX AMERICA FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 1965 
(In Thousands of Dollars) 
Argentina $1,206 
Bolivia 591 
Brazil 2,314 
Chile 1,096 
Colombia 1,124 
Costa Rica 13 
Ecuador 573 
El Salvador 91 
Guatemala 238 
Panama 16 
Paraguay 744 
Peru 1,703 
Uruguay 11 
Venezuela 40 
Alliance for Progress Security $9,700 
*Source: Hearings, Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriation, 
SSth Cong., 2d Sess., Foreign Operations Appropriations for 1965. Part II. p. «"• 
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TABLE 7* 
AID AND MAP CIVIC ACTION, 1962-64 
(In Thousands of Dollars) 
FISCAL YEAR FISCAL YEAR FISCAL YEAR 
1963 1964 
COUNTRY 
AID AID MAP AID MAP 
Argentina 302 
Bolivia 1,700 1,990 1,817 1,062 530 
Brazil 300 2,220 1,207 2,156 2,442 
Chile 200 860 283 2,019 187 1,483 
Colombia 698 1,488 698 1,578 
Costa Rica 247 
Dominican Republic 451 596 233 64 
Ecuador 700 1,500 160 323 273 657 
El Salvador 100 534 216 
Guatemala 325 863 80 809 
Haiti 
Honduras 100 103 84 21 
Jamaica 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 59 
Panama 2 
Paraguay 200 2,130 840 1,402 
Peru 100 1,135 162 2,794 260 791 
Uruguay 546 453 
Venezuela 23 
Total 3,300 5,715 7,609 14,119 2,793 11,021 
•Source: Interview, November, 1964, with an officer of the Internationa] 
Security Affairs Section of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense. 
Much of the Pentagon and State Department testi­
mony is about the tactics and the putative advantages 
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of civic action. But the funds appropriated for Latin 
American military assistance are spent largely for heavy 
war equipment and supplies. The acceptance of the 
concept of civic action is stretched to cover a great deal 
of military hardware. In 1964, Secretary of Defense 
McNamara testified before the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs that 15 per cent of the $66.2 million 
military assistance program for Latin America would 
go for civic action. That would amount to less than $10 
million for operations in twenty countries (Jamaica is 
included in Pentagon plans)—an average of $500,000 
per country in that one year. 
In recent years, the Military Assistance Program has 
been presented to the congressional committees, under 
the heading "Alliance for Progress Security." The use 
of the catch-words "Alliance for Progress" as an um­
brella under which to shield the appropriations requests, 
which increase each year, is perhaps an understandable 
gambit for the executive departments to use in their 
dealings with Congress. But the relationship to the 
alliance of the major expenditures under MAP is a 
distant one. Moreover, as noted, those expenditures for 
civic-action projects, which can and may ultimately 
contribute to alliance goals, account for only 15 per 
cent of the total. Furthermore, in presenting MAP 
requests for Latin America, Pentagon representatives 
are prone to refer to "internal security" purposes. This 
might, to the uninitiated, seem to correspond to civic 
action. A close reading of the testimony and of the re­
quests reveals that under the heading "internal se­
curity," the Pentagon classifies such expenditures as 
those incurred for patrol boats, equipment and training 
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for airborne military units, transport aircraft, communi­
cations equipment, and related items. This is despite the 
relative importance and time devoted in appropriations 
hearings to the objectives and benefits of civic action. 
Civic action may even be justified on its own merits 
and in certain countries in addition to other military 
expenditures, but the more important point is that it 
should not be used as window dressing for other regular 
military expenditures. Those who are convinced that 
civic action is a worthwhile program that should be 
encouraged, no less than those who might choose to use 
it for window dressing, might be tempted to claim all 
things for civic action, especially in answer to congres­
sional questioning. But those who are convinced of the 
value of the program might in the long run do better to 
emphasize that civic action by the military has been 
only a small fragment of the United States program 
within the hemisphere as a whole or within any indivi­
dual country. It will presumably continue to be only 
a fraction of the program. There is no evidence in the 
middle 1960's of the repeated urgency by the White 
House or aggressive follow-up by the attorney general 
in the now infrequent meetings of the Special Group. 
It might be safe to assay the current efforts and civic 
action as routine and even declining in official favor, 
compared with 1960-63. Therefore, not too much should 
be expected of it. It cannot remake the countries; mili­
tary civic action, as the most constructive element of the 
broader coined concept, would be only one minor aspect 
of such a purpose. 
A danger in "overselling" the program is that, when 
it does not produce the miracle likely to be expected of 
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it, it may be abandoned. In this respect, we have noted 
a change of emphasis in the Johnson administration. 
Without abandoning or even reducing expenditures for 
civic action, there are signs of an increasing reliance on 
military solutions to hemispheric defense and threats 
of Communist subversion, while, at the same time, the 
Kennedy policy of giving all-out moral and economic 
support to the so-called democratic governments has 
been dropped. (The realities of political life, the paucity 
of policy alternatives submitted to voters, the weakness 
of political parties, the lack of an independent judiciary, 
and the limitations on the freedom of press and civil 
rights make the use of the adjective "democratic" a 
comparative one at best. This is not to disparage the 
diplomatic protocol under which it is accepted usage 
to refer to Latin American governments as "members of 
the democratic Free World," but, in fact, some have 
military rulers, some have civilian dictators, and 
others have few of the characteristics of government 
and society that could, in any objective use of the term, 
be considered democratic.) 
Within Washington, there is evidence to indicate that 
there was a rapid rise in the prestige and favor with 
which military civic-action projects met in the period 
1960-63. Previously there had been mixed views within 
different United States government agencies; some 
civilians were favorably inclined, but some were opposed 
to them as dangerous additions to the already over­
whelming influence of the Latin American military. Some 
military advocated civic action. Perhaps for purposes of 
re-establishing their own branch or service to a more 
prominent place, some military were opposed to military 
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civic action on the theory that the energies expanded for 
these purposes were only subtracted from the normal de­
fense capability of the local military. After civic action 
became popular, there was a period when there were 
recriminations and blame assigned to one or another 
agency for having delayed or limited the military civic-
action program. In 1963-65 there has been much less 
public urgency displayed regarding civic action. Mes­
sages to Congress have been much less frequent or 
strongly stated than was the case in 1961-63. In refer­
ence to the Latin American area, in a dozen policy 
speeches delivered by Mr. Mann during his tenure in 
1964 as assistant secretary of state for inter-American 
affairs and United States Co-ordinator of the Alliance 
for Progress, no mention is made of any aspect of mili­
tary civic action. President Johnson has mentioned the 
subject but not with emphasis or priority. The projec­
tions of hopeful results to be anticipated from civic action 
are normally made by Secretaries Rusk and McNamara 
in connection with appeals to Congress for funds. 
The retreat of United States policy in hard pressed 
countries, such as Vietnam, from a policy which empha­
sized military civic action to overcome subversion and 
insurgency to greater reliance on conventional military 
strength and modern weapons, such as jet bombers, 
could be an indication that strategic and security think­
ing in Washington no longer relies on "winning the 
hearts and minds of men" to contain guerrillas or dis­
courage potential insurgents. Somewhat similar would 
be the consequence of the experience in Santo Domingo 
where it soon became clear to all that armed force was 
going to play the determining role. 
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At the beginning of this volume, we pointed out that 
a dilemma is contained in the related objectives of pro­
moting security and reform in Latin America. Strength­
ening the military was advocated by the United States 
as a means of providing the internal stability necessary 
for sustained economic growth and social reform. Yet 
strengthening the armed forces might help to perpetuate 
military dictatorships in some countries and to over­
throw reform-minded civilian governments in others. 
Civic action was seen as a means of bringing the Latin 
American military into line with the objectives ex­
pressed in the Alliance for Progress. There is no undis­
puted proof of the success of civic action, but the same 
must be said for the Alliance. 
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7. Lieuwen, Generals vs. Presidents, p. 7. 
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Appendix B: U.S. National Objectives 
Regarding Overseas Internal Defense 
"Statement of U.S. Overseas Internal Defense 
Objectives" from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
Politico-Military Affairs (Mr. Jeffrey C. Kitchen) to the 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Se­
curity Affairs (Mr. William P Bundy). 
A basic premise of U.S. foreign policy is that the security 
of the U.S. and its fundamental values and institutions will 
best be preserved and enhanced as part of a community of 
free and independent nations. These nations should be charac­
terized by economic growth, political responsibility and social 
justice in their domestic affairs and a due respect for estab­
lished international behaviour in their foreign relations. In 
this regard, the U.S. is endeavoring to assist newly emerging 
and developing nations to maintain their freedom and inde­
pendence and to deal effectively with their problems. 
The U.S. believes that the processes of development and 
nation-building should be aided and encouraged but not 
manipulated by outside forces. The creation of a relatively 
stable international environment within which economic growth 
can occur and free people are able to determine their own 
form of government is therefore a primary U.S. objective. 
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The achievement of this objective, however, is being chal­
lenged by an alien force which advocates and actively pursues 
the subjugation of free nations through subversion, insurgency 
and other means of indirect aggression. 
The primary responsibility for preventing or combating 
internal aggression rests with the threatened country. It is the 
policy of the U.S. to assist threatened nations, when requested, 
to prevent or defeat communist inspired, suported or directed 
insurgency in order to ensure that all nations—especially those 
newly emerging and developing states—are given the oppor­
tunity to determine their own future. 
Appendix C: Inter-American 
Military Co-operation 
Resolution III of the Fourth Meeting of Con­
sultation of the American Foreign Ministers, 1951} 
WHEREAS : 
The military defense of the Continent is essential to the 
stability of its democratic institutions and to the well-being 
of its peoples: 
The American Republics have assumed obligations under 
the Charter of the Organization of American States and the 
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance to assist any 
American States subjected to an armed attack, and to act 
together for the common defense and for the maintenance of 
the peace and security of the Continent; 
The expansionist activities of international communism re­
quire the immediate adoption of measures to safeguard the 
peace and the security of the Continent; 
The present grave international situation imposes on the 
American Republics the need to develop their military capabil­
ities in order, in conformity with the Inter-American Treaty 
of Reciprocal Assistance: (1) to assure their individual and 
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collective self-defense against attacks; (2) to contribute effec­
tively to action by the Organization of American States against 
aggression directed against any of them; and (3) to make 
provision, as quickly as possible, for the collective defense of 
the Continent; and 
The Ninth International Conference of American States, in 
its Resolution XXXIV, entrusted the preparation for collec­
tive self-defense against aggression to the Inter-American De­
fense Board, which, as the only inter-American technical-mili­
tary organ functioning, is the suitable organ for the preparation 
of military plans for collective self-defense against aggression, 
The Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs 
RESOLVES: 
1. To recommend to the American Republics that they 
orient their military preparation in such a way that, through 
self-help and mutual aid, and in accordance with their capabili­
ties and with their constitutional precepts, and in conformity 
with the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, they 
can, without prejudice to their individual self-defense and their 
international security: (a) increase those of their resources 
and strengthen those of their armed forces best adapted to the 
collective defense, and maintain those armed forces in such 
status that they can be promptly available for the defense of 
the Continent; and (b) cooperate with each other, in military 
matters, in order to develop the collective strength of the Con­
tinent necessary to combat aggression against any of them. 
2. To charge the Inter-American Defense Board with pre­
paring, as vigorously as possible, and keeping up to date, in 
close liaison with the Governments through their respective 
Delegations, the military planning of the common defense. 
3. That the plans formulated by the Inter-American Defense 
Board shall be submitted to the Governments for their con­
sideration and decision. To the end of facilitating such con­
sideration and decision, the Delegations of the American 
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Republics to the Inter-American Defense Board shall be in 
continuous consultation with their governments on the projects, 
plans, and recommendations of the Board. 
4. To recommend to the Governments of the American 
Republics: (a) that they maintain adequate and continuous 
representation of their armed forces on the Council of Dele­
gates, on the Staff of the Inter-American Defense Board, and 
on any other organ of the Board that may be established in 
the future; (b) that they actively support the work of the 
Board, and consider promptly all the projects, plans, recom­
mendations of that agency; and (c) that they cooperate in the 
organization, within the Board, of a coordinated system of 
exchange of appropriate information. 
1. Source: Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs of American States, March 26-April 7, 1951, Report of the 
Secretary of State (Washington, D.C.: Department of State publica­
tion 4928, released May, 1953). 
Appendix D: Contribution of the 
Armed Forces to the Economic-Social 
Development of the Countries 
Resolution XLVII of the Inter-American De­
fense Board, December 1, 1960 
WHEREAS : 
1. One of the weaknesses of the American Bloc is the lack 
of economic development to meet the need for required basic 
supplies for the rapid growth of the population ; 
2. One of the means of coping with the problem of the 
rapid growth of population is opening new ways of communica­
tions and incorporating into the economy of each country new 
agricultural lands, especially in underdeveloped regions; 
3. In general, the expansion of the highway communications 
systems contributes effectively to facilitating the execution of 
the General Military Plan, with respect to the dispersion of 
industrial installations and to the development of strategic 
routes, to achieve the self-sufficiency of the Continent; 
4. The General Military Plan for the Defense of the 
American Continent recognizes the desirability of doing every­
thing possible to raise the standards of living of the peoples, 
with the object of effectively combatting Communist propa­
ganda, which tries to exploit the ignorance and poverty of the 
underdeveloped areas; 
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5. The Estimate of the Situation recognizes that "Often the 
military establishment of each country can plan a very useful 
role in economic development"; 
The Council of Delegates 
RECOMMENDS: 
A. That the Governments of the American States take 
into consideration the advisability of employing organs of their 
Armed Forces, preferably in regions considered to be under­
developed, in order to: 
1. Undertake highway and settlement work, and promote 
the establishment of technical services; 
2. Broaden the economic bases directed toward raising 
the standards of living of the peoples; and 
3. Educate the native populations in their own surround­
ings and create reserves of specialized labor for specific types 
of work. 
B. The use of military personnel for this purpose, to the 
extent and degree that the specific conditions in each country 
may determine, should not compete with private civilian activ­
ity nor decrease the capability of their Armed Forces for the 
accomplishment of their specific military tasks required by 
the General Military Plan. 
C. The effort required by the organization, employment 
and maintenance of the services necessary for the accomplish­
ment of this task could be covered in any bilateral agreements 
or arrangements mutually acceptable to any of the countries 
involved. 
(signed) L. MATHEWSON 
Lt. General, U.S. Army 
Chairman 
Official:

(Signed)

WILLIS M. SMYSER

Colonel, U.S. Air Force 
Secretary 
Appendix £: Special Consultative Committee on 
Security against the Subversive Action of 
International Communism 
Resolution II of the Eighth Meeting of Consul­
tation of the American Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 1962 
WHEREAS : 
International communism makes use of highly complex tech­
niques of subversion in opposing, and in the task of counter­
acting such techniques which certain states may benefit from 
mutual advice and support; 
The American states are firmly united for the common goal 
or fighting the subversive action of international communism 
and for the preservation of democracy in the Americas, as 
expressed in Resolution XXXII of the Ninth International 
Conference of American States, held in Bogota, in 1948, and 
that for such purpose they can and should assist each other, 
mainly through the use of the institutional resources of the 
Organization of American States; and 
It is advisable, therefore, to make available to the Council 
of the Organization of American States a body of an advisory 
nature, made up of experts, the main purpose of which would 
be to advise the member governments which, as the case may 
be, require and request such assistance, 
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The Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in Application of 
the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 
RESOLVES: 
1. To request the Council of the Organization of American 
States to maintain all necessary vigilance, for the purpose of 
warning against any acts of aggression, subversion, or other 
dangers to peace and security, or the preparation of such acts, 
resulting from the continued intervention of Sino-Soviet pow­
ers in this hemisphere, and to make recommendations to the 
governments of the member states with regard thereto. 
2. To direct the Council of the Organization to establish 
a Special Consultative Committee on Security, composed of 
experts on security matters, for the purpose of advising the 
member states that they may desire and request such assistance, 
the following procedures being observed: 
3. To urge the member states to take those steps that they 
may consider appropriate for their individual or collective 
self-defense, and to cooperate, as may be necessary or desir­
able, to strengthen their capacity to counteract threats or acts 
of aggression, subversion, or'other dangers to peace anfl se­
curity resulting from the continued intervention in this hemi­
sphere of Sino-Soviet powers, in accordance with the obliga­
tions established in treaties and agreements such as the Charter 
of the Organization of American States and the Inter-Ameri­
can Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. 
Appendix F: Precis of the 
Counterinsurgency Course (1963), 
the Special Warfare School 
Fort Bragg, North Carolina1 
U.S. Army Special Warfare School, Fort 
Bragg, N.C. (8 weeks) Counterinsurgency Operations Course 
(33-G-F6) 
Prerequisite—Counterinsurgency and Special Warfare Staff 
Officer Course (33-G-F7). 
A. Purpose: To provide commissioned officers, both United 
States and Allied, and selected United States civilian govern­
ment representatives, with a working knowledge in the nature 
and conduct of operations against Communist insurgents and 
the participation of United States military personnel in the 
civic action programs. 
B. Concept of the Course: Using the Counterinsurgency 
and Special Warfare Staff Officer Course as a base, this 
specialized course directs major emphasis toward the causa­
tive factors underlying insurgency and includes the develop­
ment of doctrine, tactics, and techniques applicable of military 
operations as part of civic action aimed at preventing and 
coping with such movements. Special attention is placed on 
the unity of effort required at the U.S. national level which 
terminates with the country team in the host country. The 
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course emphasizes self-help techniques on the part of host 
countries and does not envision the large-scale employment of 
U.S. forces in direct support of foreign national programs. 
C. Summary of the Program of Instruction: In conso­
nance with the purposes and concept of the course, instruction 
includes: 
1. The nature and causes of irregular movements. 
2. The strategy and tactics of international communism in 
gaining control of and exploiting irregular movements. 
3. The free world's concept and rationale of evolutionary 
change based on freedom, individual rights, the dignity of man, 
and social responsibilities. 
4. The programs of free governments for meeting legiti­
mate popular needs and aspirations to eliminate the causes 
of rebellion. 
5. The contributions which armed forces can make to the 
nation-building programs in support of civil governments. 
6. The tactics of armed forces in combatting guerrilla 
forces attempting to overthrow duly constituted governments. 
7. The course concludes with a practical field exercise em­
ploying the techniques and skills taught in the classroom. The 
exercise includes the students of the other two specialized 
courses playing their normal role. 
1. Source: Precis of Courses, Special Warfare School, 1963. 
Appendix G: Texts of a Military Assistance 
Agreement, a Military Mission Agreement, 
and Exchanges of Notes on Internal Security 
[When the Agreement takes the form of an 
exchange of notes, only the English language note is repro­
duced. The other note is a reply confirming the statements 
contained in the United States note.] 
MILITARY ASSISTANCE AGREEMENTS WITH ECUADOR 
AND PERU 1 
The Departments of State and Defense have announced 
the signing of bilateral military assistance agreements with 
the Governments of Ecuador and Peru. 
The agreement with Ecuador was signed at Quito on Feb­
ruary 20 on behalf of the United States by Paul C. Daniels, 
Ambassador to Ecuador, and on behalf of Ecuador by Neftali 
Ponce, Foreign Minister of Ecuador. 
The agreement with Peru was signed at Lima on February 
22 on behalf of the United States by Harold H. Tittmann, Jr., 
Ambassador to Peru, and on behalf of Peru by Manuel C. Gal­
lagher, Foreign Minister of Peru. 
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The Military Assistance Agreements just signed are con­
sistent with, and conform to, inter-American instruments 
already in effect, such as the Inter-American Treaty of Recipro­
cal Assistance (the Rio Treaty), the resolution on Inter-
American Military Cooperation approved at the Washington 
Meeting of Foreign Ministers of 1951, and the continuous 
planning of the Inter-American Defense Board. 
Negotiations for similar agreements, involving the provision 
of military-grant aid by the United States to promote the 
defense of the Western Hemisphere, are in progress with cer­
tain other American Republics. These negotiations were initi­
ated under the program of military-grant aid for Latin Amer­
ica, authorized in the Mutual Security Act of 1951. The 
program to be carried out will assist in the development of the 
capabilities of the countries concerned to join in performing 
missions important to the security of all the American Repub­
lics. Such agreements illustrate the spirit of cooperation pre­
vailing among the American Republics which makes it possible 
for them to concentrate, through self-help and mutual aid, 
upon increasing their ability to contribute to the collective 
defense of the Western Hemisphere, and, by serving as a 
deterrent to potential aggressors, contribute to the mainte­
nance of world peace. 
TEXT OF AGREEMENT WITH ECUADOR ­
The Governments of the United States of America and of 
the Republic of Ecuador : 
Conscious of their pledges under the Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance and other international instruments to 
assist any American State subjected to an armed attack and 
to act together for the common defense and for the mainte­
nance of the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere. 
Desiring to foster international peace and security within 
the framework of the Charter of the United Nations through 
measures which will further the ability of nations dedicated to 
the purposes and principles of the Charter to participate effec­
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tively in arrangements for individual and collective self-defense 
in support of those purposes and principles; 
Reaffirming their determination to give their full coopera­
tion to the efforts to provide the United Nations with armed 
forces as contemplated by the Charter and to obtain agreement 
on universal regulations and reduction of armaments under 
adequate guarantee against violation: 
Taking into consideration the support that the Government 
of the United States of America has brought to these principles 
by enacting the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as 
amended, and the Mutual Security Act of 1951, which provide 
for the furnishing of military assistance to nations which have 
joined with it in collective security arrangements; 
Desiring to set forth the conditions which will govern the 
furnishing of such assistance by one contracting Government 
to the other; 
Have agreed as follows: 
ARTICLE I 
1. Each Government will make or continue to make 
available to the other and to such additional governments as 
the parties hereto may in each case agree upon, such equip­
ment, materials, services, or other military assistance as the 
Government furnishing such assistance may authorize and in 
accordance with such terms and conditions as may be agreed. 
The furnishing of any such assistance as may be authorized by 
either party hereto shall be consistent with the Charter of the 
United Nations. Such assistance shall be so designed as to 
promote the defense and maintain the peace of the Western 
Hemisphere and be in accordance with defense plans under 
which both Governments will participate in missions impor­
tant to the defense and the maintenance of the peace of the 
Western Hemisphere. Assistance made available by the Gov­
ernment of the United States of America pursuant to this 
Agreement will be furnished under the provisions, and sub­
ject to all the terms, conditions and termination provisions of 
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the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, the Mutual Secu­
rity Act of 1951, acts amendatory and supplementary thereto 
and appropriation acts thereunder. The two Governments will, 
from time to time, negotiate detailed arrangements necessary 
to carry out the provisions of this paragraph. 
2. The Government of Ecuador undertakes to make effec­
tive use of assistance received from the Government of the 
United States of America pursuant to this Agreement for the 
purpose of implementing defense plans, accepted by the two 
Governments, under which the two governments will partici­
pate in missions important to the defense and the maintenance 
of the peace of the Western Hemisphere, and will not, with­
out the prior agreement of the Government of the United 
States of America, devote such assistance to purposes other 
than those for which it was furnished. 
3. Arrangements will be entered into under which equip­
ment and materials furnished pursuant to this Agreement and 
no longer required for the purposes for which it was originally 
made available (except equipment and materials furnished 
under terms requiring reimbursement) will be returned to the 
Government which furnished such assistance for appropriate 
disposition. 
4. In the common security interest of both Governments, 
the Government of Ecuador undertakes not to transfer to any 
person not an officer or agent of such Government, or to any 
other Government, title to or possession of any equipment, 
materials, or services furnished to it by the Government of 
the United States of America under this agreement, without 
the prior agreement of the Government of the United States 
of America. 
5. The two Governments will establish procedures 
whereby the Government of Ecuador will so deposit, segre­
gate, or assure title to all funds allocated to or derived from 
any program of assistance under-taken by the Government of 
the United States of America so that such funds shall not be 
subject to garnishment, attachment, seizure or other legal 
process by any person, firm, agency, corporation, organization 
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or government, when in the opinion of the Government of the 
United States of America any such legal process would inter­
fere with the attainment of the objectives of the said program 
of assistance. 
6. Each Government will take such security measures as 
may be agreed in each case between the two Governments in 
order to prevent the disclosure or compromise of classified 
military articles, services or information furnished by the other 
Government pursuant to this Agreement. 
ARTICLE II 
Each Government will take appropriate measures consistent 
with security to keep the public informed of operations under 
this Agreement. 
ARTICLE III 
The two Governments will, upon request of either of them, 
negotiate appropriate arrangements between them to provide 
for the availability of patent licenses and technical information 
required in furtherance of the objectives of this Agreement. 
In these negotiations consideration shall be given to the inclu­
sion of an undertaking whereby each Government will assume 
the responsibility for all claims of its nationals arising under 
such arrangements, and such claims arising in its jurisdiction 
of nationals of any country not a party to this Agreement. 
ARTICLE IV 
1. The Government of Ecuador undertakes to make avail­
able to the Government of the United States of America local 
currency in sucres in an amount to be agreed for the use of 
the latter Government for its administrative and operating 
expenditures in connection with carrying out the purposes of 
the Mutual Security Act. 
The two Governments will forthwith initiate discussions 
with a view to determining the amount of such local currency 
in sucres and to agreeing upon arrangements for the furnish­
ing of such local currency. 
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2. The Government of Ecuador will, except as otherwise 
agreed, grant duty-free treatment and exemption from internal 
taxation upon importation or exportation to products, prop­
erty, materials, or equipment imported into its territory in 
connection with this Agreement or any similar agreement 
between the United States of America and any other country 
receiving military assistance. 
ARTICLE v 
1. The Government of Ecuador agrees to receive person­
nel of the Government of the United States of America who 
will discharge responsibilities of the latter Government in 
connection with the implementation of this Agreement. Such 
personnel will be accorded facilities to observe the progress of 
assistance furnished pursuant to this Agreement. Such per­
sonnel who are nationals of the United States of America, 
including personnel temporarily assigned, will, in their rela­
tions with the Government of Ecuador, operate as a part of 
the Embassy of the United States under the direction and 
control of the Chief of the Diplomatic Mission, and shall be 
accorded all privileges and immunities conferred by interna­
tional custom to Embassy personnel of corresponding rank. 
Privileges and courtesies incident to diplomatic status, such 
as diplomatic automobile license plates, inclusion on the "dip­
lomatic list," and social courtesies may be waived by the 
Government of the United States of America for its personnel 
other than the senior military member and the senior Army, 
Navy and Air Force officer and their respective immediate 
deputies. 
2. The two Governments will negotiate arrangements for 
classification of personnel and for appropriate notification 
thereof to the Government of Ecuador. 
3. The Government of Ecuador shall grant, upon request 
of the Chief of the Diplomatic Mission of the United States 
of America, exemption from customs duties on articles im­
ported for the personal use of such personnel and of members 
of their families. 
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ARTICLE VI 
Existing arrangements relating to Armed Forces missions 
of the United States of America established under other 
instruments are not affected by this Agreement and will remain 
in full force. 
ARTICLE VII 
In conformity with the principle of mutual aid, under 
which the two Governments have agreed as provided in Article 
I, to furnish assistance to each other, the Government of 
Ecuador agrees to facilitate the production and transfer to the 
Government of the United States of America for such period 
of time, in such quantities and upon such terms and conditions 
as may be agreed upon of raw and semi-processed strategic 
materials required by the United States of America as a result 
of deficiencies or potential deficiencies in its own resources, 
and which may be available in Ecuador. Arrangements for 
such transfers shall give due regard to reasonable requirements 
for domestic use and commercial export of Ecuador. 
ARTICLE VIII 
In the interest of their mutual security, the Government of 
Ecuador will cooperate with the Government of the United 
States of America in measures designed to control trade with 
nations which threaten the security of the Western Hemi­
sphere. 
ARTICLE IX 
The Government of Ecuador, reaffirming its determination 
to join in promoting international understanding and good will 
and maintaining world peace, and to take such action as may 
be mutually agreed upon to eliminate causes of international 
tension, agrees to fulfill the military obligations which it has 
assumed under multilateral or bilateral agreements or treaties 
to which the United States is a party; to make, consistent with 
its political and economic stability, the full contribution per­
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mitted by its manpower, resources, facilities and general eco­
nomic conditions to the development and maintenance of its 
own defensive strength and the defensive strength of the free 
world; and to take all reasonable measures which may be 
needed to develop its defense capacities. 
ARTICLE x 
Whereas this Agreement has been negotiated and concluded 
on the basis that the Government of the United States of 
America will extend to the other party thereto the benefits 
of any provision in a similar agreement concluded by the Gov­
ernment of the United States of America with any othei 
American Republic, it is understood that the Government of 
the United States of America will interpose no objection to 
amending this Agreement in order that its provisions may 
conform, in whole or in part, to the corresponding provisions 
of any similar Military Assistance Agreement, or agreements 
amendatory thereto, concluded with an American Republic. 
ARTICLE XI 
1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of 
signature, and shall continue in force until one year after the 
receipt by either party of written notice of the intention of 
the other party to terminate it, except that the provisions of 
Article I, paragraphs 2 and 4 and agreements made pursuant 
to the provisions of Article I, paragraphs 3, 5, and 6 and of 
Article III shall remain in force unless otherwise agreed by 
the two Governments. 
2. The two Governments shall, upon the request of either 
of them, consult regarding any matter relating to the applica­
tion or amendment of this Agreement. 
3. This Agreement shall be registered with the Secretary 
General of the United Nations. 
Done in duplicate, in the English and Spanish languages, 
both equally authentic, at Quito, this twentieth day of Feb­
ruary, 1952. 
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[2] 
JOINT BRAZIL-UNITED STATES MILITARY AND 
DEFENSE COMMISSION 
"Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts 
Series," No. 3421 
Agreement effected by exchange of notes 
Signed at Rio de Janeiro August 1 and September 20, 1955; 
Entered into force September 20, 1955. 
The American Ambassador to the Brazilian Minister of

Foreign Affairs

THE FOREIGN SERVICE 
OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
EMBASSY OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RIO DE JANEIRO, AUGUST 1, 1 9 5 5 .

EXCELLENCY : 
I have the honor to advise Your Excellency that the Gov­
ernment of the United States of America, recognizing the 
long friendship and mutual cooperation which have existed 
between our two Governments throughout their history and 
mindful of the ever-increasing community of interests which 
our two Governments share, and desiring to further the ability 
of the United States of America and of the Republic of the 
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United States of Brazil to participate more effectively in 
arrangements for their individual and mutual security and the 
security of the hemisphere within the scope of the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance and the framework 
of the Charter of the United Nations, proposes the following 
agreement: 
(1) The joint Brazil-United States Military Commission 
(JBUSMC), originally established in Rio de Janeiro during 
World War II by the two Governments as a means of assist­
ing each other in achieving their common goal of mutual 
security, will continue to function as the principal agency in 
the United States of Brazil for facilitating military coopera­
tion between the two countries. 
(2) The Joint Brazil-United States Defense Commission 
(JBUSDC), originally established in Washington, D.C., during 
World War II by the two Governments as a means of assist­
ing each other in achieving their common goal of mutual 
security, will continue to function as the principal agency in 
the United States of America for facilitating military coopera­
tion between the two countries. 
(3) Each Government, upon being appropriately advised, 
agrees to receive personnel of the other Government who will 
discharge responsibilities of that Government in connection 
with the implementation of this agreement. 
(4) Arrangements governing the composition, functions, 
and procedures of the two commissions may be entered into 
from time to time, as necessary, by the appropriate military 
authorities of the two Governments. 
(5) This Agreement shall remain in effect until one year 
from the date of notice by either Government of its intention 
to terminate the Agreement. 
If the foregoing provisions are acceptable to Your Excel­
lency's Government, I have the honor to propose that this 
note and Your Excellency's reply thereto shall be regarded as 
constituting an agreement between the two Governments con­
cerning this matter. 
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Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest 
esteem and consideration. 
JAMES CLEMENT DUNN 
His Excellency 
RAUL FERNANDES, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, 
Rio de Janeiro 
[3] 
EXCHANGE OF NOTES WITH GUATEMALA ON FURNISHING

ARTICLES AND SERVICES TO STRENGTHEN INTERNAL­

SECURITY CAPABILITIES

"Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts 
Series," No. 5173 
Agreement effected by exchange of notes

Signed at Guatemala May 25 and August 2, 1962;

Entered into force August 2, 1962.

The American Ambassador to the Guatemalan Minister of 
Foreign Relations 
EMBASSY OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
GUATEMALA, May 25, 1962. 
EXCELLENCY : 
I have the honor to refer to recent conversations between 
the representatives of our two Governments concerning the 
furnishing of military assistance to the Government of Guate­
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mala for the purpose of contributing to its internal security 
capabilities. I am pleased to inform Your Excellency that the 
Government of the United States of America is prepared to 
furnish such assistance for this purpose as may be mutually 
agreed by representatives of our two governments, subject 
to the following understandings: 
1. Defense articles and defense services shall be or continue 
to be furnished for internal security purposes in accordance 
with the terms and conditions of the Military Assistance 
Agreement between the United States of America and the 
Republic of Guatemala, signed June 18, 1955,3 at Guatemala 
City. In view of the special purpose of assistance furnished 
hereunder, however, the requirement of the third sentence of 
Article I, paragraph 1, of that Military Assistance Agreement, 
and so much of the requirements of the first sentence of Article 
1, paragraph 2, thereof as relates to implementation of defense 
plans under which our two governments participate in mis­
sions important to the defense and maintenance of the peace 
of the Western Hemisphere shall not be applicable to such 
assistance. 
2. Defense articles and defense services furnished here­
under may be used for the purpose of implementing the 
defense plans referred to in paragraph number 1 of this note 
when not required for the purpose of maintaining internal 
security and, at such time as so used, shall be subject to all 
the requirements of the Military Assistance Agreement re­
ferred to in paragraph number 1 of this note. 
3. Defense articles and defense services furnished here­
under shall be subject to the Agreement effected by an exchange 
of notes signed at Guatemala City on December 16, 1957,4 
which relates to disposition of military equipment and mate­
rials no longer required for the purposes stated in paragraphs 
number 1 and 2 of this note. 
I have the honor to propose that, if these understandings 
are acceptable to your Government, this note and Your Ex­
cellency's reply concurring therein shall constitute an agree­
ment between our two Governments which shall enter into 
force on the date of your reply. 
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Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest 
consideration. 
JOHN O. BELL 
His Excellency 
JESUS UNDA MURILLO 
Minister of Foreign Relations 
Republic of Guatemala 
[4] 
EXCHANGE OF NOTES WITH PARAGUAY REGARDING

ROAD CONSTRUCTION

'Department of State Treaty and Other International Acts 
Series," No. 5532 
Capability of the Paraguayan Army 
Agreement effected by exchange of notes 
Signed at Asuncion February 10, 1964; 
Entered into force February 10, 1964. 
The American Ambassador to the Paraguayan Minister of 
Foreign Affairs 
ASUNCION, February 10, 1964. 
EXCELLENCY : 
I have the honor to refer to recent conversations between 
representatives of our two Governments concerning the fur­
nishing of assistance by the Government of the United States 
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of America to the Government of Paraguay for the purpose of 
promoting the defense of Paraguay by increasing the road 
construction and maintenance capability of the Paraguayan 
Army and to propose the following understanding with respect 
to this assistance: 
1. Road construction and maintenance equipment, and 
related materials and services, will be furnished for the above-
mentioned purpose subject to the terms and conditions of 
applicable United States laws and regulations, and to such 
other conditions as may be specified in arrangements between 
representatives of our two Governments. The equipment, mate­
rials and services to be provided under this agreement shall 
not be used for any purpose other than road construction and 
maintenance in Paraguay and shall not be transferred to, nor 
used by, anyone not an officer, employee or agent of the Gov­
ernment of Paraguay, without the prior consent of the United 
States Government. The Government of Paraguay will pro­
vide substantially the same degree of security protection as 
that afforded to such equipment, materials and services by 
the Government of the United States of America. 
2. The Government of Paraguay will, as the United States 
may require, permit continuous observation and review by, 
and furnish necessary information to, representatives of the 
Government of the United States of America with regard to 
the use of such equipment, materials and services, and will 
offer for return to the United States such equipment and mate­
rials when no longer needed for the purpose of road con­
struction and maintenance. 
I have the honor to propose that, if these understandings 
are acceptable to the Government of Paraguay, the present 
note and your note in reply concurring therein shall constitute 
an agreement between our two Governments, which shall 
enter into force on the date of your note. 
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest 
consideration. 
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WILLIAM P. SNOW 
His Excellency 
Dr. RAUL SAPENA PASTOR 
Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of the Republic of Paraguay 
Ascunsion 
[5] 
EXCHANGE OF NOTES WITH ARGENTINA, PROVIDING FOR

MILITARY EQUIPMENT

"Department of State Treaty and other International Acts 
Series," No. 5594 
Agreement effected by exchange of notes 
Signed at Buenos Aires May 10, 1964; 
Entered into force May 10, 1964. 
The American Ambassador to the Argentine Minister of

Foreign Affairs and Worship

BUENOS AIRES, May 10, 1964 
EXCELLENCY : 
I have the honor to refer to the enclosed agreed texts in 
English and Spanish of a Memorandum of Understanding on 
the subject of cooperation between our two Governments in 
making available military equipment, materials and services. 
Both English and Spanish texts are equally authentic. 
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Upon receipt of a note from Your Excellency indicating 
that the understandings confirmed in the enclosed agreed 
texts are acceptable to the Government of Argentina, the 
Government of the United States will consider that this note 
and your reply thereto constitute an agreement on this sub­
ject between the two governments, the agreement to enter 
into force on the date of your note in reply. 
Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest con­
sideration. 
ROBERT MCCLINTOCK 
Enclosure: Memorandum of Understanding 
His Excellency 
MIGUEL ANGEL ZAVAIA ORTIZ, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship, 
Buenos Aires. 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
The Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Republic of Argentina: 
Desiring to foster international peace and security within 
the framework of the Charter of the United Nations,5 through 
measures which will further the ability of nations dedicated to 
the purposes and principles of the Charter to participate effec­
tively in arrangements for self-defense in support of those 
principles and purposes; 
Conscious of their pledges under the Inter-American Treaty 
of Reciprocal Assistance G and other international instruments 
to assist any American State subjected to an armed attack and 
to act together for the common defense and for the mainte­
nance of the peace and security of the American continent; 
Taking account of the objectives set forth in Resolution I 
and II adopted at Punta del Este on January 31, 1962, at the 
Appendix G 293 
Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Af­
fairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in Application of the 
Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance; 
Desiring to set forth the conditions which will govern the 
furnishing of such assistance by one Government Party to the 
other; 
Have mutually agreed on the following understanding: 
ARTICLE I 
1. Each of the parties to this agreement is willing to take 
all reasonable measures, consistent with economic and political 
stability, to develop its own defense capacity, and is willing 
to participate in a cooperative program to the same ends. 
2. Each Government will make or continue to make 
available to the other such defense articles and defense services, 
or other military assistance, as the one Government may 
request and the other Government may authorize in accord­
ance with such terms and conditions as may be agreed. 
3. The furnishing of any such assistance as may be au­
thirized by either Government party hereto shall be consistent 
with the Charter of the United Nations and the Inter-Ameri­
can Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. 
4. The assistance to be furnished by the parties under 
this agreement shall be subject to the respective constitutional 
provisions and to the terms and conditions of the applicable 
laws which are in force in each country at the time of furnish­
ing such assistance, and those terms and conditions shall be 
made known. Any future amendments or additions to such 
terms and conditions shall not apply to assistance already 
furnished. Future terms and conditions under legislation will 
be made applicable through arrangements pursuant to para­
graph 5 of this article. 
5. In conformity with their respective constitutional pro­
cedures, the two Governments through appropriate representa­
tives shall, from time to time, enter into detailed arrangements 
to carry out the provisions of this agreement. Pursuant to such 
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arrangements, military assistance may be furnished either for 
the purpose of requirements based upon the above-mentioned 
Resolutions I and II adopted at Punta del Este on January 
31, 1962, or for the purpose of defense missions which are 
important to the maintenance of peace and security in the 
American Continent, in accordance with such plans as may 
be agreed to in this connection. 
6. Neither Government will, without prior agreement of 
the other Government, devote such assistance furnished to it 
to purposes other than those for which it was furnished. 
7. Arrangements will be entered into under which any 
defense articles furnished pursuant to this agreement, other 
than on a reimbursable basis, and no longer required for the 
purpose specified in the detailed arrangements provided for in 
paragraph 5 of this Article, will be offered for return and 
appropriate disposition to the Government which furnished 
such assistance. 
8. Neither Government will permit any use of defense 
articles and defense services furnished by the other Govern­
ment under this agreement by anyone not an officer, employee, 
or agent of such Government without the prior agreement of 
the Government which furnished the assistance. 
9. Neither Government will transfer, nor permit any 
officer, employee, or agent of that Government to transfer, 
such defense articles and defense services by gift or otherwise 
without the prior agreement of the Government which fur­
nished the assistance. 
10. Each of the Governments will maintain the security 
of the defense articles and defense services transferred to it by 
the other Government under this agreement, and through 
arrangements under paragraph 5 of Article I will provide the 
highest degree of security protection that the receiving Gov­
ernment would provide to its own articles and services. Where 
the items or information to be furnished carry a security clas­
sification provided by the furnishing government, such arrange­
ments shall specify the degree of security protection to be 
afforded such items or information. 
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ARTICLE II 
1. In connection with the receipt of military assistance 
under this agreement, each party will agree to accept, when 
appropriate, personnel of the other party for the purpose of 
coordinating the execution of said assistance. Such personnel 
shall be composed of citizens of the country furnishing it. 
2. The two Governments shall agree on the ranks and 
number of the above-mentioned personnel, who will perform 
the responsibilities indicated in paragraph 1 of this Article. 
Such personnel shall be granted reasonable facilities and serv­
ices, including office space, custodial services, and suitable 
motor transportation, necessary to enable them to perform 
their duties in connection with this agreement. 
ARTICLE III 
1. This agreement shall continue in force until six months 
after either Government receives from the other written notice 
of that Government's intention to terminate it. In any case, 
notwithstanding a declaration of intention to terminate this 
agreement, the provisions of paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of 
Article I, shall continue in force until the two Governments 
agree to the contrary. 
2. At the request of either Government, the two Govern­
ments will consult concerning any matter relating to an amend­
ment or change considered desirable in this agreement as a 
result of its application. 
1. Source: Department of State Bulletin, XXVI, No. 662 (March 
'3, 1952), 336 ff. 
2. For text of similar agreement with Peru, see Department of State 
press release 139 of February 22, 1952. 
3. TIAS 3283; 6 UST 2107. 
4. TIAS 3966; 8 UST 2463. 
5. TIAS 993; 59 Stat. 1031. 
6. TIAS 1838; 62 Stat. (pt. 2), 1681. 
Appendix H: "Problem Area": An Excerpt 
from "Military Civic Action" (1964), 
Prepared by the Department of the Army1 
MILITARY CIVIC ACTION 
As the result of approximately three years of experience, 
general problem areas have arisen, both in-country and in 
Washington in supporting the program. 
a. In-country problems. 
(1) Personal ambitions. 
Since civic action is designed to be a program which 
directly benefits the people, it logically has a decided impact 
on their affections and allegiances. Quite naturally, therefore. 
there will be a direct political dividend accruing to the persons 
who appear responsible for the program. The solution to this 
problem rests in having the Head of State sponsor the civic 
action program. 
(2) Bureaucratic functional jealousies. 
Since civic action is involved in many fields of 
social and economic 'development, it can be seen that it may 
extend into the functional fields of the Ministries of Health, 
Education, Economics, and Transportation, among others. To 
prevent conflicts of interest, a proper working relationship is 
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established early in the program. This problem must first be 
recognized, and then if the Head of State personally sponsors 
the program, the various ministries will hesitate to obstruct 
it. Finally, the civic action program must complement and not 
compete with the various ministerial programs. 
(3) Selection of projects is another problem area. This 
problem is one to which the Country Team must address 
itself. Its solution rests solely with the Country Team. 
(4) The "Pork Barrel." 
This problem is not unique to the United States. 
In the developing nations, according priorities to civic action 
can become a real political issue. Probably the best solution 
lies in the development of a long-range program and under­
taking projects which are of benefit to large segments of the 
population. 
(5) Problems within indigenous armed forces include: 
(a) Not all armed forces personnel will be in­
terested in doing civic action. 
(b) Armed forces units may not be located where 
civic action projects are most needed. 
(c) Other operational requirements may prevent 
military units from doing civic action. 
(d) The living conditions of the military person­
nel and their families may be as low or lower than those of 
their needy countrymen. 
(e) The personnel of the armed forces may be 
of such a low caliber that they possess little or no technical 
capability to support a civic action program. 
(6) The people themselves present certain problems. 
Since civic action is directed toward the people, the maximum 
benefit is obtained when the people can participate. For this 
reason, small, high impact, short term of completion projects 
should have high priority. Surveys must be conducted to con­
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sider the character, customs, taboos, and religious mores of 
ethnic and tribal groups which make up the population. 
b. Problem areas affecting U.S. Army support of the 
program. 
(1) Shortage of personnel trained in civic action tech­
niques. 
(2) Shortage of personnel with required language and 
area training. 
(3) Highly trained, technically qualified functional 
specialists required to support the program are in short supply. 
(4) Long lead times required to procure type of equip­
ment needed to support the program, particularly the impact 
projects. 
1. Pages 17-19. 
Appendix I: Resolution Regarding the 
Dominican Republic Adopted by the 
Tenth Meeting of Consultation of the 
American Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs, 7965 
[1] 
INTER-AMERICAN FORCE 1 
WHEREAS : 
This Tenth Meeting of Consultation at its session on May 
1, 1965, established a Special Committee composed of five of 
its members to go to the Dominican Republic to seek the re­
establishment of peace and normal conditions in the territory 
of that republic; 
The above mentioned resolution requests the governments 
of the member states and the Secretary General of the Organi­
zation of American States to extend their full cooperation to 
facilitate the work of the Special Committee; 
The formation of an inter-American force will signify 
ipso facto the transformation of the forces presently in Domini­
can territory into another force that would not be of one state 
or of a group of states but that of the Organization of 
American States, an interstatal organization, which Organiza­
tion is charged with the responsibility of interpreting the 
democratic will of its members; 
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The American states being under the obligation to provide 
reciprocal assistance to each other, the Organization is under 
even greater obligation to safeguard the principles of the 
Charter and to do everything possible so that in situations such 
as that prevailing in the Dominican Republic appropriate 
measures may be taken leading to the re-establishment of 
peace and normal democratic conditions; 
The Organization of American States being competent to 
assist the member states in the preservation of peace and the 
re-establishment of normal democratic conditions, undoubtedly 
it is also competent to provide the means that reality and 
circumstances require and that prudence counsels as adequate 
for the accomplishment of such purposes; and 
The Special Committee that went to the Dominican Re­
public, in its second message to this Meeting of Consultation, 
advises the formation of an inter-American force to achieve 
the objectives determined by the Meeting. 
THE TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS 
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
RESOLVES: 
1. To request governments of member states that are will­
ing and capable of doing so to make contingents of their land, 
naval, air or police forces available to the Organization of 
American States, within their capabilities and to the extent 
they can do so, to form an inter-American force that will 
operate under the authority of this Tenth Meeting of Consul­
tation. 
2. That this Force will have as its sole purpose, in a 
spirit of democratic impartiality, that of cooperating in the 
restoration of normal conditions in the Dominican Republic, 
in maintaining the security of its inhabitants and the inviola­
bility of human rights, and in the establishment of an atmos­
phere of peace and conciliation that will permit the functioning 
of democratic institutions. 
3. To request the commanders of the military contingents 
that make up this Force to work out directly among them­
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selves and with a committee of this Meeting the technical 
measures necessary to establish a Unified Command of the 
Organization of American States for the coordinated and 
effective action of the Inter-American Force. In the composi­
tion of this Force, an effort will be made to see that the national 
contingents shall be progressively equalized. 
4. That at such time as the Unified Command of the 
Organization of American States shall have determined that 
the Inter-American Force is adequate for carrying out the 
purposes set forth in the resolution adopted by this Meeting 
on May 1, 1965, the full responsibility of fulfilling these 
purposes shall be assumed by that Force. 
5. That the withdrawal of the Inter-American Force from 
the Dominican Republic shall be determined by this Meeting 
of Consultation. 
6. To continue in session in order to keep the situation 
under review, to receive the report and recommendations of 
the Special Committee, and in the light thereof to take the 
necessary steps to facilitate the prompt restoration of demo­
cratic order in the Dominican Republic. 
7. To inform the Security Council of the United Nations 
of the text of this resolution. 
(Adopted at the third plenary session, held on May 6, 1965) 
[2] 
UNIFIED COMMAND OF THE INTER-AMERICAN FORCE2 
(ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS FOR THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE) 
WHEREAS : 
On May 1 the Tenth Meeting of Consultation established a 
Special Committee, composed of representatives of five mem­
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ber states, to go to the city of Santo Domingo to seek the re­
establishment of peace and normal conditions; and 
At the Session held on May 6, the Meeting adopted a resolu­
tion, requesting the member states to contribute contingents 
to form an Inter-American Force that would operate under 
the authority of this Meeting and providing that the necessary 
measures would be taken for the establishment of a Unified 
Command of the Organization of American States for the 
coordinated and effective action of that Force, 
THE TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS 
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
RESOLVES: 
1. To express the thanks of this Meeting to the Special 
Committee established by the resolution of May 1, 1965, for 
the outstanding work it has done to date. 
2. To continue the existence of that Committee so that it 
may carry out the tasks that were assigned to it in that 
resolution. 
3. To request that Committee to assume the functions as­
signed to the committee referred to in paragraph 3 of the 
operative part of the resolution adopted on May 6, 1965. 
(Adopted at the sixth plenary session, held on May 10, 1965) 
[3] 
APPEAL FOR A CEASE-FIRE IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC3 
THE TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS 
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
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RESOLVES: 
To appeal once again to the parties in conflict for a cease-fire 
in order to create conditions favorable to peace and normality 
in the Dominican Republic. 
(Adopted at the ninth plenary session, held on May 19, 1965) 
[4]

PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE INTER-AMERICAN FORCE4

THE TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS

OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

RESOLVES: 
1. That the Secretary General of the Organization of 
American States shall assume the functions referred to in 
paragraph 3 of the resolution adopted by this Meeting of 
Consultation on May 6, 1965. 
2. That this Meeting shall determine the mission and ob­
jectives of the Inter-American Force in accordance with the 
sole purpose set forth in paragraph 2 of the abovementioned 
resolution of May 6. 
3. To request the Government of Brazil to designate the 
Commander of the Inter-American Force and the Government 
of the United States to designate the Deputy Commander of 
that Force. 
4. To appoint a committee composed of those members 
designated by the President of the Tenth Meeting of Con­
sultation to study the functioning and maintenance of the 
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Inter-American Force, and to present a report to the present 
Meeting of Consultation. 
(Adopted at the thirteenth plenary session, held on 
May 22, 1965. At this same session, the President 
appointed as members of the committee the Delega­
tions of Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, and the United States of America, as well 
as those of other member states that contribute con­
tingents to the Inter-American Force.) 
[5] 
AD HOC COMMITTEE FOR THE RESTORATION OF

DEMOCRATIC ORDER IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC3

WHEREAS : 
The situation prevailing in the Dominican Republic con­
tinues to be a danger to peace; and 
The Organization of American States should continue to 
exert efforts and to take the steps necessary for the prompt 
restoration of democratic order in that republic so that the 
Dominican people may freely decide their own destiny, 
THE TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS 
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
RESOLVES: 
1. To reiterate its confidence in the Secretary General of the 
Organization of American States and its gratitude for the way 
he has been carrying out the mission that the Council of the 
Organization of American States and the Tenth Meeting of 
Consultation entrusted to him. 
2. To appoint an ad hoc committee made up of representa­
tives of Brazil, El Salvador, and the United States of America,8 
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which will act on behalf of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation 
for the following purposes : 
a. To continue the task begun by the Special Committee 
and now being carried out by the Secretary General of pro­
viding good officers to all parties, for the purpose of achieving 
the establishment of a climate of peace and reconciliation that 
will permit the functioning of democratic institutions in the 
Dominican Republic and its economic and social recovery; 
b. To provide the Inter-American Force, through its 
Commander and on behalf of the Tenth Meeting of Consulta­
tion under whose authority it functions, the directives neces­
sary for the effective accomplishment of that Force's sole 
purpose as defined in paragraph 2 of the resolution adopted 
by this Meeting on May 6, 1965; and 
c. To keep the Tenth Meeting of Consultation duly in­
formed of its activities and the results thereof. 
(Adopted at the fourteenth plenary session, 
held on June 2, 1965) 
[6] 
INTER-AMERICAN PEACE FORCE 
THE TENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS

OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

RESOLVES: 
That the force created by resolution of this Meeting of 
Consultation on May 6, 1965, shall be called the Inter-Ameri­
can Peace Force. 
(Adopted at the fourteenth plenary session, held on 
June 2, 1965) 
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1. Registered as Doc. 39, Rev. 2 of the Meeting. 
2. Registered as Doc. 54, Rev. 2 of the Meeting. 
3. Registered as Doc. 82, Rev. 2 of the Meeting. 
4. Registered as Doc. 93, Rev. 2 of the Meeting. 
5. Registered as Doc. 118, Rev. 2 of the Meeting. 
6. Ambassador Ilmar Penna Marinho (Brazil), Ambassador Ramon 
de Clairmont Duenas (El Salvador), and Ambassador Ellsworth 
Bunker (United States of America) were designated by their respec­
tive governments to serve on the ad hoc committee. 
7. Registered as Doc. 118, Rev. 2 of the Meeting. 
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Burdened by seemingly insurmountable difficulties 
and marked by frequent failures, the Latin American 
experiment in civic action takes on tremendous im 
portance when considered in the light of recent 
developments in other parts of the world threatened 
by Communist subversion. These developments indi 
cate a tendency on the part of the present administra 
tion in Washington to abandon the principle by which 
civic action becomes the means of overcoming in­
surgency directed from without. Instead, as in Viet 
nam, there has been a resort to military force as a 
means of answering Communist subversion 
The success of the Latin American experiment may, 
in the long run, very well be of equal or even more 
significance than recent events in Southeast Asia. 
For we are attempting, in the Western Hemisphere, 
to discover whether a politically influential force can 
become the means for national self help in eradicat 
ing social unrest before it becomes externally im 
planted and directed insurgency. If the experiment 
should fail, the United States may well confront a 
dilemma equal to that posed by Vietnam that is dis 
turbingly closer to home. 
Willard F. Barber has had a distinguished career in 
the U.S. Foreign Service in Washington, Latin America 
and behind the Iron Curtain, as well as shorter duty 
in Burma, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey Me is now 
Lecturer in International Affairs at the University of 
Maryland. C Neale Ronning is currently visiting as 
sociate professor of Latin American affairs at the 
School for Advanced Studies of the Johns Hopkins 
University, and has taught at a number of American 
universities. During 1964 65, both Mr. Ronning and 
Mr. Barber held visiting professorships under the 
Mershon Social Science Program of the Ohio State 
University 
Designed by Harold M Stevens 
OTHER PUBLICATIONS OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCE PROGRAM OF 
THE MERSHON CENTER . . . 
THE WESTERN ALLIANCE: ITS STATUS AND PROSPECTS, edited by 
fdgar S. Furniss, Jr. $4.75 
THE UNCOMMON DEFENSE AND CONGRESS, 1945-1963, by Edward 
A. Kolodiiej. $7.50 
THE FRENCH ARMY IN POLITICS, 1945-1962, by John Steward 
Ambler. $6.50 
THE POLITICS OF BRITISH DEFENSE POLICY, 1945-1962, by William 
P Snyder $6.25 
Pamphlet! 
A Revaluation of Collective Security: The OAS in Action, by Jerome 
Slater $1.50 
Ocean Sciences, Technology, and the Future International Law of the 
Seo. by William T. Burke. $1.50 
The Dilemma of British Defense: The Imbalance between Commitments 
and Resources, by Walter Goldstein. $1.50 
The United States and the Threat to Security in Latin America, by 
tdwin Ueuwen. $1.50 
FROM YOUR BOOKSTORE OR 
OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS 
164 WEST NINETEENTH AVENUE 
COLUMBUS. OHIO 43210 
